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Abstract
This thesis studies the impact of dierent types of policy interventions on demand for human
capital in Latin America. Chapter 1 focuses on the unintended consequence (spillover eects)
of the Oportunidades program in rural Mexico. We show that the program has an indirect
eect on cervical cancer screening rates of women who were not eligible for the program but
lived in areas where the program was in operation. These eects  health externalities  can
dramatically change the assessment of the impacts of a program as well as considerations about
its design. In addition to this, we show evidence of the mechanism through which the program
operates being the weakening of the social norm of husbands' opposition to their spouses being
screened by male doctors. In Chapter 2 we show that Oportunidades is bringing families out
of poverty, which is considered here as a necessary condition to allow them to invest in human
capital. We also discuss why CCT programs can have perverse incentives on the labor supply
of eligible individuals and show that the program is not having this eect. In chapter 3 and 4
we contribute to the evidence on the impact of Early Childhood interventions. In chapter 3 we
discuss how conditional cash transfers can increase the caloric intake of very young children and
young mothers. This chapter also has some methodological content, in that it shows how to
apply a technique for estimating individual caloric intake when only household aggregate data
is available to a program evaluation setting. Results show that Oportunidades is successful at
increasing the caloric intake of young children and young mothers, while it does not seem to have
an eect at other age ranges. Chapter 4 focuses on the evaluation of the impact of a preschool
nursery program in Colombia: Hogares Comunitarios. When compared to a CCT program,
this program can be thought as a direct attack to children development, as participants (kids
age 0 to 6) in the Hogares Comunitarios receive daycare services and food at the house of a
community mother. Our evidence shows that this program can have a positive and sizeable eect
on child growth, with this result being robust to dierent instruments for participation into the
program and dierent samples. In chapter 5 we deal with the long-standing debate about in-kind
transfers vs. cash transfers and with how this relates to child nutrition. In particular, we study
how nutrient intake responds to changes in income in a sample of rural Mexican households.
This increase in income can be thought as an unconditional cash transfer to households. Our
evidence is mixed: while consumption of some key nutrients (vitamins A and C, heme iron,
calcium and fats) responds positively to an increase in income, other nutrients (energy, zinc
and protein) seem not to be aected by a change in income, with this supporting the case for
conditionalities and/or in-kind transfers.
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Introduction
Juana Maria is a mother of 4: Jaime was just born (he is 4 months), Yadira is 6
years old, Estela is 11 and Lester is 12. Her husband, José, works as a farmer in the
small plot they have; they grow some fruit and vegetables for their own consumption
and mainly maize and coee for sale. In the coee harvest season, José will typically
leave the household for a couple of months and work as a coee picker in a nca
(farm) which is around 100 miles away. During this period, the rest of the family
takes care of the small plot they farm and of the few animals they have (mainly
chickens and dogs for the moment, but one day they want to buy a cow and a few
pigs). Juana and José feel every single day that their budget constraint binds: in
good years (good harvest, high wages in the coee region), they earn an income which
is enough to feed the kids and themselves and maybe save a little. In bad years, they
have to rely on their small savings, friends and relatives to get the minimum needed
to feed the family.
Jaime, the newborn, has a long way before his family needs to start thinking
about investments in his human capital. Yadira is a very successful student in the
local primary school, which is not a surprise for people in the community: everyone
knows that Yadira tiene mucha chispa1, very much like her mother. Estela and
Lester, the older kids, should be attending secondary school at their age, but they
are not. They actually enrolled at the beginning of the academic year, but then, as
José explained in very simple words, they dropped out as their work was very much
needed in the eld with their father. In addition, Estela has always struggled with
keeping up with her peers in primary school. She is a very well-mannered kid, but
she does not speak much and she is very quiet. Juana and José know very well the
importance of education as they remember when their teachers would tell them to
continue studying. However, they continued only until primary school. They would
like to send their kids to school, but they simply cannot aord it.
In the same community of Juana and José's, there is also Don Julio. He is the
undisputed nonelected leader of the locality and he is denitely the wealthiest person
around. He owns a large nca extending more than 400 hectares, which in a normal
period would employ around 25/30 people from his and neighbor communities. His
sons work with him. Aurelio is 25 and Nestor is 30 and they are very well respected
by the employees, partly because they are the owner's sons and partly because they
1This is the Spanish for She is a very bright kid.
12
know their job very well. Last year Nestor bought a brand new moped, and this
year Aurelio decided to buy one as well. Money has never been a problem for Don
Julio and his family. They have always worked hard to a very protable use of the
land they inherited and purchased from neighbor farmers over the years. Aurelio
and Nestor have completed primary school, but no more. They could have easily
aorded the fees and the trip to one of the best secondary schools around, which is
located in the municipality's capital, but Don Julio thought the best future for his
kids was with him in the nca. Don Julio has always loved his kids, as Dona Rosa
does; she is his wife and she would have liked her kids to continue in school, but she
never really had a say in decisions about her kids' education2.
Investments in health and education are a key factor for successful and productive lives. In
developing countries, many families do not invest in human capital, or not invest enough, for
several reasons. For instance, families might simply not have enough resources to send their
kids to school or to buy nutrient-rich foods to feed their children, or they might not have good
information on the returns to investments in human capital. Specically for Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC), macroeconomic data reveal that countries in this region tend to invest less
as percentage of GDP compared to OECD countries3.
A long established literature has shown that investing in people is a good investment. Early
studies in the mid-twentieth century compared investment in human capital to those in physical
capital and concluded that investing in peoplethat is, in their skills and abilitiescould be
just as protable as investing in physical capital. In particular, Schultz (1961, 1971) empirically
showed the importance of education for productivity growth in the United States. At the
individual level, starting with Mincer (1958), who was the rst to empirically demonstrate that
education dierentials are related to dierences in wages at later stages in life, a voluminous
set of wage function estimates has grown and now it provides the basis for calculating market
returns to education for virtually every country in the world. Becker (1964) organized this
work and that of others into what we now refer to as human capital theory, which is the
foundation of much recent work on the relationship between investments in people and the
benets (both for individuals and the society as a whole). Recent reviews of studies that report
positive associations between school attainment and experience and wages or other indicators
of productivity are in Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
This early seminal work focused only on education as a form of human capital. Another
form of human capital, which originally received less much attention, is health. Conceptually,
investments in health are the foundation of any other type of investment, as health and nutrition
are intimately related to the very capacity of the body of performing tasks through which an
individual can get his schooling and generate income.4 In their review of the interrelationships
2While the people mentioned in the paragraphs above are ctional, the stories reported are based on very real
experiences we have heard in our eldwork in rural Nicaragua.
3Investments in preschool are not more than 0.6% of GDP in LAC, while are typically more than 1% of GDP
in OECD countries. See Vegas and Santibáñez (2010).
4See Chapter 8.4 in Ray (1998) for a discussion of the relationship between nutrition (health status), work
capacity and outcomes in the labor market.
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between health, nutrition and economic development, Strauss and Thomas (1998) stress how
the link between health and economic outcomes has received serious attention only recently.
Interestingly, they spell-out the main reasons why the marginal productivity of health is likely
to be higher in a developing context relative to higher-income industrialized economies. These
include the fact that levels of health are much lower in developing countries as well as that
incidence and nature of disease tends to be dierent, typically because of higher prevalence
of malnutrition and infectious diseases. The age distribution of ill health is thus more tilted
towards infants and preschool children: this has the one important implication that adults in
poorer economies are more likely to be aicted with health problems and to feel the consequences
of ill health throughout the life cycle (and not only at older ages as in advanced societies). In
addition, the structure of employment in lower income economies is such that work often relies
more heavily on strength and endurance and, therefore, on good health. They conclude that a
substantial progress has been made in documenting the existence of a causal impact of health
on wages and productivity in low-income settings.
However, despite this evidence on positive return to investments in human capital, invest-
ments are still dramatically low in developing countries. Being perfect credit markets and com-
plete information5 not more than a textbook curiosity in these settings, low level of investments
does not come as a surprise.
When thinking about investments in human capital in this thesis, we have in mind a simple
dynamic forward-looking model of human capital demand behaviors6 in which human capital
demands are determined by a series of family or individual decisions given past, current and
expected future resources, markets, policies and other institutions. The context in which these
demands are determined, in turn, reects decisions of suppliers of education and health services.
In terms of timing of the decisions, it is useful to think about three main stages: preschool (from
conception through about age 5 or 6), school ages and postschool. In particular, household de-
mands are modeled within this framework as if households are maximizing an objective function
subject to budget constraints and production functions which leads to a set of reduced-form de-
mand relations. In terms of policy impacts, estimates of the reduced-form demands typically give
the total policy impact, but with no indications of the channels or mechanisms through which
the policy is exerting its eects and with less potential for exploring counterfactual policies. On
the other hand, estimates of structural parameters7 of objective and production functions can
give insights on the underlying mechanisms and can be combined in structural models which,
typically under strong assumptions, will allow simulating counterfactual policies.
This thesis presents evidence of the impact of dierent types of policy interventions on
demand for human capital in Latin America, specically rural Mexico and Colombia. The
rst three chapters study the same intervention, Oportunidades, which is a conditional cash
5Credit constraints and information failures are commonly thought as the main explanations behind the low
level of investments. However, several other factors might be relevant including characteristics of education and
health suppliers, gender preferences and social norms.
6The characterization of the model of human capital investments we are considering here is as in Behrman
(2010).
7See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000); Keane (2010); and Heckman and Urzua (2009).
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transfer (CCT) program targeting poor households in rural Mexico. The general objective of
the program is to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. To achieve this objective,
the program's main focus is on fostering human capital accumulation of poor kids. Given its
ideal evaluation design, the program has been rigorously evaluated and it has been shown that it
has a substantial positive impact on several relevant dimensions, such as consumption, income,
and health and education outcomes.8
In particular, in chapter 1 we focus on the unintended consequence (spillover eects) of the
Oportunidades program. This chapter oers interesting contributions on two dimensions: rst,
we show that the program has an indirect eect on cervical cancer screening rates of women who
were not eligible for the program but lived in areas where the program was in operation. This
is evidence of substantial spillover eects of the program, in particular of health externalities,
which is in line with results in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009). These eects can dramatically
change the assessment of the impacts of a program as well as considerations about its design.
The other contribution of chapter 1 is about underlying mechanisms through which programs
work. In general, study of spillover eects naturally leads to attempts to unveil program channels
as the researcher typically might have only a limited idea a priori of how the program works
in terms of its unintended eects. Here, we show evidence of the mechanism through which
the program operates being the weakening of the social norm of husbands' opposition to their
spouses being screened by male doctors.
In Chapter 2 we do two things: rst, we estimate the impact of Oportunidades on the poverty
status of treated households. This a total policy impact and no attempt is made to investigate
underlying channels; however bringing families out of poverty is considered here as a necessary
condition to allow them to invest in human capital. This chapter also discusses why CCT
programs can have perverse incentives on the labor supply of eligible individuals and shows that
the program is not having this eect.
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on the impact of interventions targeted at a specic age group: early
childhood. A key issue in the literature on human capital investments has been about the best
timing when families or individuals should invest in their human skills formation. Cunha et
al. (2006) systematize the arguments which make the theoretical case for investments in early
childhood. They develop a model of skill formation that builds on Becker (1964), Becker and
Tomes (1979, 1986) and Ben-Porath (1967) which oers a number of important insights. First,
ability formation is governed by a multistage technology: there are certain given periods in one's
life (sensitive periods) in which some abilities can be produced most eectively; other abilities
can only be produced at a particular period, which can be called critical periods. The existence
of sensitive and critical periods means that the remediation of some abilities not acquired in
early childhood is impossible or prohibitively costly. Another characteristic of skill formation
is self-productivity, as skills acquired in one period persist into the next period, and those
skills acquired in one dimension (for example, self-control) can make it easier to acquire skills
in another dimension (for example, cognitive learning). Finally, skills are complementary, in
8See Skouas (2005) for a review of the impacts of the Oportunidades program. See also Levy (2005).
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that the productivity of later investments is increased by investments made in previous periods.
All these arguments make a strong case for investments at early ages: investments in school
or postschool period might not be productive at all were they not preceded by suciently
high levels of investment earlier on. In addition, investments at early ages can have important
multiplier eects later on as a result of self-productivity and complementarity. Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) calculate the rates of return to human capital investments at dierent stages of
life and show that, under standard assumptions, the rate of return if the highest for the preschool
period.9
Even if the theoretical case for investments in early childhood is sound, an open question is
the one about which type of intervention is the most eective. This question has to be answered
empirically. Schady (2006) reviews the evidence of the impact early childhood development
(ECD) interventions in the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean. He reports
that, if carefully administered, intensive preschool programs (such as the Perry Preschool Project
and the Carolina Abecedarian Project) can have very high returns in the US10, and that evi-
dence of large-scale interventions like Head Start is more mixed, although generally positive11.
Interestingly, he argues that evidence from the US cannot be easily generalized to contexts such
as countries in LAC, with this implying that specic evidence from these countries should be
sought. However, the current status of the knowledge base on the eectiveness of ECD inter-
ventions in LAC is still thin, though recent research has been trying to ll this gap, with a
promising switch towards the use of experimental evaluations.12
This thesis' contribution to the evidence on the impact of ECD interventions is twofold:
in chapter 3 we discuss how conditional cash transfers can increase the caloric intake of very
young children and young mothers. This chapter also has some methodological content, in that
it shows how to apply a technique for estimating individual caloric intake when only household
aggregate data13 is available to a program evaluation setting. We show that Oportunidades is
successful at increasing the caloric intake of young children and young mothers, while it does
not seem to have an eect at other age ranges.
Chapter 4 focuses on the evaluation of the impact of a preschool nursery program in Colom-
bia: Hogares Comunitarios. When compared to a CCT program, this program can be thought
as a direct attack to children development, as participants (kids age 0 to 6) in the Hogares Co-
munitarios receive daycare services and food at the house of a community mother. Our evidence
shows that this program can have a positive and sizeable eect on child growth, with this result
being robust to dierent instruments for participation into the program and dierent samples.
Finally, in chapter 5, we study the relationship between household income and nutrient
intake in a sample of households in rural Mexico. Studying how nutrient intake responds to
9See also the discussion of the model of Cunha and others in Schady (2006)
10See Scheweinhart (2005), Currie (2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003).
11See among others, Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Heckman and Rubin-
stein (2001), Currie (2001), and Blau and Currie (2004).
12See Gertler and Fernald (2004); Berhman, Parker and Todd (2004); Behrman, Cheng, and Todd (2004);
Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2004); Berlinski and Galiani (2005); Berlinski, Galiani and Gertler (2009);
Grantham-McGregor et al. (1997); Walker et al (2000); Powell et al. (2004).
13This methodology is as in Chesher (1997 and 1998).
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changes in income has relevant policy content, in that increases in income can be thought as
an unconditional cash transfer to households. The debate about whether to condition to some
behaviors the recipients of cash transfers is a long standing one, as it is the one about in-kind
transfers vs. cash transfers. Advocates of conditions attached to cash transfers and of in-kind
transfers typically invoke the argument that availability of more resources for the household does
not necessarily mean that this additional money will be spent on more and better nutrients. On
the other extreme, arguments are that choice sets are larger and no extra costs (to comply with
the conditionalities) are incurred by households when given unconditional cash transfers. Our
chapter shows that increases in income are associated with signicant and sizeable increases in
the consumption of vital nutrients among poor households in rural Mexico, namely vitamins
A and C, heme iron, calcium and fats, thus supporting transfers with no strings attached.
However, intake of other nutrients seems not to respond to income or show a negative elasticity.
In particular, we nd that increase in income does not seem to be a policy tool that can remedy
the deciency in energy, zinc and protein for poorer households. This could indicate a limit of
interventions that only focus on transfer of money.
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CHAPTER 1
Spillover Eects in Healthcare Programmes: Evidence on Social
Norms and Information Sharing
Screening programmes are a key healthcare priority. These programmes may have unin-
tended eects on groups other than those the programme targets. While potential spillovers
are not well understood or evaluated, their systematic assessment might change the eval-
uation or design of screening programmes and shed light on the determinants of screening
behaviour. This paper exploits the randomized research design of a large welfare programme
- PROGRESA - to study the size and determinants of spillover eects in cervical cancer
screening in rural Mexico. Cervical cancer is considered to be one of the most preventable
types of cancer, but cervical cancer mortality rates in Mexico have been dramatically high
by international standards for many years. We nd signicant evidence of spillover eects
in demand for Papanicolaou cervical cancer screening, yet there is no evidence of similar
spillovers in non-gender specic tests, such as blood pressure and blood sugar. When we
study the mechanisms that drive spillover eects we are able to distinguish between the
roles of social norms and information sharing. For women living in male headed households
there is increased demand for screening as PROGRESA undermines the social norm asso-
ciated with husbands' opposition. Among women in female headed households screening is
more frequent as a result of information sharing between those eligible and those not eligible
for the programme. Importantly, these results are conrmed when a more recent, but non
experimental, evaluation sample is used.
1.1. Introduction
Cervical cancer is the second most common cancer in women, and was responsible for 250,000
deaths in 2005, approximately 80% of them in developing countries.1 Mexico for many years has
had the highest cervical cancer mortality rates in the world (Lazcano-Ponce (1997)) and cervical
cancer is still the prime type of cancer mortality for women aged 25 and above.2 Unlike the case
with other types of cancer, early detection can virtually eliminate the mortality risk associated
with cervical cancer. In this paper we exploit the randomized research design of PROGRESA, a
large conditional cash transfer programme, to study the determinants of the decision to screen
for cervical cancer in rural Mexico.
1See Comprehensive cervical cancer control: a guide to essential practice, World Health Organization.
2See Hidalgo-Martinez (2006).
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While in many developed countries there is ongoing debate on the benets and costs of breast
cancer screening programmes, programmes aimed at detecting cervical cancer have been unani-
mously hailed as successful. Cervical cancer has recognized and well-described risk factors; there
is an identiable precancerous condition;3 and a safe and cheap test (the Papanicolaou (PAP)
smear test) for detecting precancer and cancer exists. As result, systematic use of PAP test has
led to a huge drop in cervical cancer mortality in developed countries. However, this has not
happened in developing countries.4 Mexico is one of the most striking examples here. Despite a
national screening programme being in place since 1974, the percentage of Mexican women who
regularly screen for cervical cancer is well below the average of other OECD countries. Lack
of compliance with cervical cancer screening advice is dramatically higher in rural areas where
the percentage of women who have never been screened is more than double that in the Mexico
City district (Lazcano-Ponce (1997)). While absence of screening is strongly correlated with low
socioeconomic status, the mechanisms behind this correlation are largely unexplored.
The main question we address in this paper is why, despite availability of a free service and
such a high expected payo, women in rural Mexico do not screen for cervical cancer. In order
to answer this question we exploit the randomized research design of PROGRESA, which is a
large social welfare programme in rural Mexico. The sample consists of 506 villages: 320 were
randomly assigned to be a treatment group within the PROGRESA programme, starting in May
1998, and 186 acted as controls, with the programme starting after November 1999. Data are
available for all households in every village, both poor and non-poor, although only poor house-
holds are eligible for PROGRESA. The programme has two main components in the form of
incentives. The rst provides cash transfers to households conditional on their children's school
attendance. The second provides a nancial reward to households whose members, both adults
and children, undertake regular health checks and attend health-related courses. In particular,
eligible adults have to undergo full preventive screening: both male and female household mem-
bers have their blood pressure and blood sugar tested, but the PAP smear test is female specic.
In this paper we study whether and how PROGRESA aects the demand for cervical can-
cer screening from women living in non-eligible households. Exploring the indirect eects of
PROGRESA,5 the so called Indirect Treatment Eect (ITE ), is important for a number of rea-
sons. First, there is limited evidence on the existence and magnitude of health externalities.
Christakis (2004) stresses that from a social perspective the cost eectiveness of a medical in-
tervention might change substantially if the evaluation of benets and costs takes account of
externalities.6 So far there is no large scale evidence on spillover eects across individuals in
active health-seeking behaviour.7 Second, identifying how PROGRESA aects the decision of
3The transition to cancer occurs over a period of 10 years on average (see Blumenthal and Gaykin (2005)).
4The World Health Organization estimates that 95% of women in developing countries have never been
screened for cervical cancer.
5Programmes with similar characteristics have either been or are in the process of being adopted in Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, New York city and Nicaragua.
6A related strand of literature (see Dow et al. (1999)) argues that, as implied by the competing risk model,
complementarities between diseases might alter the evaluation of cause-specic health programmes.
7Miguel and Kremer (2004) using evidence from a randomized experiment show that a deworming programme
signicantly reduced infection rates among children not treated by the programme.
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non-eligibles to screen can shed light on the determinants of the demand for screening. As Luke
and Munshi (2007) suggests, most of the existing literature fails to identify how cultural factors
and social norms aect the demand for health services. Social norms might be particularly im-
portant to explain the health related decisions of the female population.8 Others have studied
the indirect eects of PROGRESA, focusing mainly on the role of income spillovers from eligible
to non-eligible households and changes in informal credit markets.9 This paper contributes to
this literature by providing evidence that PROGRESA aects the behaviour of non-eligibles
through non-market mechanisms, such as social norms and information sharing.
We begin by studying the eect of the programme on the demand for cervical cancer screen-
ing by non-eligible households compared to the demand for non-gender specic screening tests.
In order to disentangle the eect of PROGRESA on the demand for screening from the supply,
we exploit variations in health centre waiting times across villages. Our results show that the
indirect treatment eect of PROGRESA on the demand for cervical cancer screening is positive,
non trivial and signicantly dierent from zero. We do not nd any signicant indirect eect on
the probability of screening for diabetes and high blood pressure, or attending a health centre.
We provide evidence that rules out the possibility that the indirect eect of PROGRESA on
cervical cancer screening is due to income spillovers from eligible to non-eligible households.
We also study to what extent gender related social norms and information sharing can ex-
plain the indirect eect of the programme. While the literature that studies peer eects suggests
that both mechanisms might be important (see Sacerdote (2000)), there is no empirical evidence
that distinguishes one from the other. This is mainly because rst, it is necessary to dene the
exact nature of the social norm, and second, social norms and lack of information might be
strongly correlated. There is considerable qualitative evidence collected during the evaluation of
PROGRESA (see Adato et al. (2000)) and in the course of epidemiological studies (see Watkins
et al. (2002) and Lazcano-Ponce (1997)), to show that male opposition to wives being checked
by male doctors is one of the most common reasons women give for not taking the test. In order
to disentangle the social norm eect from the lack of information we examine the substantial
heterogeneity of male and female headed households in terms of female status and cervical can-
cer risk factors. We show that while the degree of emancipation of female respondents in male
headed households is lower than in female headed households, female respondents in the latter
display lower levels of education and have higher risks of contracting cervical cancer. We sketch
a simple model of social norm diusion that shows how PROGRESA might aect the social
norm. We test the theoretical predictions of the model exploiting across-village variations in
the fraction of households eligible for the programme, and within-village variations in household
composition.
Finally, we study whether PROGRESA generates information spillovers from eligible to non-
8Boulis (2000) argues that social norms might be an important factor to explain the low rate of breast and
cervical cancer screening among ethnic and religious minorities in the US.
9Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) nd a signicant eect of the programme on consumption of non-eligible
households operating through insurance and credit mechanisms. Bobonis and Finan (2006) and Cattaneo and
Lalive (2006) nd that the programme signicantly increases school enrollment among non-eligible families
through a peer eect.
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eligible households. Exploiting dierent denitions of peer groups, we test a prediction of learn-
ing models that is not supported by alternative explanations. Models that study the adoption
of new agricultural technologies (see Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and Conley and Udry (2005))
predict that the learning externality should be bigger for farmers with lower initial information.
We use information on whether the respondent has ever used any method of contraception to
proxy for the initial level of information about sex related diseases.
We nd signicant evidence of both social norm and information sharing mechanisms. Our
results show that while the social norm mechanism mainly drives the indirect eect of the pro-
gramme on women living in male headed households, information sharing explains the eect on
female headed households.
Even though the specic focus of this paper is on rural Mexico and the impact of a con-
ditional cash transfer programme, our ndings have much wider applicability for developing
and developed countries. There is persistent controversy on the design of national screening
programmes and on target groups. Traditional approaches to evaluating the costs-benets of
screening programmes, such as the health cost eectiveness principle, fail to take account of the
externalities from eligible to non-eligible individuals. Our results suggest that spillovers might
signicantly increase the benets related to a screening programme. Although many European
countries have breast cancer screening programmes in place for women age 50-70, the percentage
of the female population that regularly screens for breast cancer varies dramatically across coun-
tries (see Avitabile et al. (2008)). Our ndings show that the design of screening programmes
should explicitly address cultural beliefs if the programme is to be eective. In the specic case
of rural Mexico an increase in the number of female health professionals would improve screening
rates and similar interventions should be considered in areas with large presence of ethnic and
religious minorities. Recent literature (see Munshi and Myaux (2006)) has stressed the role of
traditional institutions in shaping the eect of external interventions to increase growth. Our
results can be seen as evidence that large scale interventions can have indirect eects on social
norms that have negative consequences for social well being.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we provide background information on cer-
vical cancer and its prevalence in Mexico, and on other chronic diseases. Section 1.3 describes
the PROGRESA programme and the evaluation data. Section 1.4 presents the empirical method
and the baseline estimation results. Section 1.5 provides evidence on the specic mechanisms
through which the indirect eect of PROGRESA occurs. Section 1.6 concludes. Additional
robustness checks are provided in appendix A.
1.2. Background
1.2.1  Cervical Cancer in Mexico
The Human Papillomavirus (HPV) has been identied as the major cause of cervical cancer and
is found in 99.7% of cases. Out of the 100 dierent HPV types that have been characterized so
far, there is a group of 30 that are transmitted through sexual contact. HPVs are believed to be
the most common of all sexually transmitted infections and most sexually active people get at
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least one HPV infection in their lifetime, usually without knowing it. Persistent infection with a
subset of about a dozen so called `high risk' sexually transmitted HPVs, including types 16, 18,
30 and 33 can lead to the development of cervical cell change (dyskaryosis), which in turn may
lead to cancer of the cervix. The main risk factors are related to sex behaviour: early age of rst
intercourse, multiple sexual partners, early age of rst pregnancy, multiparity,10 and previous
sexually transmitted infections. Additional risk factors include smoking and malnutrition. Since
precancerous cells can be identied with the standard screening procedure, never being screened
increases the risk of contracting cancer. The most common screening procedure is the PAP
smear test. Although it is gradually being replaced by Liquid Based Cytology (LBC), the PAP
smear test has proved very successful in reducing cervical cancer mortality. Between 1950 and
1998 in the US there was a 79% reduction in the incidence of cervical cancer and a 75% decrease
in mortality; there is a unanimous consensus among specialists that most of these improvements
are due to the systematic use of the PAP test (see among others Montz (2001)). When detected
at an early stage, safe, eective and relatively inexpensive outpatient treatments are available
(see Blumenthal and Gaykin (2005)).
Following the example of developed countries, in 1974 the Mexican government started the
Cervical Cytology Screening programme (CCSP). The programme's measures11 allow for: i) all
women to be screened free of charge regardless of their age; ii) health professionals to invite
women in the age group 25-64 for screening, with particular attention to those with high risk
factors; iii) written or verbal invitations to screen for all rural households with at least one woman
aged 25 or over. Women who present two normal cytologies for two consecutive years are invited
to screen every three years.12 Despite this programme being in place, the adjusted mortality
rate gap between Mexico and other developed and developing countries has been increasing over
time (see Figure 1.1). According to the statistics provided by the National Health programme
in 2000 the average cervical cancer mortality for women aged 25 or above was 20 over l00,000.
Four states covered by the PROGRESA programme (Veracruz, Michoacán, Guerrero and San
Luís Potosi) display an average mortality above the national average. While this high mortality
might be due in part to the poor quality of health provision,13 the main cause is the low take
up of screening. OECD data for 2002 show that only 38.9% of Mexico's female population in
the age group 20-69, were screened for cervical cancer in the previous three years, compared to
84.8% in the US (see Table 1.1). The National Health Survey (ENSA) 2000, which was designed
to identify the health status of the entire Mexican population, reports that in 2000 only 27.4%
of the female population aged 20 or over was screened for cervical cancer in the previous 12
months. 67.3% of the women who were screened received the results of the screening, and 9.3%
were diagnosed as either a carcinoma or a dysplasia.
10Controversy exists over the causal explanation for this correlation. While some studies suggest that the
physiological process in the last two trimesters of pregnancy modies the host-immune response, others focus on
the trauma of the cervix during delivery.
11The programme has been constantly modied and improved and the last change was passed by law on
31/05/2007.
12This is the recommended screening frequency in the UK and US for women in the age group 25-49.
13Flisser et al. (2002) nds that inadequate supply of reagents and inadequate laboratory facilities increases
the failure rate of the PAP test.
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1.2.2  Previous studies
As cervical cancer has for many years been considered a major health issue, there is an extensive
epidemiological literature on the determinants of cervical cancer mortality in Mexico. Lazcano-
Ponce (1997) carried out a cross-sectional study in two geographic regions of Mexico, Oaxaca
(rural area) and Mexico City (urban area) to study the determinants of participation in the
CCSP. This study found that non-compliance is strongly associated with low socioeconomic
status and high reproductive risk. In Mexico City 35.8% of women (compared to 70% in Oaxaca)
reported that they had never had a PAP smear test. A high proportion of women (20.3% in
Mexico City vs 59.5 % in Oaxaca) were not correctly informed about what the test detects. In
rural areas, many women reported they did not seek testing because their partners would not
allow it. Watkins et al. (2002) conducted a pilot study using direct interviews to learn about
factors that may inuence cervical cancer screening among rural Mexican women. In a sample
of 97 rural women between the ages of 16 and 66 the most frequent reason for not seeking
a PAP smear was anxiety regarding physical privacy (50%). Less frequent reasons were lack
of knowledge (18%) and diculty accessing healthcare (14%). Other studies stress that while
most women know what the PAP test is for, they do not perceive themselves to be at risk (see
Lazcano-Ponce (2001)).
Cultural barriers to cervical cancer screening were also documented in the PROGRESA
evaluation. Adato et al. (2000), in their study of the operational performance of PROGRESA,
report that when asked about the main diculties related to the programme's health component,
doctors often mentioned problems encountered by male colleagues over family planning advice
and the preventive PAP smear test. Most doctors agreed that the PAP smear was the most
dicult for women because many men were opposed to their wives having the test, and especially
if it were done by a male doctor. However, discussions with beneciaries and non-beneciaries14
suggest that PROGRESA fostered better acceptance of the PAP test.
1.2.3  Prevalence of and screening for other chronic diseases
This section provides information on the prevalence of and screening rates for diabetes mellitus
and high blood pressure using ENSA data. Among men (women) 8.5% (12.1%) of those aged
20 or above have been screened for diabetes and had a prevalence of 7.2% (7.8%). Among the
states covered by PROGRESA, Guerrero, Hidalgo and Veracruz have an average prevalence
higher than the national average. Prevalence among the non educated is 15.1% versus 4.8% for
graduates. 10.9% (15.7%) of men (women) aged 20 or over had their blood pressure checked in
2000. The prevalence of hypertension is 30.7% for the total sample, with 32.6% for men and
29.0% for women. Prevalence of hypertension was highest among women aged 60-69 (48.1%).
22.9% of women graduates are aected by hypertension as opposed to 44% among non educated
women.
Men and women in the age range 30-45, with no signicant risk factors, are invited for
diabetes screening every three years. Men and women aged 45 and over are recommended to have
14See p. 135 in Adato et al. (2000).
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an annual diabetes test, and men and women aged 30 and over are advised to have their blood
pressure checked annually. Women receive free screening under the Woman's Health programme
(Programma de Salud de la Mujer); to our knowledge, there are no special arrangements for
men.
1.3. The PROGRESA programme
1.3.1  The food and health component
The PROGRESA programme15 was launched by the Mexican government in 1997 to alleviate
poverty by fostering human capital accumulation. The programme oers two benets: it provides
cash transfers to households conditional on their children's attendance of primary and secondary
school. It also provides transfer and nutritional supplements conditional on attendance in health
programmes oered at local facilities.16 The basic requirement for eligible households to receive
the health and nutrition component is regular visits to local health centres. Children less than 24
months old and pregnant women are required to have screening on a continuous basis throughout
the year, lactating women and children age 2-4 years old are required to have two health checks
per year, and all individuals aged 17 or over are required to have an annual check up. The
health centre visits include family planning advice, prenatal, childbirth and puerperal care,
vaccinations, prevention and control of high blood pressure and diabetes mellitus, preventive
treatment and screening for cervical cancer. In addition, beneciaries are asked to attend health
and nutrition talks (known as platicas).17 In principle the cash transfer is conditional on all
members of the household having met these criteria before payment is received. For the period
July to December 1999 the value of the cash grant for food consumption was 125 pesos18 per
month (on average this corresponds to a quarter of the household's monthly income).
While mainly aimed at increasing the demand for health services, the food and health com-
ponent also includes four actions to improve the supply of healthcare: (i) ensuring adequate
supply of equipment to health centres; (ii) encouraging sta working in remote rural areas to
continue there on a long-term basis; (iii) ensuring that health-care units have the necessary
medicines and material (including educational health materials to distribute to families); (iv)
providing training to improve the quality of medical care and the operational dimensions of the
health service.
15Under the Fox administration the programme was renamed Oportunidades.
16The programme was initially oered to 140,544 households in 1997, and was expanded to more than 2.6
million recipient households by the end of 1999. This represents approximately 40% of all rural families (Skouas
(2005)).
17Platicas are directed mainly to mothers, but other family members as well as non-beneciaries are invited
to attend. Various aspects of health and nutrition are discussed, with special emphasis on preventive healthcare.
This includes ways of reducing health risks (e.g. prenatal care, early detection of malnutrition), how to recognize
signs and symptoms of sickness, how to follow appropriate primary-care procedures.
1810 pesos is approximately US 1$.
24
1.3.2  Data and eligibility criteria
The experimental data contain information on households from a sub-sample of 506 poor rural
villages in seven states: 320 villages were randomly assigned to the treatment group and started
receiving the benets of the programme from May 1998, while 186 villages were randomized
out and did not receive treatment until the end of 1999. The sample initially included 24,077
households. Eligibility for the programme was based on poverty level, as dened by a measure of
permanent income based on the information collected in the September 1997 census of villages.
There were two rounds of selection for eligible households in PROGRESA: 52% of households
were classied as poor in 1997 and were therefore eligible for cash transfers. In October 1998, 54%
of households initially classied as non-poor, were added to the beneciary group.19 Households
were informed that, once classied either as poor or non-poor, their status and thus eligibility
would not change until November 1999, irrespective of any income variation. Two features of
PROGRESA are particularly interesting for our analysis. First, households were clearly informed
about their eligibility status and the conditionalities, mainly through village assemblies. Hence
take-up rates among eligibles were over 90%. Second, within the household, it was the women
who were the recipients of the cash transfers. All residents of both control and treatment
villages were interviewed at roughly six month intervals: twice before the programme started
(the October 1997 wave and the March 1998 wave) and again in October 1998, May 1999 and
November 1999.
Households fall into four groups of eligible, and non-eligible households, in treatment and
control villages. Only the eligible households in treatment villages received the PROGRESA
transfer.
In the March 1998, October 1998 and May 1999 waves every respondent (usually female)
was asked about three dierent types of screening: cervical cancer (via the PAP smear test),
diabetes (blood sugar test) and hypertension (blood pressure testing). In the March 1998 wave
respondents were asked whether any household member had been screened in the previous
12 months; in the following two waves this question referred to the previous six months. In
addition, in March 1998 respondents were asked about sex related behaviour, including whether
contraceptive methods were used, total number of pregnancies and whether or not they had a
PAP smear test done.
PROGRESA also collected information about dierent aspects of health provision at both
the village and individual level. The October 1997 and October 1998 locality questionnaires
included detailed questions about the type of health infrastructures and services available in the
village. The socio-economic questionnaires administered to the March 1998 and October 1998
waves elicited specic information about the main characteristics of any health centres attended
by any of the household members in the previous six months . Questions enquired about centre
opening times, cost of visits, waiting times before being seen, length of visits and whether or
19These are usually referred to as densicados. A non-random subset of these households began receiving
PROGRESA transfers in treatment villages prior to November 1999. As no precise algorithm exists to determine
which densicados received transfers in treatment villages, there is no counterfactual set of households in control
villages.
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not they had received medicines from the doctor.20
In 2003, a new follow up round of data and a new control group, consisting of communities
where Progresa had yet to be received and chosen through propensity score matching, was
brought into the evaluation. The 2007 Rural Evaluation Survey (ENCEL) collected data on the
original evaluation sample21 and the 2003 control localities.
Unlike the evaluation sample, information on screening decisions are at individual level. All
women younger than 50 living in the household were asked if they screened for cervical cancer.
Additional questions ask about screening for breast cancer, hypertension, diabetes and choles-
terol. Among others, the 2007 survey contains two additional modules that are particularly
relevant for our purposes. The health center questionnaire asks the center administrators an
exhaustive set of questions about characteristics of the center, number and type of services of-
fered, technical equipment, number, tenure and working hours of both doctors and nurses. There
is also a doctors questionnaire that collects information on socio-demographic characteristics,
specializations, training and current practices. In particular doctors are asked the frequency
at which they either perform or advice gender specic screenings, i.e. PAP smear test and
mammogram.
In the matched sample of localities belonging to the evaluation sample and those that acted
as controls in 2003, there are 165 localities with at least one health center. Among them, at
least one doctor operates regularly in 133 localities and for 128 of them we have information
directly elicited from doctors.
1.4. Empirical Analysis
1.4.1  Preliminary descriptives
This section provides descriptive evidence on the pre-programme levels of screening and how
they vary over time, by eligibility status in the treatment and control villages. It also provides
a description of how healthcare supply changes over time in treatment and control villages.
In order to compare screening levels during the operation of the programme with those
before, we calculate the cumulative probability that any household member is screened either in
the six months before October 1998 or in the six months before May 1999. This measure can be
directly compared with the March 1998 information. While pre-programme screening rates for
high blood pressure and blood sugar show small and insignicant dierences between treatment
and control villages for both eligibles and non-eligibles, the dierence for PAP tests at March
1998 is bigger and especially for non-eligible households, but not signicant (see Table 1.2).22
Our results are consistent with those of Berhman and Todd (1999), who studied the quality of the
randomization comparing the equality of the distributions for many characteristics both at village
20Additional information about the competence and availability of doctors and nurses and how easy it was to
understand what they were told, is also available.
21Communities with very small populations (less than 20 households) were not resurveyed in 2007
22In the group of non-eligibles the screening rates of the densicados households in March 1998 are signicantly
lower than those of households whose eligibility status was not revised. For example, the average screening rate
for cervical cancer among densicados is 29.7% compared to 39.7% for non-densicados.
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and household (only for the group of eligibles) level. Screening rates show a sharply increasing
trend over time for eligibles and non-eligibles in both the treatment and control villages: this
result is consistent with the increase in the health supply coverage for treatment and control
villages, which we refer to later in this section. In order to measure how screening rates change
after programme implementation, we estimate an unconditional Dierences in Dierences (DD)
linear model, with standard errors clustered at village level. As expected, the screening rates
for eligibles show a remarkable increase for all the tests (on average above 20%). Among non-
eligibles, blood pressure and blood sugar screening rates do not change signicantly between
the treatment and control groups. In contrast, the DD response for cervical cancer screening is
strong and signicantly dierent from zero: there is a 6.3% increase in the PAP test take up
rate for non-eligibles in treatment villages (see Table 1.2).
One of the distinctive criteria for a village to be included in the PROGRESA programme
was the presence of basic health services. The upper panel of Table 1.3 provides evidence on
the health providers coverage in the PROGRESA villages and how the composition between
treatment and control villages varies over time. Consistent with previous work that studied the
quality of the random assignment,23 we nd that, at the baseline, the proportion of villages with
at least one major health provider does not dier signicantly between treatment and control
villages. In Mexico there are two main public providers for households not covered by insurance:
Health Secretary (SSA) and IMSS Solidaridad. In October 1997, 13% of the control villages had
SSA clinics, compared to 8% of treatment villages with a dierence signicant at 10%. By Oc-
tober 1998 the proportion of villages with at least one SSA hospital does not dier signicantly
between treatment and control villages. No signicant changes are observed in the fraction of
villages covered by IMSS Solidaridad clinics.24
Only 4% of the PROGRESA sample is covered by the IMSS insurance.25 This explains why
the presence of IMSS hospitals is fairly small in the PROGRESA villages and does not vary
signicantly between treatment and control villages either at the baseline or at October 1998.
The auxiliary health units are usually in rather inaccessible rural locations, where populations
vary between 500 and 1,000 inhabitants. They can usually rely on the presence of one general
practitioner. The mobile health units are composed of both medical and paramedic sta who
oer a full set of ambulatory services. Auxiliary health units and mobile units are the most
common providers in PROGRESA villages. At the baseline there is a bigger proportion of vil-
lages with at least one auxiliary health unit in control villages, while in October 1998 coverage
does not dier signicantly between treatment and control villages. By contrast, the proportion
23See Berhman and Todd (1999).
24At national level 42% of all Mexican hospitals are run by SSA. IMSS Solidaridad is a programme launched
by the Mexican Government in cooperation with Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) to reach rural
populations in marginal areas. The programme currently provides healthcare for 10.6 million Mexicans, 1.2
million of whom benet from the PROGRESA-Oportunidades programme. In July 2000 the programme has
been renamed IMSS Oportunidades.
25Participation is compulsory for workers employed in the formal sector. The self-employed can join on a
voluntary basis. Public employees are covered by the Institute of Social Security for Public Employees (ISSSTE)
but they represent a negligible fraction of the PROGRESA sample. At national level, IMSS and ISSSTE clinics
make up approximately 33% of all hospitals and 12% of the ambulatory care facilities.
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of villages served by mobile units is higher for treatment than control villages in October 1997
but becomes signicantly not dierent once the PROGRESA programme is in place. While on
average SSA and IMSS Solidaridad hospitals are bigger, and better equipped than health aides
centres and mobile units, all oer the three types of screening tests.
The lower panel of Table 1.3 provides evidence on some health supply outcomes. The average
number of health services available in the village26 increases sharply in October 1998, but does
not dier signicantly between treatment and control villages. Taking account of the village av-
erages of individual responses, we can provide evidence on average waiting times for individuals
to be seen, opening times of centres, average duration of visits and consultation fees. Baseline
dierences between treatment and control villages are not signicant, except for duration of
visits, which is slightly longer in non-treatment than in treatment villages. PROGRESA does
not result in signicant changes in waiting times, opening times or visit duration.
While cervical cancer screening is provided free of charge for both eligibles and non-eligibles
under the CCSP, women could decide to undertake this screening within a more general medical
consultation. In this case the fee charged by the doctor for the visit would represent the real
cost of the screening. For the October 1998 wave the average consultation fee for treatment and
control villages dropped dramatically, but the reduction is signicantly bigger for the treatment
villages. This is due to the eligibles accessing health centres free of charge as part of the pro-
gramme conditionalities.27 These results, along with the screening coverage described above,
suggest that health services were strengthened equally in treatment and control villages, pro-
ducing an increase in the number of services available and a reduction in prices for both groups.
Improvements in health facilities in the control villages might have been carried out ahead of
the programme implementation at the end of 1999. This is consistent with the observed upward
trend in screening rates for non-eligibles in the treatment and control villages. However, as
noted above, only cervical cancer screening diers signicantly between treatment and control
villages (see Table 1.2).
1.4.2  Model of demand and supply of screening
In this section we propose a framework to identify how PROGRESA can aect the demand for
screening from non-eligible households. The model draws on the literature that relates wait-
ing times to service demand and supply (see Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), Gravelle (1990),
Blundell and Windmeijer (2000)). In this framework the village average waiting time acts as
the price of the health services for households in the community. There are two main reasons
why we chose waiting time rather than a more `standard' price. First, screening tests are free
for women independent of the status of the village and the health provider. Second, the aver-
age consultation fee would not represent the true cost sustained by non-eligibles in treatment
villages, as eligibles access health facilities for free as part of the conditionalities.
26These are taken from the 7 services listed in the locality questionnaire: prenatal care, delivery care, infant
care, vaccination, diarrhoea treatment, family planning and hospitalization.
27Our estimates show a small and insignicant indirect treatment eect of PROGRESA on the consultation
fee, as opposed to a negative, sizeable and signicant treatment eect for eligibles.
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Formally, in each village j there are NNEj non-eligible households and N
E
j  Nj   NNEj
eligible households. Within non-eligible households, each individual will be assumed to under-
take screening at any point in time if it yields a greater expected utility than non-screening,
where the uncertainty is due to the probabilistic nature of the disease being screened.28 For
each member of household i the net benet of screening is assumed to be positively correlated
with the expected payo of the test, and negatively correlated with the average waiting time to
access health services in the village, Wj . Since the data only provide information on whether at
least one household member was screened, we model the demand for screening at the household
level. Let qNEij be a binary variable that takes the value 1 if at least one member of household i
in village j is screened, and 0 otherwise.
While in the next sections we will provide evidence on the mechanisms through which PRO-
GRESA aects the expected benet from screening, in this section we want to test whether
PROGRESA has a signicant eect on the demand for screening. The reduced form demand
equation for screening of household i in village j can be written as:
qNEij = 1(Xij ; Tj ;Wj ; vij) (1.1)
where 1() is an indicator function. Xij is a set of socio-demographic characteristics of
household i in village j, Tj takes the value 1 if village j is covered by PROGRESA, and 0
otherwise; Wj is the average waiting time to access a generic health centre in village j. vij
represents the unobserved characteristics correlated with the decision to screen. The aggregate
demand for preventive screening in village j is given by:
Dj =
NNEjX
i=1
qNEij +
Nj NNEjX
k=1
qEkj (1.2)
where Dj represents the proportion of both eligible and non-eligible households that demand
for screening and is negatively correlated with Wj . We assume that in each period the supply
of health facilities in the village, Sj , is given and is inelastic with respect to Wj . The market
for screening services is in equilibrium if the observed waiting time, Wj , is equal to the waiting
time W j at which demand and supply of screening intersect:
Dj = Sj ,Wj = W j (1.3)
While we want to test whether the programme aects the demand for screening from non-
eligible households, qNE , eq. 1.2 and eq. 1.3 show that the programme might aect the screening
rate of non-eligibles through two dierent mechanisms. First, the higher demand of eligible
households might crowd out the demand for screening by non-eligible households. Second, health
supply, Sj , might improve in PROGRESA villages, beneting both eligibles and non-eligibles.
The underlying assumption of the model is that these two mechanisms aect qNEij through the
waiting time, Wj .
28Another potential source of uncertainty that we do not consider in this work is related to the eectiveness of
the treatment once the disease has been diagnosed (see Picone et al. (2004)).
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In order to estimate the eect of PROGRESA on the demand for screening from non-eligible
households we estimate the following demand equation with a probit model:
qNEij = (
0Xij + Tj + 1Wj + 02Hj + vij) (1.4)
Xij includes household head's characteristics,
29 the proportion of eligibles in the village, the
total number of households in the village and state xed eects. Hj is a vector of the dummy
variables that control for the type of provider in the village.
We are interested in estimating the indirect treatment eect of PROGRESA (ITE) on the
demand for screening, namely the parameter 30 in eq. 1.4. Since waiting time aects the
screening decisions of non-eligibles, and waiting time can be aected by the screening decisions
of non-eligibles (as well as of eligibles), positive demand shocks will lead to longer waiting times,
so that waiting time and the error term are positively correlated. Although the elasticity of
demand for screening with respect to the waiting time is not relevant for our purposes, the
endogeneity of Wj would threaten identication of the ITE if Wj and Tj are correlated. In
our empirical analysis we account for this possibility by instrumenting the waiting time with
variables that can aect it only through the supply side.
Three basic assumptions are needed to identify the ITE of PROGRESA on the demand for
screening. First, we assume there are no spillover eects from treatment to control villages, so
that the demand for health services is driven by whether they live in a treatment village or not
and not by the status of other villages. Second, we assume a random assignment of villages into
treatment and control groups. This is equivalent to assuming that whether a household is in
a treatment or a control village is independent of unobservables that might aect the demand
for health services. These two assumptions of no cross village spillovers and random assignment
are standard requirements for the identication of the ITE31 and are equivalent to assuming
that non-eligibles in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for non-eligibles in treatment
villages in terms of health service utilization. To provide support for the rst assumption we
note that villages were included in the evaluation data because they were geographically distant.
With respect to the second assumption, it has already largely documented (Schultz (2004) and
Berhman and Todd (1999)) that household and village characteristics do not signicantly dier
across treatment and control villages, which is consistent with the random assignment. Third, we
assume that PROGRESA aects the health supply only through waiting time and composition
of health providers. While this assumption might at rst seem overly strong, in the next section
we provide evidence to support it.
Since we cannot completely rule out the presence of pre-programme dierences in the preva-
29These controls are household head's gender, age and its square, literacy status, whether (s)he speaks the
indigenous language, the household poverty index, the household's size, number of children, whether there are
females in the age group 25-64, and the proportion of women over 18 with a secondary school degree.
30In a probit model the marginal eect is a function of the coecient as well as of the derivative of the
conditional density function. For notational simplicity, in this work we will use the coecient when referring to
the marginal eect.
31See Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) and Angelucci et al. (2007).
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lence of a certain disease and/or the possibility to screen for it,32 we estimate eq. 1.4 using a
DD strategy.
1.4.3  Baseline results
We rst estimate the ITE of PROGRESA, as described in eq. 1.4, on four dierent outcomes:
testing for cervical cancer, diabetes and hypertension and the probability of at least one visit to
health centres. The marginal eect of the interaction between the treatment status of the village
(T ) and the survey round when PROGRESA was rst in place (98o) presented in Table 1.4
measures the eect of the programme on the demand for screening of non-eligibles. PROGRESA
leads to a 5.5% increase in the demand for cervical cancer screening among non-eligibles. Com-
paring this eect with the overall increase due to the programme shown in Table 1.2, suggests
that the variation in health supply plays a fairly limited role in explaining the indirect eect of
the programme on cervical cancer screening. Later in this section we provide a more accurate
benchmark to assess the size of the demand eect with respect to the supply eect. We do not
nd any signicant evidence of ITE on either demand for other types of screening or health
centre attendance.
We now compare the ITE with the average treatment eect on eligibles, the so called treat-
ment on the treated eect (TTE ). Table 1.5 shows that there is a signicant increase of over
20% in the probability of an individual undertaking the screening tests. The treatment eect for
the eligibles on the probability of accessing a health centre is around 16%.33 While there is no
evidence of the eect of PROGRESA on the screening behaviour of eligibles, the TTE on health
centre visits is consistent with previously documented eects of PROGRESA on health centre
attendance.34 The presence of a SSA, an IMSS Solidaridad clinic and a medical aid centre sig-
nicantly increases the level of screening for both eligibles and non-eligibles. Due to the limited
IMSS social insurance coverage, the presence of an IMSS clinic has either a negative or a not
signicant eect on the access to health services. We would expect the waiting time coecient
to be upwardly biased because of the reverse causality problem and this could account for the
positive coecient in Table 1.4.
We address possible endogeneity by instrumenting the waiting time with the average weekly
opening days of health providers in the village, and its square. The validity of the instrument
relies on two assumptions. First, that the opening days of a health service aect the screening
probability only through the waiting time. Second, that the opening times do not change in
response to the increased demand for health services driven by the programme. Potential vio-
lation of the rst assumption would arise if health providers that are better equipped for the
performance of screening tests are open on more days, but we found no evidence of this.35 In
32This might be related to the distance from a bigger hospital where screening tests can be performed more
accurately and more quickly.
33In March 1998 and October 1998 respondents were asked about health centre attendance in the previous 6
months.
34Gertler (2004) using hospital data found that in 1998 the number of visits was about 8% higher in treatment
than in control villages.
35When we control for the type of providers that operate in the village we do not nd any signicant correlation
between the number of services available in the village and the opening times either at the baseline of October
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support of the second assumption, in the previous section we showed that there is no signi-
cant change in opening times once PROGRESA is implemented. Table 1.6 shows that when
we control for the possible endogeneity of waiting time both the ITE and the TTE are in line
with those discussed above.36 These results can be read as evidence that the programme had
a non-trivial indirect eect on the demand for female specic screening, compared with a small
and insignicant eect on non-gender specic health outcomes. Since our ultimate goal is to
understand how the indirect eect on the demand for cervical cancer screening is related to its
gender specic nature, we need to explore a variety of mechanisms.
First, because of the income spillover from eligible to non-eligible households already docu-
mented in previous works (Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009)), the programme might have shifted
upward the demand for health services from non-eligible households. Hence, women are being
screened for cervical cancer more often just as result of the higher propensity to use health ser-
vices among non-eligibles. While the lack of a signicant eect on other health outcomes seems
to exclude this explanation, we provide further evidence by testing whether the programme
increased non-eligibles' expenditure on medicines and consultations with a doctor. The results
in Table 1.7 do not show any signicant evidence of ITE on health related expenditure. This
nding is consistent with the results in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), which did not nd any
indirect eect on the consumption of durable goods. We also do not nd any signicant evidence
of a treatment eect on the eligibles. This might be related to the fact that poor households
receive medicines and treatment under the programme. Taken together, these results suggest
that the signicant response for non-eligibles in terms of cervical cancer screening is not due to
an increased demand for health services generally, from non-eligible households.
So far we have assumed that PROGRESA would aect the supply of health services by in-
creasing the amount of health provision. This is a restrictive assumption. As emerged from the
description of the food and health component, PROGRESA might have improved the `quality'
of the health supply in treatment villages. In particular, since the programme is mainly targeted
at pregnant and lactating women, doctors operating in treatment villages might have gained a
better knowledge of female specic conditions either by attending training courses or receiving
specic guidelines. This might explain the signicant indirect eect on cervical cancer screening
but not on other screening procedures. In order to investigate this opportunity, we estimate the
ITE on two prenatal care outcomes: the number of checks during pregnancy and whether the
pregnant woman was administered a tetanus vaccination. The rationale behind this is straight-
forward: if the programme has improved the ability of the doctors to deal with female specic
issues, we should observe a change in pregnancy related outcomes as well. Results in Table
1.8 display a negative and insignicant indirect eect of the programme on pregnancy related
outcomes, as opposed to a positive average treatment eect for eligibles. Another potential issue
related to the quality of health providers might be related to the substitution of public care with
1998.
36In order to check the validity of the village waiting time as a measure of the health services, we allow the
treatment eect to interact with the waiting time. The sign of the interaction is negative and signicantly
dierent from zero.
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private care. Consistent with the ndings of Gertler (2000), we do not nd any evidence of a
change of healthcare provider for non-eligible households.
We have shown that PROGRESA has a large and signicant eect on the demand for cer-
vical cancer screening from non-eligibles. We now try to assess the size of this demand eect
compared to the supply eect. Table 1.3 shows that in control villages between October 1997
and October 1998 there was an increase in the number of villages with at least one major health
provider and a reduction in the proportion of villages covered by a SSA hospital. In the same
time interval, there has been a signicant increase in the number of available services and a re-
duction in the average consultation fee. Since households living in control villages would receive
the cash transfer only at the end of 1999, we study how screening behaviour varies over time in
control villages in order to isolate the eect of changes in health supply due to the programme.
In Table 1.9 we present the results of two specications, the second of which includes a full set
of supply controls at village level, including the distance from a SSA hospital and the number
of services available.37 In the rst specication the time dummy captures variations related and
unrelated to the programme. When we include the supply-side characteristics the estimated
coecient on the time dummy shrinks for all three screening tests. Reassuringly, the eect
of supply is relatively small. For the group of non-eligibles changes in supply account for an
approximate 1% increase in the probability of cervical cancer screening over time. This result
allows us to conclude that the indirect eect of PROGRESA on the demand for cervical cancer
screening is about ve times greater than the eect of changes in supply. The coecients of the
distance from a SSA hospital and the number of available services are signicant and have the
expected sign.
Our results are robust to a variety of checks. In appendix A we present some results for
specic checks. The lack of a signicant eect on non-gender specic health outcomes might
hide responses to the programme that vary dierentially with the age and gender composition
of the household. While systematic screening for cervical cancer is recommended mainly for
women in the 18-30 age group, it is recommended that blood pressure and blood sugar levels
are checked annually only after the age 45. In order to test whether the eect of PROGRESA
on screening for high blood pressure and high blood sugar is greater for households that include
at least one woman aged 45 or over, we split the sample of non-eligibles and estimate the model
in eq. 1.4 for each separately. Table A1 shows that for both samples the ITE on blood pressure
and blood sugar screening and health centre visits is not signicantly dierent from zero. The
ITE on cervical cancer screening is above 5% and strongly signicant for both samples.
We also test the validity of the waiting time as the "price" of the screening services in the
village. While the consultation fee calculated as the average of the prices paid by the entire
village population would be a lower biased measure of the monetary cost paid by non-eligible
households for health checks, we estimate eq. 1.4 taking village price as the average fee paid by
the non-eligibles. Even though the marginal eect of the price should be interpreted with care,
37Villages with a SSA hospital not included in the evaluation sample might be closer to the control villages.
We assume that the over time variation in the distance as measured in our sample is a good proxy for changes
in the availability of SSA hospitals.
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estimates of the ITE conrm our earlier conclusions (see Table A2).
To summarize, the evidence suggests that the magnitude of the ITE on the demand for
cervical cancer screening is non-trivial. Also, the response to PROGRESA from non-eligible
households is not driven by changes in the "quantity" or the "quality" of supply. Unlike existing
studies on the indirect eect of PROGRESA on consumption, we found no evidence that the
ITE is due to income spillovers from eligibles to non-eligibles. Understanding how this eect is
related to the gender specic nature of the test is the objective of the next section.
1.5. Transmission mechanisms
We formally test for two mechanisms (not necessarily exclusive) that might explain how PRO-
GRESA has increased the demand for cervical cancer screening from non-eligibles, i.e. social
norms and information sharing.
By social norm we mean that the individual decision to seek screening for cervical cancer is
socially regulated. Descriptive evidence discussed in section 1.2.2 suggests that one of the most
common reasons for women not having the PAP test is fear of their partners' reaction, especially
if the test is performed by a male doctor.
By information sharing we mean that women who have been screened for cervical cancer
might share information with their own peers about the existence and the nature of the PAP
technology and also other information received from the doctors. This latter might include
information about potential risk factors involved in lack of systematic screening and sexual
behaviour.
Since both female status and information about cervical cancer risk factors are strongly
correlated with socio-economic status, it is a priori dicult to distinguish between them. The
strategy we adopt in this paper to separate the two exploits the substantial heterogeneity between
male and female headed households in terms of female status and cervical cancer risk factors.
In this section we show that while female respondents in male headed households display higher
levels of formal education and lower risks of contracting cervical cancer than those in female
headed households, the latter are more emancipated and less likely to be aected by the gender
bias. Therefore, if PROGRESA aects the screening decisions of non-eligibles by reducing the
cost of the social norm, we would expect this eect to be stronger in the sample of male headed
households. On the other hand, if the programme generates information spillovers about dierent
aspects of cervical cancer screening, the indirect eect should be stronger in the sample of female
headed households.
At the baseline 14% of the 11,558 non-eligible households are female headed of which 71% are
widows. First, we test whether the screening behaviour of male and female headed households
systematically diers and whether the ITE eect of PROGRESA on screening behaviour varies
with the gender of the household head. The results in Table 1.10 show that the dummy that
controls for the gender of the household head has a large and signicant negative eect on
the probability of screening for cervical cancer. While living in a female headed households
increases the probability of screening for high blood pressure, it is negatively correlated with
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the probability of screening for diabetes. In both cases the estimated marginal eects are much
smaller than for cervical cancer screening. This result can be interpreted as evidence that there
are no systematic dierences in the screening for non-gender specic diseases between male and
female headed households.
The ITE eect of PROGRESA on the probability of screening for cervical cancer does not
vary signicantly with the gender of the household head and is large and signicant for both
male and female headed households. Results for blood pressure and blood sugar tests conrm
that the programme has no indirect eect on the probability of screening for non-female specic
screening diseases, irrespective of the gender of the head of household.
We also examined how observable characteristics correlated with the risk of contracting the
cervical cancer are distributed in the sample of male and female headed households. The upper
panel of Table 1.11 shows that female heads are on average older and less educated. Male and
female headed households are not signicantly dierent when measured on the poverty index
and in terms of the proportion of households where the household head speaks the indigenous
language.38 The proportion of women in the age group more at risk of contracting cervical cancer
is signicantly higher in female than in male headed households. In female headed households the
percentage of women age 18 or over who have completed secondary education is 7% versus 13%
in male headed households. The results in the lower panel of Table 1.11 show that female heads
are more likely to have never used any form of contraception and to have had more pregnancies.
There is no signicant dierence in the probability of having been screened for cervical cancer
in the past.
While so far we have assumed that women in female headed households are not aected by
the gender bias in the decision to screen for cervical cancer, the PROGRESA dataset contains
measures of female emancipation and allows us to measure how they correlate with sex related
behaviour. In the March 1998 wave all female respondents were given a set of questions about
women's status. In particular, they were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following
statements: i) Woman`s place is in the house; ii) Women have to obey men; iii) Women have
their say in community issues; iv) Women should have a job outside the house; v) Women
should have same rights as men; vi) Women should have their own opinions. We converted
the answers to these questions into dummy variables and derived a Female Status (FS ) index
ranging between 0 and 6, where 6 represents the lowest degree of female emancipation. Figure
1.2 shows the distribution of this index by gender of the household head for the group of non-
eligible households. As expected, female heads display, on average, higher levels of emancipation
than females in male headed households.39 Table 1.12 shows that the FS index is signicantly
correlated with PAP testing and use of contraceptive methods (as reported in March 1998) only
38As a further check on whether male and female headed households dier in the overall distribution of observ-
able characteristics potentially correlated with the decision to screen, we estimate a propensity score based on
observable characteristics elicited either on October 1997 or March 1998. Figure A1 reports the results for the
group of non-eligibles. Overall female and male headed households seem quite balanced in terms of household
and village characteristics.
39Both a Pearson chi square test and a Kolmogorov Smirnov test strongly reject the hypothesis that the two
samples are drawn from the same distribution.
35
for the sub sample of male headed households.
On the assumption that the level of emancipation of the female respondent is a good proxy
for the average level of independence of the women in the household, these results suggest that
women in female headed households, while less educated (potentially less informed) and more
at risk of contracting cervical cancer are, on average, not aected by the gender bias towards
screening for cervical cancer. In the next section we propose a simple model of social norm
diusion. We derive and test implications for how PROGRESA might have aected the social
acceptability of the PAP test. In section 1.5.3 we test for the presence of knowledge spillovers.
1.5.1  Social Norm
We rst propose a simple model of screening behaviour with social regulation. Our characteriza-
tion of social norm is close to those proposed by Munshi and Myaux (2006) and Kandori (1992).
While the long run equilibrium of social norm diusion is characterized in detail in these models,
the objective of our framework is to show how PROGRESA aects the strength of the social
norm that regulates cervical cancer screening, in the short run.
Consider a village consisting of a continuum of women. At the beginning of each period a
woman can choose between two actions: screening for cervical cancer (s) and not screening (ns).
When screening behaviour is socially regulated, its payo depends not only on the intrinsic util-
ity that she derives from screening but also on the social pressures or sanctions that accompany
it. Within each community the cost associated with the social norm, li, varies across women
and is assumed to be normally distributed with li  N(l, 2). In our framework the individual's
payo depends on her action, as well as on her peer action.
We assume that in each period each woman can only be matched with one other woman in
the village. Before implementation of the programme households that are potentially eligible
and those that are not eligible for a cash transfer have the same payos, which correspond to
four combinations of actions:
Vi(s; s) = w (1.5)
Vi(s; ns) = w   li (1.6)
Vi(ns; ns) = 0 (1.7)
Vi(ns; s) = 0 (1.8)
Vi is the payo for woman i, where the rst term in parentheses refers to the woman's own
action and the second term refers to her peer's action (for simplicity we assume that the payo
for cervical cancer is constant); and li is either the husband's reaction or simply her fear of his
reaction. The underlying intuition is that husbands would punish their wives if their behaviour
does not conform to the behaviour of most of the community. We assume that the expected loss
of utility from the decision not to screen is equal to 0, independent of peer action.40 In each
40Alternatively we could assume that there is social reward for the woman who decides not to screen and is
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village there is a fraction P of women who undergo screening for cervical cancer, where P is
given by:
P = pE + (1  )pNE (1.9)
 is the exogenous fraction of village households potentially eligible for the PROGRESA
transfer, pE is the average screening probability of women eligible for the cash transfer; pNE is
the average screening probability of women not eligible for the cash transfer. Every woman will
opt for screening if
Pw + (1  P )(w   li)  0 (1.10)
When PROGRESA is introduced, the expected payo for women eligible for the PROGRESA
transfer increases (w
0
> w) in treatment villages, but not in control ones. As a result, pE only
increases in treatment villages. Among non-eligible women those with li  lNE will screen for
cervical cancer, with lNE given by:
lNE =
w
(1  P ) (1.11)
and P  given by:
P  = pE + (1  )
Z w
(1 P)
 1
(l)dl (1.12)
Taking the derivative of lNE with respect to P  in eq. 1.11 and applying the implicit
function theorem to eq. 1.12, we can derive how the equilibrium social norm of non-eligibles
varies in response to an increase in the screening probability of eligibles:
g  @l
NE
@pE
=
w
(1  P )2  h(P
; w; ; l; 2) (1.13)
where h() is a positive function with the following properties: 1) @h
@
> 0; 2)
@h
@@l
>0. Func-
tion h() describes how the fraction of women in the village that go for screening, P , changes
as result of changes in the screening probability of eligible women, pE . Previous work on social
norms (see Munshi and Myaux (2006)) has modeled social norm diusion as a learning process
over time: people gradually learn about P , constantly updating their priors. In our case, even
though women living in treatment villages had no information about the pre-programme screen-
ing rate in the village, they know how it varies because of the programme. Between October
1997 and August 1998, PROGRESA held public meetings where the eligibility of each household
and the conditionalities were spelt out. Moreover, after the programme started a community
outreach worker, known as the promotora, chosen from among the eligibles, was responsible
for providing information about the programme throughout its duration.41 Therefore, all the
matched with a woman who does have the test (Munshi and Myaux (2006)).
41Even though the promotora was mainly meant to be contacting beneciaries, Adato et al. (2000) reports
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non-eligible women in the treatment villages were informed about who was required to undergo
PAP testing as part of the conditionalities of the cash transfer.
The model has two testable implications. PROGRESA increases the screening probability of
non-eligibles by shifting upward the threshold value of the cost of the social norm, below which
non-eligible women screen for cervical cancer. The bigger the fraction of households eligible for
the programme, the greater the size of the shift. The variation in the indirect eect driven by
the proportion of eligibles should be stronger in those communities where the social norm cost
is higher.
In order to test these implications we estimate the model in eq. 1.4 allowing the ITE to vary
with the proportion of eligibles in the village:
qNEij = (
0Xij + 1Tj + 2rpj + 3Tj  rpj + 1Wj + 02Hj + vij) (1.14)
where rpj is the ratio of eligibles in the village j.
42 The evidence provided in the previous
section suggests that before the programme women's emancipation levels in male headed house-
holds are signicantly correlated with the decision to have screening, but not in female headed
ones. Therefore, we expect 3 to be higher for male than for female headed households. Further,
we exploit variations in the Female Status index at village level to test whether 3 is higher in
those communities where the average social norm is stronger.43
So far we have exploited variations in the gender of the household head, but the cost of
the social norm might vary across male headed households. In particular, enforcement of the
social norm might be stronger in those households with more conservative male heads. If so,
the ITE should vary with the characteristics of the household head in the group of male headed
households, but not in the female headed ones. An enforcement mechanism could be based on
internalization of the norms of proper conduct (see Young (2007)). Although female widows
need no longer fear their partners' reactions, they might have internalized their dead husbands'
opposition to cervical cancer screening. Therefore the indirect eect should be stronger among
widowed female heads than others.
Table 1.13 show how the ITE varies with the proportion of eligibles in the village. Consistent
with our theoretical predictions, the ITE increases signicantly with the proportion of eligibles
in the village. On average, a 10% increase in the proportion of eligible households determines a
1.4% increase in the ITE. When we estimate our model separately for the sample of male and
the sample of female headed households, we nd that the interaction is strong and signicant
only in the sub-sample of male headed households.44
In order to test whether the response to the programme varies across villages according to
level of female emancipation, we split the sample of villages according to the average value of the
show that there were also frequent interactions with non-beneciaries.
42The ratio varies between 0.19 and 1 with the average being 0.59.
43While the value of the Female Status might not necessarily reect the severity of the penalties inicted by
husbands, we assume that the average level of female emancipation is a good proxy for the strength of the social
norm in the community.
44We rule out the possibility that the dierential eect between male and female headed households is driven
by an age eect. Estimates on a sample of household heads aged 60 or under show similar results.
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Female Status index and estimate the model in eq. 1.14 for each tercile. In the rst column of
Table 1.14 (High) the analysis is restricted to those villages where women are on average more
emancipated. While the ITE is strong and signicant, its interaction with the proportion of
eligibles in the village is not signicantly dierent from zero. In the second column, (Medium),
where the analysis includes only those villages with an average level of female emancipation,
neither the ITE nor its interaction with the proportion of eligibles, is signicant. In the last
column of Table 1.14 (Low) only women who live in the least emancipated villages are included.
We nd that the interaction between the ITE and the proportion of eligibles is strong and
signicant. This result could be taken as evidence that the eect of the programme on the social
norm is convex with respect to its strength. The presence of an ITE that does vary signicantly
with the proportion of eligibles in the villages characterized by high levels of female emancipation
suggests that mechanisms other than the social norm might explain the ITE on cervical cancer
screening.
Next we look at how the size of the ITE varies with the characteristics of the household
head. As mentioned earlier, these characteristics could proxy for the strength of the social norm
in male headed households, but not in female headed ones. There is a large body of medical
literature (see Stephens (2005) for a summary of the existing evidence) documenting how dicult
it is for the indigenous female population to access health services. In order to test whether
these diculties are related to restrictions imposed by the husband, in the rst specication
we interact the treatment eect of the non-eligibles with the dummy for the household head
speaking the indigenous language or not.45 We nd that the interaction of the treatment eect
with the indigenous status dummy has positive, non-trivial and signicant marginal eects for
the sample of male headed households, as opposite to negative and not signicant eects for
the sample of female headed households. In the second specication we interact the treatment
eect with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household head is over 60 and 0
otherwise. Again, the marginal eect on the interaction is positive and signicant only for the
sub sample of male headed households. Finally, we allow the treatment eect to vary with a
dummy variable for whether the head of household is illiterate or not and, consistent with the
previous results, we nd that the interaction is strongly signicant only for the sub sample of
male headed households. In principle, the variables we interacted with the treatment eect
might not necessarily proxy for the strength of the social norm within the household. However,
explanations other than the social norm-based one would have shown the interactions to be
signicant also for the sub sample of female headed households.
Last, we study whether in the group of female headed households, the indirect eect of the
programme varies with the household head being a widow or not. The results in Table 1.16
show there is a sizeable and signicant eect for widows, and a smaller and insignicant eect
for non-widows.46 Taken together, these results suggest that PROGRESA weakens the social
459 million Mexicans have indigenous origins and live mainly in dispersed rural areas. Among the indigenous
population, the rate of illiteracy among females is almost double that for males.
46Consistent with our social norm based explanation when we allow the treatment eect to interact with the
Female Status index the interactions is positive and signicant only for the sample of widows.
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norm related to male opposition to women being screened for cervical cancer. The eect is
particularly strong for women in male headed households, but women living in less emancipated
female headed households also benet from the increased social acceptability of the PAP smear
test.
1.5.2  Long Run Evidence on Social Norm
The objective of this section is to provide long run evidence on the eect of Progresa on the social
norm that regulates the decision to screen for cervical cancer. While the model presented in
section 1.5.1 is completely static, it is pretty straightforward to derive its dynamic implications.
In localities that have been exposed longer to the program there is a higher fraction of women
screening for gender specic conditions and, therefore, a lower probability of matching with peers
who do no screen. In other words, the cost of the social norm should be lower for women who
live in localities that received the program earlier.
Throughout the paper we have suggested that husbands' opposition to their women being
screened for cervical cancer might be related with the gender of the doctor. In line with a norm
based explanation, we expect the program to have a stronger eect in those localities where
there is a higher fraction of male doctors. The evaluation data do not contain any information
on the gender of the doctors. This information is available in the 2007 survey.
In order to evaluate the eect of exposure on female screening decisions, we restrict the
sample to the localities included in the original evaluation sample and those that were selected
to act as control group in the 2003 survey. The latter group of localities was chosen in such a
way to match the observable characteristics of the localities included in the original evaluation
sample. Although not experimental, this sample represents the best possible choice to evaluate
the long run eects of program on individual behavior. Between the group of localities included
in the evaluation sample and those added in 2003 there is a considerable variation in terms of
when the program was implemented: while in the rst one, the program was implemented at the
latest in November 1999, the second started receiving it only in 2004 or afterwards. We create a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the locality belonged to the original evaluation sample, 0 if
it was among those that were chosen as controls in 2003. Preliminarily, we check how observable
characteristics, as elicited in 2007, are correlated with the exposure dummy. Since questions
about cervical cancer are only addressed to women younger than 50, the top panel of table 1.17
reports the mean and the standard deviations of demographic characteristics of women aged 18-
50. Characteristics are not perfectly balanced across the two groups. Among those reported,47
literacy displays a dierence that is statistically at 5% signicance level: almost 87% of the
women living in later exposure localities are literate, as opposed to 80% in those living in earlier
exposure.
When we look at household assets, in localities belonging to the original evaluation sample
there is a signicantly higher fractions of households with radio (19% versus 11%). Quality of
health centers seems to be higher in those localities that received the program after 2004. Table
47Similar patterns hold for those not reported.
40
1.17 shows that localities where the program started later display, on average, a higher number of
doctors and nurses, and a longer doctors' tenure. In 77% of the localities that received Progresa
in 2004 or afterwards there is at least one health center that oer the cervical cancer screening
service, as opposed to 69% in early exposure ones.48 However, for none of the variables the
dierence is statistically signicant from zero. The same pattern holds when we look at the
characteristics of doctors (bottom panel of table 1.17). In the group of localities added in 2003
there is a higher fraction of doctors who completed postgraduate studies (36% versus 20%)
and a higher fraction of doctors who advise their patients to screen for cervical cancer at least
once every two years (82% versus 74%). The fraction of doctors who advise a mammogram on
biannual basis is practically the same for the two groups.49 Also in this case the dierences
between the two groups of localities are not statistically dierent from zero. In summary, the
dierences, if any, in health supply characteristics between early exposure localities and later
exposure ones should determine higher screening rates in the latter ones.
In order to test whether longer exposure to Progresa aects the propensity to screen among
women younger than 50 and whether the eect varies according to the proportion of male doctors
operating in the locality we estimate two specications. In the rst one, presented in the odd
columns of table 1.18, we regress the decision to screen on the dummy for whether the locality
belongs to the original evaluation sample or not. In the second specication, presented in the
even columns of table 1.18, we add a control for the proportion of male doctors in the locality
and we allow for this variable to interact with the exposure dummy. All the specications
control for the following socioeconomic variables: dummies for being literate, indigenous, head
of household, for completing primary, and secondary or higher school, number of kids alive,
a dummy for working the weak before the interview, whether the woman was sick in the last
four weeks, whether in the house there is a television and a radio. The regressions also control
for state xed eects and for a set of health supply characteristics in the locality: the type of
health provider, number of doctors, number of nurses, and the total number of families that
have registered with at least one health provider in the locality. The latter variable allows to
control for possible congestion eects. In localities with more than one health center we might
potentially match each individual with the center they attended. However, the decision to attend
a specic center might be driven by characteristics that are correlated with the strength of the
social norm. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that women would travel to other localities when at
least one health center operates where they live.
In table 1.18 we present results for the female propensity to undertake 5 screening exams:
PAP test, mammogram, and tests for hypertension, diabetes and cholesterol. For the two
female specic screenings we nd very similar patterns. A longer exposure to Progresa increases
the probability of screening for cervical (breast) cancer by 0.14 (0.06). A higher fraction of
male doctors is associated with a signicantly lower probability to screen for female specic
conditions. Most important for us, the eect of the exposure dummy tends to be signicantly
48We do not consider mobile health units in table 1.17.
49According to the latest guidelines, Mexican women aged 40-49 should be screened once every two years, and
once a year if they are 50 or older.
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stronger in those localities where there is a higher fraction of male doctors. When we look
how Progresa aects non-gender specic screenings, the coecients are very small and not
signicantly dierent from zero. The eect does not seem to vary with the proportion of male
doctors, as the coecients on the interaction term are negative, very small and never statistically
dierent from zero.50
The results presented in this section, although not experimental, provide strong support the
hypothesis that Progresa weakens the social norm that regulates the decision to screen for female
specic conditions.
1.5.3  Information sharing
Our nal analysis tests whether learning contributes to explaining the indirect eect of PRO-
GRESA in the decision to screen for cervical cancer. As already mentioned, a social norm based
explanation does not exclude the fact that there are other inuences. Women who take the PAP
test to comply with the programme conditionalities might potentially share information about
dierent aspects of cervical cancer screening. Eligible women might inform their peers about
the existence of PAP technology and the experience of the actual test. They might pass on
information provided by the doctor about risk factors and recommended frequency of screening.
In the absence of direct questions about cervical cancer screening we are not able to separate
these two channels.
In order to test whether eligible women share information with non-eligible women we rely
on a prediction common to many social learning models in the literature. If there is learning
through peers the learning externality should be bigger for those individuals who have less ac-
curate initial information.51 Testing this prediction poses many diculties. First, the set of
neighbors from whom a woman might learn about cervical cancer is dicult to dene. Then,
once a meaningful group has been chosen, we have to deal with the problems described in the
literature that tries to identify peer eects,52 namely the presence of so called correlated eects
(e.g. shocks that aect the network as a whole53 and creates spurious correlation between in-
dividual decisions and peer actions) and produces the reection problem (within a peer group
every individual`s behaviour aects the behaviour of the others and it is impossible to distinguish
whether one's action is the cause or the outcome of peer inuence).54 Finally, we need to nd a
suitable proxy for the initial level of information about cervical cancer. How we deal with these
problems and how we specify and test our model is described below.
We dene our main network grouping as all those households in the village whose eldest
50In alternative specications we add controls for experience, age, additional qualications and working hours
of the doctors, but the results are almost identical to those presented.
51Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and Conley and Udry (2005) test this implication in a study of whether farmers'
decisions about whether or not to adopt a new technology are aected by their neighbors' decisions.
52See among others Manski (1993) and Sacerdote (2000).
53For example, all households in a particular network might be under the care of a not very well informed
doctor. This is comparable to the teacher eect in schooling decisions (see De Giorgi et al. (2007), Hoxby
(2000)).
54See Manski (1993).
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child is in the same school grade, as recorded in the October 1997 wave.55 While this might be
only one of several possible network groupings,56 there are good reasons for believing it to be
appropriate for studying cervical cancer screening decisions. First, Cattaneo and Lalive (2006),
studying the indirect eect of PROGRESA on schooling decisions, argue that there might be
substantial exchange of information among parents of children in the same grade. Second, given
the small number of households in each village (the average is 67), mothers with children in the
same grade are not only likely to be of similar age, but since they obviously were pregnant at
the same time, they may have exchanged information on sex related issues. The average size
of peer groups dened in this way is relatively small (5.42 households), and the average age of
the household head is younger than in the full sample (43 versus 47 years). Since it is beyond
the scope of this work to determine the most relevant network for the sharing of cervical cancer
information, in the appendix we test the robustness of our results with alternative denitions of
peer groups.
In order to identify the endogenous peer eect in cervical cancer screening decisions we rely
on the so called partial population experiment introduced by Mott (2001): a policy intervention
targeted at a subgroup of the population allows identication of the endogenous peer eect in
the form of an exclusion restriction.57 Because of the PROGRESA conditions, the proportion
of women who go for screening in each group exogenously increases in the treatment, but not in
the control villages.
We use information about whether the female respondent has ever used contraception meth-
ods (as recorded in March 1998), as a proxy for initial information about cervical cancer. Accord-
ing to the medical literature the only contraception method that reduces the risk of contracting
the HPV virus through sexual contact is the condom. However, in our sample only 2% of
non-eligible women professing to use contraception relied on this method. For the purposes of
this analysis, we interpret use of contraception as an indicator of knowledge about sex related
issues.58
We estimate the following equation using a probit model:
qNEigj = (+ xigj + 1Qgj + 2ci + 3Qgj  ci + 1Wj + 02Hj + uigj) (1.15)
In our framework, qNEigj takes the value 1 if a woman living in a non-eligible household i
belonging to peer group g in village j, undergoes screening for cervical cancer,59 xigj is a set of
household characteristics, Qgj is the average screening rate for group g in village j, ci takes the
value 1 if the female respondent in household i has never used any method of contraception. Wj
55This rules out the possibility that the size of the group is aected by the increased incentives to enroll children
in school.
56Direct data on information sharing are typically unavailable. Most of the literature makes assumptions based
on dierent proximity criteria. Exceptions include Conley and Udry (2005).
57Bobonis and Finan (2006) and Cattaneo and Lalive (2006) follow this identication strategy to estimate the
impact of peer eects on the schooling decisions of children living in non-eligible households.
58Among the women who answered no to the question about whether or not they wanted another child, 69%
stated they were not practising any form of contraception.
59For simplicity, we suppress the index t.
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and Hj are controls for health supply, described earlier in the paper. In this specication, 3
shows how the peer eect varies with the proxy for initial information about cervical cancer. A
learning based explanation would imply that the interaction is positive and signicantly dierent
from zero.
So far we have argued that use of a contraceptive method proxies for the quality of women's
initial information on cervical cancer. We might also expect use of contraception to be correlated
with female emancipation. The results in the previous section show that the use of contraception
is strongly correlated with the level of female emancipation in male headed, but not in female
headed households. The latter display lower levels of formal schooling. Overall, this evidence
suggests that if our model is eectively capturing a learning externality, we would expect 3 to
be signicantly bigger for the sample of female headed households.
In order to control for the possible endogeneity of Qgj , we use an Instrumental Variables
approach. Our strategy recognizes that within each peer group there might be variability in the
number of payments received by the eligibles. Since payments are correlated with the number
of medical check-ups attended by the eligible household member(s), a higher average number of
payments determines higher exposure of the peer group to medical treatment. Therefore, we use
as instruments the treatment eect (Tj  98o), the average number of payments received by the
eligibles in the peer group at October 98 (NP 98o), and their interaction (Tj 98oNP 98o). This
strategy allows identication of endogenous social interactions based on within-village variation
in the number of payments across groups. Results are reported in Table 1.19.
The rst column of Table 1.19 presents the estimates for the full sample and columns 2 and
3 report the results for the male and the female headed samples respectively. A 10% increase
in the proportion of women undergoing screening in the peer group increases the probability
of screening for cervical cancer by 4.9%.60 The magnitude of the marginal eect is similar to
that estimated by Cattaneo and Lalive (2006) when measuring peer eects in schooling de-
cisions. In households where the female respondent has never used contraceptive methods the
screening probability is signicantly lower and, more important for our purposes, the peer eects
are stronger. Consistent with our learning based explanation, the interaction between average
screening rate and contraceptive use is sizeable and signicant only for the sub sample of female
headed households. We do not put too much emphasis on the magnitude of the learning exter-
nality as this might be downward biased. In fact households with older heads are excluded from
the sample because of our peer group denition. While we cannot assess the size of the learning
externality, these results show that there is a signicant knowledge spillover providing greater
benet to those women who are more at risk.
The validity of our identication strategies relies on the assumption that the only way that
PROGRESA aects the response in terms of screening of non-eligibles is by exogenously increas-
ing the screening rate of eligibles. The results in section 1.4.3 rule out the possibility of income
spillovers from eligibles to non-eligibles, but there may be other mechanisms threatening our
identication strategy. First, in the presence of complementarities between consumption and
60Consistent with the baseline results, we do not nd evidence of peer eects on screening for high blood
pressure and diabetes and health centre visits.
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health status, rates of cervical cancer screening might increase as a result of the positive indirect
eect of the programme on consumption documented by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) and
Angelucci et al. (2007). The lack of a signicant ITE on health outcomes other than cervi-
cal cancer screening, provides enough elements to discard this explanation. Second, Grossman
(1972) predicts that the investment in health might increase as a response to an increase in
wages. Since one objective of the programme is to reduce child labor, a general equilibrium
eect might, in principle, determine an increase in the demand for female work, with a conse-
quential increase in wages. Neither Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) nor Skouas and Di Maro
(2006) nd any evidence in this direction. Last, non-eligible women might learn about cervical
cancer not from their peers but by attending the health talks we discussed earlier in the paper.
Lack of information about attendance at these events does not allow us to quantify this potential
bias.
Our results are robust to a variety of robustness checks. First, we use the variation in the
screening rate for high blood pressure among the eligibles as an alternative instrument for Qgj .
This is a direct measure of screening service utilization and has the advantage that is not aected
by the social norm. The results are perfectly in line with those described above. Second, we
address the concern that our results might be driven by how our peer group is dened. Table A3
in appendix A presents estimates of the eq. 1.15 using as the relevant peer group all households
where the eldest child is within a 2 year range dierence. While marginal eects are estimated
less precisely, the main conclusions do not change.
1.6. Conclusions
In this paper we presented evidence from the PROGRESA social assistance programme on
whether including cervical cancer screening among the conditions for receipt of cash transfers
aects the screening decisions of women living in non-eligible households. Our main nding is
that PROGRESA has a positive indirect eect on the demand for cervical cancer screening, but
not on non-female specic health outcomes. Our results suggest that PROGRESA aects the
screening decision of non-eligible women through two channels. First, PROGRESA weakens the
social norm related to the opposition of household males to women being screened by male doc-
tors. By exogenously increasing the proportion of eligible women who are required to be screened
in order to meet the programme's requirements, PROGRESA increases the social acceptability
of the PAP screening test. Our results suggest that this channel is quantitatively important
for male headed households and households headed by more conservative females. Second, the
programme generates an information spillover from eligible to non-eligible households, which
mainly benets women living in female headed households who are less well-informed and more
at risk of contracting the disease.
There are three policy implications from our ndings that could apply both to developing
and developed countries. First, the design and evaluation of national screening programme
should explicitly take account of potential externalities from eligible to non-eligible households.
Evaluation of a programme's benets might change substantially if externalities are considered.
45
Second, cultural barriers should be addressed explicitly if the programme is to be eective. In-
creasing the proportion of female health professionals in areas with a high proportion of ethnic
and religious minorities for many women might act as a strong incentive for systematic screening.
Third, information plays a crucial role in cancer prevention. Our results show that information
received from peers might be as important as the information received from health professionals.
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Figure 1.1: Cervical cancer mortality in selected OECD countries
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Figure 1.2: Proportion of Male and Female headed households by FS Index
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Table 1.1: Cervical Cancer Screening in selected OECD countries
in Year 2002
Country Participation (%)
Belgium 61.0
Canada 74.9*
Finland 71.8
France 74.9*
Germany 55.9
Iceland 74.0
Mexico 38.9
Netherlands 66.3
New Zealand 72.7
Sweden 72.0
United States 84.8**
Note: * refers to year 2003, ** refers to year 2001. The table reports the
percentage of female population age 20-69 that got screened in the last 3
years.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive evidence on screening rates
Mean, standard error in parenthesis clustered by village
Eligible Non-eligible
Village Status Treatment Control DIFF Treatment Control DIFF
Cervical Cancer
Mar 98 (1) 0.256 0.275 -0.018 0.319 0.354 -0.035
(0.437) (0.446) (0.021) (0.466) (0.478) (0.021)
Oct 98 0.361 0.219 0.142*** 0.263 0.246 0.017
(0.480) (0.414) (0.021) (0.440) (0.431) (0.016)
May 99 0.391 0.246 0.144*** 0.288 0.310 -0.022
(0.488) (0.431) (0.018) (0.453) (0.463) (0.022)
Oct 98-May 99 (2) 0.577 0.382 0.195*** 0.462 0.434 0.028
(0.494) (0.486) (0.024) (0.499) (0.496) (0.020)
Dierence (2)-(1) 0.320*** 0.108*** 0.213*** 0.144*** 0.080*** 0.063**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020)
Sugar Blood
Mar 98 (1) 0.251 0.251 -0.000 0.307 0.299 0.008
(0.434) (0.434) (0.019) (0.461) (0.458) (0.020)
Oct 98 0.402 0.251 0.150*** 0.337 0.319 0.018
(0.490) (0.434) (0.021) (0.473) (0.466) (0.019)
May 99 0.410 0.275 0.134*** 0.335 0.353 -0.018
(0.492) (0.447) (0.020) (0.472) (0.478) (0.022)
Oct 98-May 99 (2) 0.620 0.416 0.204*** 0.540 0.522 0.018
(0.485) (0.493) (0.024) (0.498) (0.500) (0.020)
Dierence (2)-(1) 0.369*** 0.165*** 0.204*** 0.233*** 0.223*** 0.010
(0.008) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018)
Blood Pressure
Mar 98 (1) 0.392 0.382 0.010 0.456 0.456 0.001
(0.488) (0.486) (0.022) (0.498) (0.498) (0.020)
Oct 98 0.521 0.334 0.187*** 0.449 0.428 0.021
(0.500) (0.472) (0.023) (0.497) (0.495) (0.020)
May 99 0.526 0.368 0.158*** 0.455 0.450 0.005
(0.499) (0.482) (0.021) (0.498) (0.498) (0.023)
Oct 98-May 99 (2) 0.747 0.541 0.206*** 0.673 0.645 0.028
(0.435) (0.498) (0.024) (0.469) (0.479) (0.020)
Dierence (2)-(1) 0.355*** 0.159*** 0.196*** 0.217*** 0.189*** 0.028
(0.008) (0.011) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018)
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The sample includes both male and female headed house-
holds. The screening indicator takes value 1 if at least one household member has been screened. In March 1998 the
question refers to the previous 12 months. In October 1998 and May 1999 to the previous six months. Oct 98-May 99 is
the cumulative probability. Standard errors on the dierences are derived from an OLS regression, estimated on eligible
and non-eligible separately.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive evidence on health supply
Proportion of villages covered by type of providers
October 97 October 98
Village Status Treatment Control DIFF Treatment Control DIFF
SSA clinic 0.079 0.130 -0.051* 0.097 0.108 -0.010
(0.271) (0.338) (0.028) (0.297) (0.311) (0.028)
IMSS Solid. 0.038 0.043 -0.006 0.028 0.022 0.007
(0.191) (0.204) (0.018) (0.166) (0.145) (0.015)
IMSS 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.011 -0.008
(0.056) (0.000) (0.004) (0.056) (0.103) (0.007)
Private Doctor 0.000 0.000 - 0.006 0.022 -0.015
(0.000) (0.000) - (0.079) (0.145) (0.010)
Health Aid 0.571 0.641 -0.070 0.633 0.602 0.031
(0.496) (0.481) (0.045) (0.483) (0.491) (0.045)
Mobile Unit 0.769 0.712 0.057 0.809 0.801 0.008
(0.422) (0.454) (0.040) (0.394) (0.400) (0.037)
Any of the providers 0.915 0.914 0.001 0.944 0.941 0.003
(0.279) (0.281) (0.026) (0.231) (0.237) (0.021)
Health indicators by village
March 98 October 98
Treatment Control DIFF Treatment Control DIFF
Services available 2.358 2.454 -0.096 3.131 3.065 0.067
(1.964) (2.043) (0.184) (2.273) (2.241) (0.209)
Opening days 5.567 5.512 0.055 5.285 5.349 -0.064
(0.783) (0.705) (0.070) (0.832) (0.784) (0.075)
Opening hours 10.403 10.119 0.284 9.225 9.232 -0.006
(3.019) (2.829) (0.272) (2.144) (2.493) (0.210)
Waiting time 55.871 58.139 -2.268 56.048 58.477 -2.429
(23.494) (24.230) (2.195) (19.813) (19.090) (1.804)
Visit duration 19.151 19.775 -0.623** 19.134 19.157 -0.022
(3.169) (3.067) (0.289) (3.304) (3.357) (0.307)
Visit fee 11.057 11.988 -0.930 5.475 9.769 -4.294***
(10.021) (10.166) (0.931) (7.035) (10.730) (0.792)
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The number of main services available is obtained
from a list of 7 services in the locality questionnaire. The remaining indicators are averages of the individual
responses. Visit durations and waiting times are expressed in minutes. Consultation fees are expressed in pesos at
October 1997 values. Standard errors on the dierences are derived by an OLS regression.
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Table 1.4: PROGRESA and the demand for health, DD for non-eligibles
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Centre
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.125*** 0.210*** 0.188*** -0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
T 0.001 0.028 0.028 0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
T*98o 0.055*** 0.000 0.010 -0.007
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
log wait. time 0.079*** 0.052** 0.028 -0.016
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016)
SSA clinic 0.045** 0.039* 0.019 -0.006
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.014)
IMSS Sol. clinic 0.065 0.159*** 0.138*** 0.093***
(0.043) (0.038) (0.035) (0.030)
IMSS clinic -0.099** -0.007 -0.059 0.006
(0.051) (0.058) (0.050) (0.025)
Private doctor -0.043 -0.009 -0.071*** 0.001
(0.050) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017)
Medical aid 0.033** 0.031** 0.048*** 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
Mobile unit 0.009 0.011 0.001 -0.009
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
Observations 17615 19056 19204 19998
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. The health centre visit takes the value 1 if at least
one household member visited a health centre in the previous six months. The screening tests refer to the previous
12 months. All specications control for the gender, age and its square, and literacy status of the household head,
and whether (s)he speaks the indigenous language. They also include controls for the household poverty index, the
household size, number of children, whether there is a woman in the age group 25-64, percentage of women above
18 with secondary school education, percentage of eligibles in the village, total number of households in the village
and state xed eects. The excluded category among the health providers is either no doctor or a "traditional"
doctor (herbalist).
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Table 1.5: PROGRESA and the demand for health, DD for eligibles
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Centre
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.266*** 0.326*** 0.314*** 0.022***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
T 0.082*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.106***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
T*98o 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.163***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
log wait. time 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.053** 0.006
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018)
SSA clinic 0.092*** 0.065*** 0.024 0.043***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.016)
IMSS Sol. clinic 0.173*** 0.200*** 0.144*** 0.087***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.022)
IMSS clinic -0.060 0.044 0.050 0.101***
(0.106) (0.124) (0.058) (0.018)
Private doctor 0.016 -0.007 -0.038 -0.050
(0.088) (0.047) (0.063) (0.066)
Medical aid 0.032** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.025**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Mobile unit 0.017 -0.003 -0.010 -0.028**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012)
Observations 20124 21130 21216 21955
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. The health centre visit takes the value 1 if at least
one household member visited a health centre in the previous six months. The screening tests refer to the previous
12 months. All specications control for the gender, age and its square, literacy status, whether (s)he speaks the
indigenous language of the head of household, the household poverty index, household size, number of children,
whether there is any woman in the age group 25-64 and the percentage of women above 18 with secondary school
education, the percentage of eligibles in the village, the total number of households in the village and state xed
eects. The excluded category among the health providers is either no doctor or a "traditional" doctor (herbalist).
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Table 1.6: IV Estimates, DD
Marginal eects from ivprobit estimations,
bootstrapped standard errors are clustered by village
Non-Eligibles
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Centre
screening screening screening visit
98o -0.017 0.028 0.023 0.022
(0.029) (0.037) (0.035) (0.022)
T 0.136*** 0.211*** 0.191*** -0.060***
(0.019) (0.030) (0.023) (0.016)
T*98o 0.056** 0.001 0.012 -0.009
(0.028) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
log wait time -0.263 0.029 -0.078 0.268
(0.437) (0.828) (0.584) (0.319)
Observations 17615 19056 19204 19998
Eligibles
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Centre
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.083*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.106***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
T 0.267*** 0.327*** 0.314*** 0.022**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
T*98o 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.162***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
log wait time -0.016 -0.137 0.105 0.043
(0.258) (0.222) (0.210) (0.197)
Observations 20124 21130 21216 21955
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. The log waiting time is instrumented using the average opening days per week of the health centres in the
village. The IV probit is calculated using a two stage procedures based on the control function approach. Marginal
eects are calculated as average partial eects. Standard errors are calculated with 200 bootstrap repetitions
and are adjusted for clustering at village level. All specications also control for all the variables included in the
regressions presented in table 1.4.
53
Table 1.7: The eect PROGRESA on health expenditure, DD estimator
OLS regresions, standard errors are clustered by village
Non-eligibles
Drugs Expenditure Visits Expenditure
98o -25.899*** -8.156***
(2.645) (1.162)
T 0.356 2.144
(3.052) (1.396)
T*98o -0.323 -0.964
(3.339) (1.611)
Observations 20015 20044
Eligibles
Drugs Expenditure Visits Expenditure
98o -20.947*** -5.640***
(2.362) (0.971)
T -1.451 -0.070
(2.650) (1.108)
T*98o -1.267 -2.060*
(2.850) (1.183)
Observations 22097 22119
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The amounts are expressed in pesos at October
1997 values. All specications also control for the variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4.
Table 1.8: Prenatal care outcomes, DD
First column: OLS
Second column: Marginal eects from probit estimations
Non-eligibles
Pregnancy checks Tetanus vaccination
98o -0.462* 0.021
(0.241) (0.055)
T 0.015 0.078
(0.218) (0.051)
T*98o -0.057 -0.097
(0.291) (0.073)
Observations 709 706
Eligibles
Pregnancy checks Tetanus vaccination
98o -0.729*** -0.031
(0.253) (0.052)
T -0.228 0.015
(0.214) (0.043)
T*98o 0.016 0.072
(0.312) (0.057)
Observations 1121 1108
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects of probit estimates are calculated
as average partial eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method and are adjusted for clustering at
village level. All specications also control for the variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4
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Table 1.9: Screening behaviour in control villages
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
All Eligibles Non-Eligibles
Cervical cancer
98o 0.119*** 0.105*** 0.133*** 0.118*** 0.094*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Distance from SSA (km) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of services 0.011** 0.012** 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 14505 14485 7493 7474 7012 7011
Blood sugar
98o 0.218*** 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.196*** 0.220*** 0.211***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Distance from SSA (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of services 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 15515 15494 7906 7886 7609 7608
Blood pressure
98o 0.201*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.186*** 0.179***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Distance from SSA (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of services 0.010** 0.010** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 15591 15570 7929 7909 7662 7661
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Distance from SSA is dened as the distance from the closest village with a SSA hospital. Number of
services ranges between 0 and 7 as described in the locality questionnaire. All specications also control for all the
variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4
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Table 1.11: Cancer related characteristics by gender of the head of household
Household Characteristics
Female Head Male Head DIFF
Age head 59.310 50.300 9.010***
(14.772) (15.900) (0.424)
Literate head 0.444 0.738 -0.294***
(0.497) (0.440) (0.012)
Indigenous head 0.241 0.255 -0.013
(0.428) (0.436) (0.012)
Marginality Index 844.514 843.618 0.895
(100.359) (110.248) (2.928)
Proportion women age 25-64 0.342 0.238 0.104***
(0.315) (0.158) (0.005)
Proportion women above 18 with sec. school 0.072 0.131 -0.059***
(0.210) (0.297) (0.008)
Observations 1588 9142
Sex related behaviour of female respondent
Female Head Male Head DIFF
Pregnancies 5.484 5.006 0.478***
(4.070) (3.467) (0.121)
Never used contraception 0.595 0.508 0.086***
(0.491) (0.500) (0.015)
Never PAP test 0.562 0.556 0.006
(0.496) (0.497) (0.015)
Observations 1053 7331
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Dierences are computed by running an OLS
regression. Statistics are calculated only on the sample of non-eligible households. Household characteristics were
collected in October 1997. The information about the sexual behaviour of female respondent was collected in March
1998
Table 1.12: Sex behaviour and female status in the sample of non-eligibles
Linear probability model
Female Head Male Head
Never PAP test Never contraception Never PAP test Never contraception
Age head -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Literate head -0.045 -0.018 -0.010 -0.033*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014)
Poverty Index -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FS index 0.010 0.002 0.021*** 0.015***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Age wife -0.005*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Literate wife -0.100*** -0.085***
(0.013) (0.013)
Constant 1.323*** 1.117*** 1.163*** 0.599***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 1261 1261 8539 8539
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The variable Never PAP test takes the value 1 if
the female respondent has never had a PAP test. The variable Never contraception takes the value 1 if she has
never used any form of contraception . The FS index ranges between 0 and 6 where 6 denotes least emancipated
women. All the variables above were created using information elicited in March 1998
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Table 1.13: Intensity of the indirect treatment eect on cervical cancer screening, DD
Marginal eects from probit estimations,
standard errors are clustered by village
Full sample Male Head Female Head
98o 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.143***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
T 0.002 0.004 -0.017**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.025)
T*98o 0.053*** 0.048** 0.088***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.037)
Ratio Eligibles -0.150*** -0.153*** -0.112***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
T*98o*Ratio Eligibles 0.140*** 0.160*** 0.005
(0.050) (0.057) (0.075)
Observations 17615 15446 2169
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. Ratio Eligibles is the proportion of eligibles in each
village. All specications control for all the variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4
Table 1.14: Intensity of the ITE on cervical cancer screening by level of female emancipation, DD
Marginal eects from probit estimations,
standard errors are clustered by village
High Medium Low
98o 0.088*** 0.125*** 0.178***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
T -0.026** 0.047* -0.025
(0.023) (0.025) (0.031)
T*98o 0.080** 0.037 0.029
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
Ratio Eligibles -0.128*** -0.031*** -0.244***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.031)
T*98o*Ratio Eligibles 0.090 0.107 0.142**
(0.091) (0.094) (0.067)
Observations 7318 6013 4284
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. The sample is split according to the terciles of the
village average of the FS index as measured in March 1998. All specications also control for the variables included
in the regressions presented in table 1.4
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Table 1.16: Indirect treatment eect on cancer screening and status of the female head
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
Widow Non-widow
98o 0.149** 0.129
(0.024) (0.035)
T -0.026** -0.007
(0.026) (0.046)
T*98o 0.094** 0.074
(0.045) (0.065)
Observations 1447 702
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. All specications also control for all the variables
included in the regressions presented in table 1.4.
Table 1.17: Descriptives by exposure to Progresa
Before 2000 After 2003
Mean SD Mean SD DIFF SE
Characteristics Women 18-50
Age 36.259 (6.782) 36.646 (6.721) -0.387 (0.406)
Literacy (Y/N) 0.795 (0.404) 0.867 (0.340) -0.072** (0.035)
Indigenous (Y/N) 0.259 (0.438) 0.160 (0.367) 0.099 (0.116)
Head HH Male (Y/N) 0.879 (0.327) 0.919 (0.274) -0.040* (0.022)
Primary School (Y/N) 0.665 (0.472) 0.696 (0.460) -0.032 (0.044)
Secondary School or Above (Y/N) 0.183 (0.387) 0.207 (0.406) -0.024 (0.049)
Children 4.108 (2.204) 4.018 (2.098) 0.090 (0.179)
Last Week Worked (Y/N) 0.230 (0.421) 0.160 (0.367) 0.070* (0.038)
Sick Last Month (Y/N) 0.209 (0.407) 0.231 (0.422) -0.022 (0.029)
Household Characteristics
Television (Y/N) 0.833 (0.373) 0.911 (0.285) -0.078 (0.053)
Radio (Y/N) 0.189 (0.392) 0.111 (0.315) 0.078*** (0.022)
PC (Y/N) 0.010 (0.100) 0.018 (0.132) -0.008 (0.007)
Refrigerator (Y/N) 0.526 (0.499) 0.644 (0.479) -0.119 (0.079)
Wash Mach. (Y/N) 0.176 (0.381) 0.228 (0.420) -0.053 (0.041)
Horses 1.557 (0.780) 1.519 (0.666) 0.038 (0.155)
Pigs 4.645 (8.318) 3.122 (3.074) 1.524 (0.964)
Cows 3.063 (3.654) 6.036 (7.047) -2.973 (2.739)
Health Center Characteristics
Number of Doctors 1.257 (1.518) 1.615 (1.387) -0.359 (0.414)
Doctors Tenure (Months) 33.355 (46.672) 39.037 (40.604) -5.683 (13.097)
Doctors Working Days 5.144 (1.297) 5.033 (0.552) 0.110 (0.237)
Number of Nurses 0.932 (0.816) 1.615 (1.850) -0.683 (0.508)
Nurses Working Days 4.473 (1.339) 4.650 (0.580) -0.177 (0.260)
PAP Test Available (Y/N) 0.685 (0.468) 0.769 (0.439) -0.084 (0.130)
Diabetes Test Available (Y/N) 0.716 (0.454) 0.846 (0.376) -0.130 (0.114)
Doctor Characteristics
Fraction Males 0.568 (0.491) 0.636 (0.505) -0.068 (0.164)
Doctors Age 33.056 (10.372) 33.545 (9.627) -0.490 (3.194)
Fraction with Postgrad. Studies 0.204 (0.407) 0.364 (0.505) -0.160 (0.159)
Fraction Advised PAP Test 0.741 (0.437) 0.818 (0.405) -0.077 (0.134)
Fraction Advised Mammogram 0.741 (0.437) 0.727 (0.467) 0.014 (0.150)
Notes: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The table reports characteristics
taken from the 2007 ENCEL survey for those localities surveyed in 2003. Localities that received
Progresa before 2000 are those belonging to the original evaluation sample. Localities that received
it after 2003 are those added as control ones in the 2003 survey. The sample is restricted to all
women aged 18-50.
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Table 1.19: Learning in cervical cancer screening: Eect of initial information
Marginal eects from ivprobit estimations, bootstrapped standard errors are clustered by village
Full Sample Male Head Female Head
Peer group screening rate 0.492*** 0.514*** 0.447
(0.144) (0.157) (0.398)
No contraception -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.077
(0.014) (0.014) (0.056)
Peer group screening rate*no contraception 0.153* 0.104 0.570**
(0.093) (0.104) (0.285)
Observations 6931 6313 618
Cragg Donald Test 30.163 25.763 4.232
Cragg Donald 2 121.213 103.560 17.821
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The peer group is dened by all the village
households whose eldest children are in the same school grade. The level of initial information is proxied by the
dummy for having never used any method of contraception, as recorded in March 1998. The IV strategy exploits
the the treatment eect, the average number of payments received by the eligibles in the peer group and their
interaction as instrument. The IV probit is calculated using a two stage procedure based on the control function
approach. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial eects. Standard errors are calculated with 200
bootstrap repetitions and are adjusted for clustering at village level. The Cragg Donald test for the validity of the
rank condition is reported. All specications also control for the variables included in the regressions presented in
table 1.4.
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CHAPTER 2
Conditional Cash Transfers, Adult Work Incentives, and Poverty
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to alleviate poverty through monetary
and in-kind benets, as well as reduce future incidence of poverty by encouraging invest-
ments in education, health and nutrition. The success of CCT programs at reducing poverty
depends on whether, and the extent to which, cash transfers aect adult work incentives.
In this paper we examine whether the PROGRESA program of Mexico aects adult partic-
ipation in the labor market and overall adult leisure time, and we link these eects to the
impact of the program on poverty. Utilizing the experimental design of PROGRESA's eval-
uation sample, we nd that the program does not have any signicant eect on adult labor
force participation and leisure time. Our ndings on adult work incentives are reinforced
further by the result that PROGRESA leads to a substantial reduction in poverty. The
poverty reduction eects are stronger for the poverty gap and severity of poverty measures.
2.1. Introduction
Mean-tested conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are increasingly popular in developing
countries as a useful tool for poverty alleviation. Examples of such programs include PRO-
GRESA/Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Bono de Desarrollo Humano in
Ecuador, Familias en Accion in Colombia, PRAF in Honduras, PATH in Jamaica, and Red
de Proteccion Social (RPS) in Nicaragua, among others. Targeting their benets directly to
populations in extreme poverty, primarily in rural areas, such programs aim to alleviate current
poverty through monetary and in-kind benets, as well as reduce future levels of poverty by
encouraging investments in education, health and nutrition.
The success of CCT programs at reducing current poverty depends on whether, and the
extent to which, cash transfers aect adult work incentives. In all of the programs mentioned
above, once a household is selected as eligible for the program, usually through geographic
targeting or household level means-testing, or both, the level of benets is not aected by the
work decisions of the household members or the income level of the household. Thus, the main
eect of CCT on the labor supply of adults may be a pure income eect. 1This is in contrast
1In most CCT programs the eligibility status of beneciary households is, in theory, re-examined every few
years. For example, in the PROGRESA program of Mexico, the eligibility status of households was supposed to
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to most welfare programs in the US and Canada, that have explicit disincentives to work. For
example, in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the US, the level of benets
is aected by work decisions as work income is eectively taxed by reducing the level of benets
provided.
The extent to which the transfers of CCT programs result to signicant income eects
on adult leisure and consumption can only be determined empirically. The incentive eects of
welfare programs on labor supply have been the subject of intense scrutiny primarily in the U.S.,
the U.K. and Canada (e.g., Staord (1985); Mott (1992); Blundell and MaCurdy (1999); and
Widerquist (2005). In developing countries, however, the evidence regarding the labor supply
responses of adults to transfer programs is quite scarce. The study of Sahn and Alderman (1996),
one of the rare studies in this topic, suggests that the labor supply eect of a rice subsidy program
in Sri Lanka is signicantly large. Yet, in a recently published ex-ante microsimulation study of
the impact of the Bolsa Escola program on poverty in Brazil, the income eect of the transfers
on adult labor supply is assumed to be negligible Bourguignon et al. (2003). In addition to this,
León et al. (2001) nd a negative labor supply eect of an unconditional transfer program.
Our paper sheds light on these issues using data from a large conditional cash transfer pro-
gram in the poor rural areas of Mexico called PROGRESA (Health, Education and Nutrition
Program). With a cash transfer of 20% of pre-program consumption, PROGRESA has the po-
tential of aecting adult work incentives of both program participants as well as non-participants.
For eligible households, the income eect of the cash transfer may be weakened by the direct
and indirect time costs associated with adhering to the requirements of the program. In addi-
tion, the means testing associated with CCT programs may also aect the incentives of both
eligible and non-eligible households. On the one hand, individuals who are not eligible for the
program's benets may also have the incentive to work less or earn (or report) a lower income
hoping to become eligible for the program in future rounds of expansion of the program. On the
other hand, the possibility of future means-tests may impact on the labor supply and investment
choices of currently eligible households.
The empirical analysis uses panel data from households surveyed for the purpose of evaluating
the impact of PROGRESA on basic indicators of household investment in human capital. 2
A distinguishing feature of the PROGRESA data is that they are based on an experimental
design, with randomization of the coverage of the program at the locality level. The empirical
methodology consists of comparing conditional means of key outcome variables (such as labor
market participation, hours of leisure, and poverty rates) between households living in villages
covered by the PROGRESA program (treatment villages) and households living in comparable
villages that are out of the program (controls). An additional advantage oered by the design of
the sample, is that we can also examine the potential eects of the program on the labor supply
of the non-eligible households living in the treated communities (i.e. the communities covered
be reviewed within three years after a household's entry into the program. In fact, more than ve years elapsed
before any eort was made to revise the list of beneciaries.
2Skouas (2005) provides a detailed discussion of PROGRESA, the evaluation design and a summary of the
impacts of the program estimated by a large team of researchers.
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by PROGRESA).
We investigate three main questions. First, we examine whether being eligible or ineligible
for PROGRESA benets aects adult labor force participation. Second, we study the eects
of PROGRESA on adult leisure hours. Leisure may be an important determinant of welfare
and beneciary households may choose to increase their welfare by using the cash transfers of
the program to buy more leisure. Finally, we analyze the impact of PROGRESA on poverty
measures based on household income. Poverty measures oer the advantage of being simple,
albeit imperfect, summary measures of the eects of the program on the communities with both
eligible and ineligible households exposed to the program. Signicant labor supply response
among households in communities covered by the program may result in small impacts of the
program on poverty.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes briey the PROGRESA
program and the data used. Section 2.3 illustrates the econometric specication and estimation
approach behind our results. Section 2.4 shows and discusses the results regarding the impact
of PROGRESA on adult labor force participation and leisure. The impact of PROGRESA on
poverty is studied in section 2.5, while section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. A Brief Description of PROGRESA and of the Data Used
PROGRESA, initially implemented by the Mexican Federal government in 1997, adopts an
integrated approach to combating the dierent causes of poverty by intervening simultaneously
in the areas of health, education and nutrition. By the year 2004, the program which was
renamed Oportunidades, included nearly 5 million families in 72,345 localities in all 31 states.
The total annual budget of the program in 2004 was around US$2.5 billion, or 0.3% of the gross
domestic product.
The education component of PROGRESA is designed to increase school enrollment among
youth in Mexico's poor rural communities by making education grants available to pupils' moth-
ers, who are then required to have their children attend school regularly. In localities where
PROGRESA currently operates, households that have been characterized as poor, and have
children enrolled in grades 3-9, are eligible to receive these educational grants every two months.
The levels of these grants were determined taking into account, among other factors, what a
child would earn in the labor force or contribute to family production. The educational grants
are slightly higher at the secondary level for girls, given their propensity to drop out at earlier
ages. Every two months, conrmation of whether children of beneciary families attend school
more than 85% of the time is submitted to PROGRESA by school teachers and directors, and
this triggers the receipt of a bi-monthly cash transfer for school attendance.
In the area of health and nutrition, PROGRESA brings basic attention to health issues and
promotes health care through free preventative interventions, such as nutritional supplements,
and education on hygiene and nutrition as well as monetary transfers for the purchase of food.
Receipt of monetary transfers and nutritional supplements are tied to mandatory health care
visits to public clinics. This aspect of the program emphasizes targeting its benets to children
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under ve, and pregnant and lactating women, and is administered by the Ministry of Health
and by IMSS-Solidaridad, a branch of the Mexican Social Security Institute, which provides
benets to uninsured individuals in rural areas.
Nutritional supplements are given to children between the ages of four months and two years,
and to pregnant and breast-feeding women. If signs of malnutrition are detected in children
between the ages of 2 and 5, nutritional supplements will also be administered. The nutritional
status of beneciaries is monitored by mandatory visits to the clinic and is more frequently
monitored for children ve years of age and under, pregnant women and lactating women. Upon
each visit, young children and lactating women are measured for wasting (weight-for-height),
stunting (height-for-age), and weight-for-age. An appointment monitoring system is set up and
a nurse or doctor veries adherence. The health care professionals submit every two months
certication of beneciary visits to PROGRESA, which triggers the receipt of the cash transfer
for food support.
The average monthly payment, distributed every two months to the mothers in beneciary
families amounts to 20% of the value of monthly consumption expenditures prior to the initiation
of the program.3 Working counter to this transfer are the direct and indirect costs associated with
participation in the program. For example, one of the conditions of the PROGRESA program
is that households eligible for the program were required to stop receiving benets from other
pre-existing programs such as Niños de Solidaridad, Abasto Social de Leche, de Tortilla and the
National Institute of Indigenous people (INI ).4 In addition to these direct costs, there are some
indirect costs associated with complying with the program's requirements. Such costs include
the time costs of taking children to school and to health center, waiting in line at the health
center, attending educational seminars on nutrition and hygiene, and traveling to the localities
where payments are being distributed.
The data used in this paper consist of the sample of communities and households surveyed
between November 1997 and November 1999, for the purposes of the evaluation of the PRO-
GRESA program. In order to obtain a credible evaluation of the potential impact of the pro-
gram the PROGRESA administration decided to adopt an experimental design that allows one
to compare households before and after the initiation of PROGRESA with similar households
that were not yet covered by the program. Specically, the full sample used in the evaluation of
PROGRESA consists of repeated observations (panel data) collected for 24,000 households from
506 localities in the seven states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis
Potosi and Veracruz. The opportunity of having a randomized design came from the fact the
3The average monthly transfers during the twelve-month period from November 1998 to October 1999 are
around 197 pesos per beneciary household per month (expressed in November 1998 pesos). The calculation
of this average includes households that did not receive any benets due to non-adherence to the conditions of
the program, or delays in the verication of the requirements of the program or in the delivery of the monetary
benets. On average, households receive 99 pesos for food support, and 91 pesos for the educational grant. For
more details, see ?)
4Before the establishment of PROGRESA, previous government interventions in the areas of education, health
and nutrition in the rural sector of the country consisted of many programs each intervening separately in health,
education or nutrition with little prior coordination or consideration of the potential synergies that could result
from a better coordinated and simultaneous intervention.
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program was introduced in phases, due to budgetary constraints. In fact, of the 506 localities,
320 localities were assigned to the treatment group (where PROGRESA was in operation) and
186 localities were assigned as controls.5 As originally planned the localities serving the role of
a control group started receiving PROGRESA benets by December 1999.
The selection of beneciaries into PROGRESA was a two stage process (?). In the rst
stage, using national census data, poor communities with schooling and health infrastructure
were identied. In the second stage, households within the selected poor communities were
classied as eligible or ineligible based on the socioeconomic data collected by a census of all
the households residing in the communities to be covered by the program. On average, in
the evaluation sample, 78% of the households were classied as eligible for program benets.
However, the fraction of households that actually ended up receiving the PROGRESA cash
transfers during the two-year interval covered by the evaluation sample is just under 65%, due
to administrative errors and delays in the nal registration of beneciary households.6
The 1997 baseline household census called ENCASEH (Encuesta de Caracteristicas Socioe-
conomicas de los Hogares) was followed by a number of socio-economic household surveys (En-
cuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares or ENCEL) designed to collect information for the evalua-
tion of PROGRESA. The rst evaluation survey took place in March 1998 before the initiation
of benets in May 1998. The remaining surveys were conducted after beneciary households
in treatment villages started receiving benets from PROGRESA. One round of surveys took
place in November 1998, which was well after most households received some benets as part of
their participation in the program. The next two waves took place in June 1999 and November
1999. A number of core questions about the demographic composition of households and their
socioeconomic status were applied in each round of the survey.
Data used in this paper are drawn from four rounds. The rst round (R1) that took place in
November 1997, the second round (R2) in November 1998 survey, the third round (R3) in June
1999, and fourth round (R4) that took place in November 1999.
The November 1997 ENCASEH survey as well as the November 1998, June 1999, and Novem-
ber 1999 ENCEL surveys collected detailed information on income earned or received from a
variety of sources for each individual in the household. 7 The survey instrument used to col-
lect individual and household income for these various sources changed signicantly beginning
with the November 1998 survey. With this caveat in mind it should be noted that a serious
eort was made to maintain comparability of income by source across the survey rounds. The
various sources of income (excluding the PROGRESA cash transfers) were transformed into
monthly income and then aggregated into 4 main sources of income: labor income; income
from self employment (such as income from sewing, food preparation, construction or carpen-
try, commerce, produce transportation, repairs and laundry or cooking); other income (such
5Behrman and Todd (1999) conducted a careful investigation of the extent to which the selection of localities
into treatment and control groups can be considered as random. Their analysis did not reveal any signicant
dierences between village means for more than 300 variables in treatment and controls.
6For more details see Skouas (2005).
7The March 1998 baseline survey was not used because it did not include household income and labor supply
information for adults.
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as pensions, interest income, rents and community prots); and government transfers (such as
educational scholarships from Niños de Solidaridad, benets from Instituto Nacional Indigenista
(INI), PROBECAT, Empleo Temporal and Procampo).
The income data by source are useful at quantifying the direct costs associated with par-
ticipation in the PROGRESA program. Children can contribute income to families by working
for wages or by being recipients of cash transfers from other government transfer programs ex-
cluding PROGRESA. Table 2.5 presents how the income contributed to families by children
between ages 8-17 evolved across dierent survey rounds in the treatment and control villages
(using only eligible households E=1). Table 2.5 reveals that the total (labor + other) income
(excluding PROGRESA cash transfers) beneciary families received from children declined in
both treatment and control localities since the initiation of PROGRESA in November 1998. The
mean total income contributed by children in November 1998 is slightly lower among treatment
villages compared to the control villages and the gap gets even bigger by the June 1999 round.
By November 1999, this gap is completely eliminated as control households are already incor-
porated into PROGRESA.8 Other columns in the same table break down total income from
children into its two components, i.e., income from labor and other income that consists mainly
of government transfers. These columns reveal that the dierences in mean total income from
children in beneciary households and eligible households in control localities are primarily due
to drops in the child-related income beneciary families received from other government pro-
grams. It also appears that there are no signicant dierences in the labor income of children
from beneciary households in treatment localities and the labor income contribution of children
in eligible households in control villages.
In addition to the potential income losses from children's work and benets, households re-
ceiving PROGRESA benets are also required to give up benets from programs like Abasto
Social de Leche, de Tortilla and the National Institute of Indigenous people (INI). Figure 2.1
makes clear that among beneciary households (i.e. those that received any PROGRESA ben-
ets between May 1998 and November 1999 in the treatment villages) the incidence of benets
received from DIF, Ninos de Solidaridad and Abasto Social de Leche decreased dramatically.
In combination the preceding discussion suggests that the eect of PROGRESA on household
income and poverty may not be adequately summarized by the size and incidence of the cash
transfers.
2.3. Econometric specication and estimation
We begin with a brief discussion of the estimation approach that underlies our estimates of the
impact of PROGRESA on labor force participation, and leisure time.
The estimation of the impact of PROGRESA (for labor force participation and poverty rates)
is based on the dierence-in-dierences estimator. This estimator is based on comparing dier-
ences between the treatment and control groups before and after the start of the PROGRESA
8Note that control households started receiving cash benets in December 1999. Households are rst incor-
porated into PROGRESA, meaning that they are given all the necessary forms and informed of all the program
requirements. A few months later, the cash benets are sent out by the PROGRESA administration headquarters.
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program9. It oers the advantage that any pre-program dierences between the treatment
and control group are eliminated in the estimation of impacts. Under the assumption that
any unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and control groups is xed over time, the
dierence-in -dierences estimator (2DIF, discussed in detail below) eliminates this heterogene-
ity. Specialized empirical specications are implemented for the labor force participation and
poverty estimation and are discussed below. We use also a number of control variables which
may be useful for reducing any remaining statistical bias.
To begin with, consider the case where there are data available for treatment and con-
trol households before and after the start of the program. Restricting the sample to eligible
households only (E=1), the following regression equation denes a model that can nest various
dierence estimators allowing for controlling for individual, household and locality observed
characteristics:
Y (i; t) = + TT (i) + R2 (R2) + R3 (R3) + R4 (R4) + TR2 (T (i) R2)+
+TR3 (T (i) R3) + TR4 (T (i) R4) +
JX
j=1
jXj (i; t) +  (i; t) (2.1)
Y (i; t)denotes the value of the outcome indicator of interest for household, individual or
population i in period/round t, , , and  are xed parameters to be estimated, T (i)is an
binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household resides in a treatment community and 0
otherwise (i.e., for control communities), R2, R3, and R4 are a binary variables equal to 1 for
the second, third and fourth rounds of the survey respectively, and equal to zero otherwise. Note
that the rst round is the baseline round prior to the initiation of the program. The vector X
summarizes household (and possibly village) characteristics and  is an error term summarizing
the inuence random disturbances.
To better understand the preceding specication it is best to consider the case of only two
rounds: one before the initiation of the program and the other after the start of the program
(e.g. round 2 or R2 = 1, 0 otherwise). One may then divide the parameters into two groups:
one group summarizing dierences in the conditional mean of the outcome indicator before the
start of the program (i.e., , T ,) and another group summarizing dierences after the start of
the program (i.e., R, and TR). Specically, the coecient T allows the conditional mean of
the outcome indicator to dier between eligible households in treatment and control localities
before the initiation of the program whereas the rest of the parameters allow the passage of
time to have a dierent eect on households in treatment and control localities. For example,
the combination of parameters R andTR allow the dierences between eligible households in
9Behrman and Todd (1999)) state in their investigation of whether assignment to treatment and control
groups can be considered random that formal tests of equality between the distributions of various characteristics
generally do not reject the hypothesis when the test is performed on locality means. However, when the test is
performed on household level data, they nd many more rejections of the null than would be expected by chance
given standard signicance level. This motivates the choice of including controls in our regressions and employ
a 2DIF approach.
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treatment and control localities to be dierent after the start of the program.
Specically, given the preceding specication, the conditional mean values of the outcome
indicator for treatment and control groups before and after the start of the program are as
follows:
[E (Y jT = 1; R2 = 1; X)] = + T + R + TR +
X
j
jXj (2.2)
[E (Y jT = 1; R2 = 0; X)] = + T +
X
j
jXj (2.3)
[E (Y jT = 0; R2 = 1; X)] = + R +
X
j
jXj (2.4)
[E (Y jT = 0; R2 = 0; X)] = +
X
j
jXj (2.5)
The advantage oered by the 2DIF estimator is that it provides an estimate of the impact of
the program that is net of any pre-program dierences between treatment and control households
and/or any time trends or aggregate eects in changes of the values of the outcome indicator. By
comparing before and after dierences between treatment and control households (or dierences
between treatment and control households after and before the program) one is able to get an
estimate of the impact of the program (summarized by the single parameter TR).
2DIF = [E (Y jT = 1; R2 = 1; X)  E (Y jT = 1; R2 = 0; X)] 
[E (Y jT = 0; R2 = 1; X) E (Y jT = 0; R2 = 0; X)] (2.6)
Using the terminology of Heckman et al. (1999), the parameter TR provides an estimate
of the intent to treat eect, which is inclusive of the operational eciency or ineciency of
the program implementation. Thus, TR provides a lower bound estimate of the impact of the
program on those who actually receive the treatment (or of the eect of the treatment on those
who actually received the treatment).
The availability of repeated observations on non-eligible households in treatment areas before
and after the start of the program also oers the opportunity to examine the potential eects
of the program on the non-eligible households residing in the treatment communities. For
example, non-eligible households in treatment localities may alter their behavior (e.g., work less
or withdraw their children from school) in anticipation that such actions may qualify them for
the program. An evaluation of the extent to which the program has had some indirect eects on
the outcome indicator among non-eligible households in treatment areas can also be conducted
by estimating a regression similar to (2.1) but restricted to the sample of non-eligible households
(E=0).
Note that T is expected to be insignicantly dierent from zero (that is, pre-program dif-
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ferences prior to program implementation are expected to be zero) and the interaction terms
represent the impact of being in a treatment community on work participation after program
implementation. The dierent intercept  terms capture the point that participation in work
may vary (for reasons unrelated to PROGRESA) during the rst round of the sample.
In estimating the impact of the program on adult leisure time, we are limited by the fact
that there is only one round of data on time allocation (June 99). Given this constraint we
estimate the model:
L (i) = 0 + TT (i) +
JX
j=1
jXj (i) + "i (2.7)
where L (i)measure leisure time of individual i, T (i)represents a binary variable equal to 1 if
individual i lives in a treatment community and 0 otherwise, and Xj (i) represents the vector
of j control variables for individual i (described in section 4). In this model the estimate of the
coecient T is the cross-sectional dierence (CSDIF) estimate of program impact.
2.4. The impact of PROGRESA on adult labor force participation and leisure
2.4.1  Adult labor force participation
To estimate the impact on labor force participation, we use the data as our baseline round and
three post-program rounds of November 1998, June 1999, and November 1999.
The dependent variable Y (i; t) in equation (2.1) is specied by a binary variable indicating
whether an individual i works in the labor market in period t. Specically, a person is classied
as working in the labor market (Y (i; t) = 1) if he/she reported that having worked over the
previous week (whether paid or unpaid). In addition, we take into account a follow-up question
to capture individuals who may engage in informal activities, which the respondent may not have
initially considered as work. This question collects information about participation in a) selling a
product; b) helping in family business; c) making products to sell; d) washing, cooking or ironing;
and e) working in agriculture activities or caring for animals. We also include as working those
individuals who respond that they engage in any of these activities. It is important to keep in
mind that domestic activities are not included in this denition of work.
We also consider two other outcomes variables, salaried work and non-salaried work and
estimate the impact of PROGRESA on each category. The distinction between salaried and
non-salaried10 work is made through what a worker reports as his/her occupational position.
Workers who report that they were daily agricultural workers or non-agricultural employees
are considered as salaried workers. All other workers are classied separately and include self-
employed workers, business owners, unpaid workers and ejidatarios.
Equation (2.1) is estimated separately for males and females. In addition, we conduct the
10In preliminary analysis, we considered separating non-salaried workers between self-employed workers and
unpaid family workers. Nevertheless, the proportions of individuals participating in each of these activities are
quite small for all age groups, and the distinction between these activities is often blurred so that we prefer to
aggregate these groups in the impact analysis.
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empirical analysis separately for 5 age group (ages 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54 and
55 and over) and for the group of all adults. In general the labor force participation of women
of all ages is quite low (for no age group do overall labor force participation rates exceed 18%).
In addition, the majority of women who do work tend to participate in unsalaried activities:
this is particularly true of women over the age of 35. It is interesting to note the decreasing
relative participation in salaried work versus unsalaried activities with age of women. Men, on
the other hand, show a very high labor force participation rate, over 90% for men between the
ages of 24 and 55. The majority of men are salaried workers, although the percentage in salaried
work tends to decrease with age. For male workers over the age of 55, almost half participate in
non-salaried activities.
In particular, our sample includes 183,646 individual observations (89,207 observations on
adult males and 94,439 observations on adult females) for 4 rounds of the PROGRESA evaluation
sample (Nov 97, Oct 98, Jun 99 and Nov 99) that are divided in treatment and control localities.
The analysis is rst carried on the sample of those who are classied as poor11, and thus
eligible to receive the program if they live in treatment localities (E=1). We then re-do the
same estimation on the sample of those who are classied as non-eligible (E=0).
The vectorX in equation (2.1) consists of individual and demographic composition variables.
In particular, we include as individual characteristics his/her age, age squared, marital status,
whether he/she is head of the household, speaks an indigenous language, and his/her level of
education. The demographic composition variables include the number of children aged 0 to 2
and aged 3 to 5, boys and girls between 6 and 7 years old , 8 to 12, and 13 to 18, men and
women aged 19 to 54 and men and women over the age of 55. At the community level, the model
also contains a variable measuring distance to the "cabecera municipal which is an indicator
of distance to the governing center of the municipality (and likely the largest locality of the
municipality).
Given that dependent variable is binary, equation (2.1) is estimated with a probit model.
Table 2.1 presents the 2DIF estimates (summarized by the parameterTR in equation 1) of the
impact of PROGRESA on the probability of working of male and female adults for the sample
of individuals form eligible households (E=1).12 The clustering of the households within villages
implies that the household-specic error terms (i; t) are likely to be correlated within each
village (as well as across time). Thus standard errors were estimated taking into account of the
clustered nature of the sample. The results are presented showing the initial level of participation
in work activities (that is prior to program implementation) and the impact estimates for each
round of the survey carried out after program implementation. The impact from each round
should be interpreted as the percentage point dierence from the pre-program level (not from
the previous round). In other words, the estimates reported represent the marginal eects of
being in a household eligible for PROGRESA benets on the probability of being in the labor
11This is the poor status after the densifcacion, the revision of the eligibility that raised the number of house-
holds eligible for the program from 52% to 78%. It has to be noticed that the fraction of households that actually
ended up receiving the PROGRESA cash transfers during the two-year interval covered by the evaluation sample
is just under 65%, due to administrative errors and delays in the nal registration of beneciary households.
12The complete set of parameter estimates is available directly from the authors upon request.
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force.13
Beginning with men, the results of the impact of PROGRESA on overall participation levels
show little impact. Moreover, irrespective of the age group examined, participation in PRO-
GRESA seems to have no impact on labor market participation.
Looking at the decomposition between salaried work and other types of works, there are
some impacts, particularly in the November 1998 round the rst round after PROGRESA was
implemented in these communities. In this round, there is a universal, for all age groups, increase
in the probability of working in salaried work and a corresponding decrease in the probability of
working in non-salaried work. These eects remain present in the next round of the data (June
1999) only for men aged 25 to 34 and disappear by the fourth round of the survey. The results
seem to suggest that, at least initially, families may have used some part of the grants to seek
work in salaried activities and to reduce their participation, perhaps, in less protable family
enterprises. This impact, however, appears to disappear over time.
For women, the results show few overall impacts of PROGRESA on participation in the
labor market. For women in the age group 45-54, there is a signicant reduction in participation
according to the rst after program round of the ENCEL, although this impact does not hold up
over time. As with men, there is also a signicant reduction in the probability of participating
in non-salaried work activities in the rst after program round, but again these eects do not
hold up over time. In short, these data do not show particularly signicant or lasting eects
of PROGRESA on labor market participation. Rather, they are consistent with a story that
PROGRESA does not aect participation of men and women.
In table 2.2 we present the results for the sample of individuals who are classied as non-
eligible for the program (or E=0). Even though these individuals are not in PROGRESA
(that only covers the poor individuals in treatment localities), the program may have been
generating spillover eects; for example, households in PROGRESA localities who are not poor
could have revised their labor force participation choices in order to become eligible for the
program. However, our results suggest that PROGRESA does not have any signicant eect on
participation on individuals who are not poor; the only coecients that are signicant (only at
10% level) are all negative, but very small in magnitude.
2.4.2  Leisure
Our measure of leisure time is constructed as a residual, that is as the dierence between 24 hours
and the time spent on all reported activities. In particular, we use the time use module (present
only in the June 1999 round) with information on 18 activities14 carried out during the previous
13The estimates reported were obtained using the dprobit command in STATA v7.0. They can be easily
converted into percentage changes or elasticities by dividing the marginal eect by the pre-program level, both
reported in table 2.1.
14Activities are: Working: for salary or wage, in own business or family land. Attending school, Doing
homework after school, Community work, Voluntary work for neighbors or other relatives, Purchasing food or
other products for the household (HH), Sewing, making clothes for HH members, Taking HH members to school,
clinic, or work, Cleaning house, Washing and ironing clothes for HH members, Preparing food, Fetching water,
rewood or throwing out trash, Taking care of animals, Taking care of small children, elderly and sick, Making
HH repairs, Transportation time to work, school, market etc., Other activities.
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day; the previous day as reference period is not particularly ideal, as for some individuals, the
survey may refer to a day which was not typical of normal activities. Additionally, many
activities may be activities which are done infrequently (i.e. not daily). The survey was carried
out this way as it was thought that a previous day reference period would reduce recall bias,
given the large number of activities included in the questionnaire. The control variables included
are the same of those in the labor force participation estimation (discussed above).
Table 2.3 presents the CSDIF estimates of the eect of PROGRESA on adult leisure (sum-
marized by parameter T in equation (2.7)). Note that one hypothesis of the impact of PRO-
GRESA on leisure is that, if the PROGRESA transfers are perceived as strict income transfers,
and leisure is a normal good, then one might expect leisure to increase with PROGRESA. Nev-
ertheless, the structure of the grants which reduce the price of schooling of children and thus
may reduce the work of children may imply that overall hours dedicated to household production
work (previously done by children) might increase. This would then imply that the program
would have an ambiguous eect on the leisure time of adults and especially women. For exam-
ple, it is conceivable that complying with the program's requirements might decrease the leisure
time of women, as they attempt to substitute for the time children used to allocate in home
production activities.15
Overall, the results do not show signicant impacts of PROGRESA on the leisure time of
men or women. There are some small negative impacts of PROGRESA on leisure for men
for one age group, namely men aged 18 to 24, which corresponds to increases in work for this
group of men of about 0.3 hours daily, or about 2 hours weekly. Nevertheless, there are no
signicant impacts on any other age groups for males. The results for women are insignicant
in all specications and for all groups. Accordingly, we can say that there is not much evidence
to support the hypothesis that PROGRESA has reduced the leisure time of men and women.
There is certainly no evidence to support that leisure time has increased under PROGRESA16.
2.5. The impact of PROGRESA on poverty
The results presented so far on the impact of the program on adult labor market participation
and leisure suggest that the program has no adverse eects on labor income. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the cash transfers received by program beneciaries are likely to increase household
income at least among beneciary families. However, the extent to which this occurs depends
on the size of the direct and indirect costs associated with participation in the program. In
addition, the income of non-eligible households may be adversely aected to the extent that non-
eligible households believe that a lower household income increases their chances of becoming
15Skouas and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2004) study the impact of PROGRESA on the work time and school
attendance of school-age children. In particular, Skouas and Parker (2001) nd signicant increases in the school
attendance of boys and girls that are accompanied by signicant reductions in the participation of boys and girls
in work activities.
16Note, however, that the results on leisure do not necessarily suggest that there has been no reallocation of
time between work activities for adults. For instance, there may have been a substitution towards more time in
domestic work and less time in market work. (for results on this issue see Parker and Skouas (2000)).
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eligible for the program17. Estimating the impact of the program on the poverty rate provides a
useful summary measure of how the program aects the income of both eligible and non-eligible
households in the treatment localities relative to those in the control localities.
The measure of welfare used in our analysis is income per capita. 1819 For households in
treatment villages receiving PROGRESA cash transfers, total income per month was adjusted
upwards by the cash transfer per month received by the household20. The actual amount of
cash transfers received per month was obtained from the records of payments sent out each
month since May 1998 by the PROGRESA administration headquarters in Mexico City. The
monthly income measure calculated for each round of the survey was then converted in November
1998 pesos by dividing by the corresponding adjustment ratio of the national consumer price
index. We calculate dierent poverty measures using two dierent poverty lines: the value of
the basic food basket (canasta basica) and the median of the per capita value of consumption
in November 1998. The rst poverty line (basic food basket) yields a baseline poverty rate of
82.16% in the treatment localities (and 81.99% in the control localities). The median of per
capita consumption in November 1998 yields a baseline headcount poverty rate P(0) of 55.44%
in the treatment localities (53.16% in the control localities) which is slightly below the fraction
of the population in the treatment villages that actually received the benets of the program
(see section 2.2 above).
Poverty is measured along the lines suggested by Foster et al. (1984), henceforth FGT. The
FGT poverty measures are summarized by the formula:
17Our measure of income is based on reported income, with this bringing into the picture all the possible
biases due to misreporting (especially underreporting) of income. As stated above eligibility for the program was
decided based on socioeconomic data collected in the 1997 baseline household census (ENCASEH) before the
start of the program. As by our knowledge households were not told that the ENCASEH information was going
to be used to discriminate eligibility. In addition to this, household did not have to apply for the program but
this was universally given to all households identied as eligible in the treatment localities. This suggests that
there might not be a clear and strong incentive to misreport income. In general, evidence on this issue is scarce
due to the severity of data requirements. Martinelli and Parker (2009) study this issues with data from the urban
evaluation sample of Progresa (now Oportunidades; it has to be noticed that the rural and urban component of
Progresa have very dierent characteristics: for example, households need to apply for the program in the urban
version) and nd that while underreporting is widespread also over reporting is common in goods that may have
a status value.
18The absence of reliable information on household consumption prior to the start of the program precluded
the use of consumption as a measure of the poverty impacts of the program. For more details on the consumption
impacts of PROGRESA see Hoddinott and Skouas (2004).
19We do not consider value of leisure in our denition of income (i.e.our income is not full income). Our
denition of income is consistent with that used for deciding eligibility for the program. It is important to
stress that the eect of the program on poverty may be depending upon the denition of income; for example,
PROGRESA would have a priori a positive eect on poverty in case we employed a full income approach (and
so we considered the value of leisure).
20Many studies have considered whether the introduction of public transfers aects private transfers among
the households targeted by the public scheme. For example, Cox and Jimenez (1992) argue that public cash
transfers may reduce the amount of private transfers to low-income households so that the net-income eect
may be signicantly less that the value of the public transfer. Albarran and Attanasio (2003) study this issue
with Progresa data and nd that the program does crowd our private transfers: both the likelihood to receiving
a transfer and the amount received conditional on receiving private transfers are signicantly and negatively
aected by the programme.
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P () =

1/N
 qX
i=1

z   yi
z

; (2.8)
where N is the total number of households, yi is the per capita income of the ith household,
z is the poverty line, q is the number of poor individuals, and  is the weight attached to the
severity of household poverty (or the distance from the poverty line). When  = 0, the FGT
measure collapses to the Headcount Index, or the percentage of the population that is below the
poverty line. When = 1 the FGT measure gives the poverty gap P(1), a measure of the average
depth of poverty. When  = 2, the FGT index becomes the severity of poverty index. The P(2)
measure assigns more weight to individuals that are further away from the poverty line21.
As described in section 3, relying on reported household income allows one to obtain the
dierence-in-dierences (2DIF) estimate of the impact of the program on poverty which compares
the change in a poverty measure in treatment villages to the changes in the corresponding poverty
measure in control villages. In addition to controlling for macroeconomic shocks common to
both treatment and control localities, this estimate allows one to account for any pre-existing
dierences in poverty between control and treatment localities and thus yield cleaner estimate
of the impact of the program on poverty.
The regression equation behind the estimation of PROGRESA's impact on poverty is:
P (i; t; ) = 0 + TT (i) + R2 (R2) + TR2 (T (i) R2)
+R3 (R3) + TR3 (T (i) R3) + R4 (R4) + TR4 (T (i) R4) +  (i; t)
(2.9)
where the left hand side variable P (i; t; ) is dened as
P (i; t; ) =

z   y (i; t)
z

 Poor (i; t) ; (2.10)
where y (i; t)denotes the income of household i in period/round t, z is the poverty line used,
 takes on the values 0, 1, and 2, and Poor (i; t) is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if
y (i; t)  z, and equal to 0 otherwise. Based on the specication of the regression equation
(2.9), the intercept term 0 is the estimate of the poverty rate (headcount ratio, poverty gap,
or the severity of poverty) in the control localities in the baseline round, while 0 + T is the
corresponding estimate of poverty in the treatment localities (in the baseline round).22 As
discussed above, the estimates of the parameters TR2, TR3, and TR4 are the 2DIF estimates
of the impact of the program in rounds 2, 3, and 4 of the survey.
In Table 2.4 we present the estimates of the parameters of equation (2.9) along with standard
errors adjusted for the clustering of households within villages. 23 The negative and strongly
21FGT poverty measures are related to stochastic dominance. In particular, rst-order stochastic dominance
(SD) implies that all P(a ) for a >0 are robust to the choice of the poverty line; the same applies for all a >1 for
second-order SD and for all a >2 for third-order SD.
22Along similar lines, 0 + R2 is the poverty rate in control localities in round 2 and 0 + T + R2 + TR2 is
the poverty rate in treatment localities in the same round.
23We have also estimated the impact of the program by symmetrically trimming the top and bottom ve
percent of the sample of observations in each round so as to eliminate extreme outliers from the sample. Using
the trimmed sample resulted in slightly lower impacts of the program on poverty. Overall, however, the estimates
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signicant estimates of TR2, TR3, and TR4 imply that PROGRESA had a signicant impact
in reducing poverty between November 1997 and November 1999. For example, using the 50th
percentile of the value of consumption per capita as a poverty line, suggests that the headcount
poverty rate declined by around 4.88% between November 1997 and November 1998 and by
18.11% in the November 1999 in treatment areas (using as base the 55.44% headcount poverty
rate in treatment localities in November 1997). Over the same period, and using as base the
corresponding value of the poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices in treatment areas in
November 1997, the poverty gap measure declined by 37.40%, and the severity of poverty measure
(squared poverty gap) declined by 47.42%. The higher impacts of the program in reducing
poverty over time are consistent with the ndings of Gertler et al. (2006), who demonstrated
that rural households increased their investments in micro enterprises and agricultural activities
which, in turn, improved the households' ability to generate income.
In general, these estimates are remarkably in line with the estimates obtained using ex-ante
simulations. These simulations are based on the predicted consumption of each household in
the evaluation sample in November 1997 and adding the maximum amount of PROGRESA
cash transfers an eligible household could receive assuming full compliance with the program's
requirements (see Skouas et al. (2001)). In particular, the results obtained from the simulated
impact of PROGRESA's cash transfers show that the headcount ratio is reduced by about 10%
through the supports of PROGRESA. The poverty gap and severity of poverty measures, that
place greater weight on the poorest households within the population in poverty, show that the
level of poverty according to the poverty gap is reduced by 30% whereas the severity of the
poverty index (squared poverty gap) is reduced by 45%.
The choice of a poverty line is a major concern when poverty measures are estimated. In ad-
dition to estimating program impact on poverty based on two alternative poverty lines, we also
conduct tests of stochastic dominance, up to order three, between the distribution of monthly
income in treatment and control areas for each round. As far as the program impact on poverty
is concerned, stochastic dominance of one distribution on the other can have important impli-
cations. The order of stochastic dominance achieved leads to dierent conclusions as regards
poverty measures considered, with rst-order stochastic dominance being the most stringent
criteria. For instance, if the distribution of income in treatment areas rst-order stochastically
dominates that in control areas, this implies that all the poverty measures we are considering
[headcount ratio P(0), poverty gap P(1), and squared poverty gap P(2)] will always show less
poverty in treatment areas no matter which poverty line is chosen. Higher orders of stochastic
dominance mean that poverty will be less in treatment areas regardless of the poverty line only
according to a smaller set of poverty measures; for example, second-order stochastic dominance
implies only P(1) and P(2) showing less poverty in treatment areas regardless of the poverty
line. In brief, stochastic dominance is explored here in order to understand whether there is
evidence of a program impact on poverty that is robust to choice of a poverty line.
Results from our test of stochastic dominance (for details see Davidson and Duclos (2000);
of the impact of the program on poverty did not change the results presented above in any substantial manner,
which implies that the role of outlier observations in income is trivial.
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test results are in 2.5.1) add some robustness to the evidence above. In particular, we nd that
the distribution of income for population of treated households rst-order stochastically domi-
nates that of control group in round June 1999 and November 1999 (while for round November
1998 we nd third-order stochastic dominance; see also gure 2.2 where we report the estimated
CDF's and poverty decit curves24). An implication of these results is that in June and Novem-
ber 1999 P(0) (and so P(1) and P(2)) will be always smaller in treatment than in control group
regardless of the poverty line chosen.
In conclusion, since we nd the strongest evidence of poverty reduction when we analyze
poverty gap and severity of the poverty index (poverty gap squared), which put greater weight
on the poorest of the poor, both the simulation and the actual ex-post results suggest that
the largest reductions in poverty of PROGRESA are being achieved in the poorest of the poor
population.
2.5.1  Test of Stochastic dominance and poverty
Test results
Z = grid point for income
D1 = statistics for distribution if households in treatment areas and poor
D2 = statistics for distribution if households in non treatment areas and poor
Nov 1999
Minimum test point is 22.631578
Maximum test point is 143.33333
Order 1
Z D1 D2 t-statistic
22.63 0.08 0.12 3.21
28.98 0.10 0.13 2.40
35.34 0.11 0.13 1.56
41.69 0.13 0.14 0.94
48.04 0.14 0.15 0.82
54.40 0.16 0.17 0.82
60.75 0.17 0.19 1.14
67.10 0.19 0.21 1.29
73.45 0.21 0.23 0.87
79.81 0.23 0.25 0.71
86.16 0.26 0.28 1.30
92.51 0.28 0.30 1.03
98.86 0.30 0.32 0.55
105.22 0.34 0.37 1.78
111.57 0.36 0.39 1.33
24The estimated CDF gives the P(0) for any level of income. Poverty decit curve is dened as the area under
the CDF up to some poverty line. If the poverty decit curve of one distribution lies above the poverty decit
curve of another, the rst distribution will always have more poverty according to the poverty-gap measure, P(1).
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117.92 0.38 0.41 1.05
124.28 0.41 0.44 1.46
130.63 0.44 0.47 1.70
136.98 0.46 0.50 1.72
143.33 0.49 0.52 1.48
Order 2
Z D1 D2 t-statistic
22.63 1.15 2.30 5.05
28.98 1.71 3.08 4.52
35.34 2.37 3.91 4.01
41.69 3.15 4.79 3.50
48.04 4.01 5.73 3.10
54.40 4.96 6.75 2.80
60.75 6.00 7.88 2.58
67.10 7.13 9.13 2.43
73.45 8.41 10.52 2.29
79.81 9.83 12.04 2.16
86.16 11.40 13.73 2.08
92.51 13.13 15.60 2.01
98.86 15.00 17.57 1.93
105.22 17.05 19.84 1.92
111.57 19.26 22.25 1.91
117.92 21.62 24.78 1.88
124.28 24.15 27.51 1.86
130.63 26.85 30.47 1.88
136.98 29.71 33.58 1.88
143.33 32.72 36.82 1.88
Order 3
Z D1 D2 t-statistic
22.63 10.89 24.48 5.52
28.98 19.91 41.56 5.23
35.34 32.82 63.76 4.91
41.69 50.33 91.36 4.57
48.04 73.05 124.71 4.24
54.40 101.51 164.29 3.94
60.75 136.29 210.72 3.68
67.10 177.93 264.70 3.45
73.45 227.21 327.05 3.26
79.81 285.06 398.63 3.10
86.16 352.41 480.38 2.95
92.51 430.24 573.48 2.83
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98.86 519.53 678.79 2.72
105.22 621.25 797.41 2.62
111.57 736.53 931.05 2.55
117.92 866.31 1080.39 2.48
124.28 1011.61 1246.36 2.42
130.63 1173.52 1430.43 2.37
136.98 1353.06 1633.74 2.32
143.33 1551.26 1857.31 2.29
Dominance achieved at order 3
June 1999
Minimum test point is 20.678703
Maximum test point is 130.96512
Order 1
Z D1 D2 t-statistic
20.68 0.11 0.20 8.30
26.48 0.13 0.21 6.52
32.29 0.16 0.21 4.55
38.09 0.17 0.22 3.72
43.90 0.19 0.23 2.61
49.70 0.21 0.24 2.41
55.51 0.22 0.25 2.27
61.31 0.24 0.27 2.52
67.12 0.25 0.29 2.51
72.92 0.26 0.31 2.91
78.72 0.28 0.34 3.64
84.53 0.30 0.36 3.49
90.33 0.33 0.41 4.42
96.14 0.35 0.42 3.91
101.94 0.36 0.43 3.43
107.75 0.39 0.46 3.97
113.55 0.42 0.49 3.74
119.36 0.44 0.51 3.67
125.16 0.46 0.52 3.00
130.97 0.48 0.54 2.97
Dominance achieved at order 1
Nov 1999
Minimum test point is 25.789475
Maximum test point is 163.33334
Order 1
Z D1 D2 t-statistic
25.79 0.04 0.10 6.72
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33.03 0.05 0.11 6.16
40.27 0.06 0.11 5.82
47.51 0.07 0.12 5.66
54.75 0.08 0.14 6.83
61.99 0.09 0.17 7.27
69.22 0.10 0.19 7.16
76.46 0.12 0.22 7.83
83.70 0.14 0.24 7.37
90.94 0.16 0.29 8.24
98.18 0.18 0.31 7.23
105.42 0.21 0.35 8.05
112.66 0.24 0.38 7.59
119.90 0.27 0.41 7.23
127.14 0.30 0.44 6.63
134.38 0.34 0.48 6.73
141.62 0.37 0.50 6.41
148.86 0.40 0.54 6.71
156.09 0.42 0.56 6.45
163.33 0.45 0.57 5.66
Dominance achieved at order 1
2.6. Conclusions
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to alleviate current poverty through monetary
and in-kind benets, as well as reduce future levels of poverty by encouraging investments in
education, health and nutrition. The success of CCT programs at reducing current poverty
depends on whether, and the extent to which, cash transfers aect adult work incentives.
Based on the experimental design of PROGRESA's evaluation sample, our ndings yield
a very consistent answer. PROGRESA does not have any signicant eect on adult labor
supply choices. In particular, the results show that there has been no particular reduction
in labor market participation rates, as may have been predicted by some economic models of
behavior. There is some evidence that individuals, at least right after they started to receive
the transfers, may have used part of the grants to seek work in salaried activities and to reduce
their participation in perhaps less protable family enterprises. This impact, however, appears
to disappear over time (see the results for the last round, November 1999). In addition, there is
not much evidence to support the hypothesis that PROGRESA beneciaries use their transfers
to buy more leisure.
The success of CCT programs at reducing current poverty depends on whether, and the
extent to which, cash transfers aect adult work incentives. In particular, policy-makers have
concerns about possible adverse eects on labor supply, such as disincentive to work for eligible
households or even for non-eligible households (that might hope to become eligible for the
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program in future rounds of expansion of the program). It is then a welcome result nding that
PROGRESA is not having a signicant eect on adult labour supply (and so any adverse eect).
We also stress that the program does not have the objective of aecting adult labor supply, with
this suggesting that its design is working properly.
Our ndings on adult work incentives are reinforced further by the result that PROGRESA
leads to a substantial reduction in current poverty. The poverty reduction eects are stronger for
the poverty gap and severity of poverty measures, which put greater weight on the poorest of the
poor, and our evidence suggests that these estimated poverty measures are robust to the choice
of dierent poverty lines. As an additional piece of evidence, we notice that our results on the
PROGRESA impact on poverty rates are remarkably in line with the ex-ante simulated impact
of PROGRESA's cash transfers (as in Skouas et al. (2001)). Thus, ex-ante simulations that
ignore or assume away behavioral responses to the transfer (as in Bourguignon et al. (2003))
are likely to provide good estimates of the ex-post impact on poverty.
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Table 2.3: The impact of PROGRESA on leisure time of program
eligible (E=1) adults
Age group 
Pre-prog 
daily
hours
Men
Pre-prog 
daily hours 
Women 
Impact  Impact 
Jun-99  Jun-99 
coef. se t-stat  coef. se t-stat 
18-24 16.24 -0.321* 0.169 -1.9  17.18 0.026 0.087 0.3 
25-34 14.69 0.122 0.122 1  16.17 -0.236 0.148 -1.6 
35-44 14.64 -0.061 0.087 -0.7  16.65 -0.016 0.160 -0.1 
45-54 14.72 0.06 0.200 0.3  17.44 0.023 -0.230 -0.1 
55 + 16.63 -0.144 0.206 -0.7  19.21 0.09 0.150 0.6 
*=significant at 10% level 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of Households in Treatment Localities that Receive
the Transfers from Other Programs and PROGRESA
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Distribution Function and Poverty Decit Curve
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CHAPTER 3
Looking within the household: Impacts for individual outcomes
using aggregate household data
While most development policies target individuals, the estimation of the program im-
pact on individual outcomes might be a priori impossible due to lack of individual level
data on key variables, such as food consumption. This paper applies an approach to infer
individual outcomes impacts when only aggregate household data is available to estimate the
impact of a program. In particular, we estimate the impact of PROGRESA-Oportunidades
on individual caloric intake. Our main results show that the program is having a stronger
impact at younger ages (both for males and females) and for females up to age 30 (mothers).
These ndings are remarkably in line with the program's design. When we allow for house-
hold composition in the model, we show that number of children living in the household
can make a dierence in terms of response to the program. Another issue explored here
is whether there is asymmetric information within the household as regards food consump-
tion. Preliminary evidence show that women might not have a complete information on
food intakes of adult male members within the household.
3.1. Introduction
Most development objectives focus on the well-being of individuals. The welfare of an individual
is largely based on the set of economic and social interactions in which he/she is involved. These
interactions can aect, and be aected by, the creation, existence, and dissolution of institutions
within which the individual is situated, of which family and households are the most important
ones. Within family and households we commonly refer to the processes of allocation of resources
among individuals and the outcomes of those processes as intrahousehold resource allocation.
Development policies, while commonly targeting individuals, might be missing two important
points as far as the individual dimension is concerned. At the design stage policies do not
always acknowledge the intrahousehold resource allocation. One of the main results of the vast
literature1 on resource allocation models predicts that neglecting patterns of intrahousehold
inequalities can lead to policy failure2.
1See the review in Haddad et al. (1997)
2Examples are in Haddad and Kanbur (1992), Pelletier et al. (1991), Senauer and Garcia (1992), Beaton and
Ghassemi (1982), Kennedy and Alderman (1987), Apps and Savage (1989) and ?)
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Another problem arises at the interventions' evaluation stage: even if the program is tar-
geting individuals, it might be impossible to estimate the impact of the program on individual
outcomes simply because of lack of data at the individual level, with this being especially true for
nutritional outcomes. Obviously, the choice of collecting household level data (and not individual
data) is commonly dictated by reasons that are not directly related to the program's evaluation
process: household budget surveys are less expensive and require less time for the interviews;
individual surveys might be too intrusive, for example as regards eating habits; information
collected in household budget surveys might be more comparable between countries.
This paper focuses on this second issue since it shows how it is possible to estimate the
program impact on individual outcomes when only aggregate household data is available. In
particular, a methodology for inferring individual outcomes from aggregate household data, in-
troduced by Chesher (1997), is used to estimate the impact of PROGRESA3 on individual caloric
intake. Key features of the PROGRESA's design and evaluation sample make it very suitable
for the purposes of this paper: rst, while all the members of the household can potentially ben-
et from the program's benets, PROGRESA has a particular focus on improving educational,
health and nutritional status of specic members within the household: children and pregnant
and lactating mothers. In addition to this and as regards nutrition outcomes, consumptions of
food are only observed at the household level in the evaluation sample. Another key aspect refers
to the assignment of the program that is completely exogenous being based on randomization
between treatment and control localities.
The positive and signicant impact of PROGRESA on average household caloric availability
is an established result in the literature: ?) nd that by November 1999, beneciary households
in treatment localities obtained around 7% more calories than did comparable households in
control localities. Here we try to shed some light on how this increased caloric availability is
shared within the household. Our results show that the program is having a stronger impact
on caloric availability for younger ages (both male and females) and for females up to age
30 (mothers). This result is remarkably in line with the very program design, which focuses
particularly on welfare of children and their mothers.
A strong assumption of the simple food consumption model used to derive individual con-
sumption from aggregate data is separability between individual and household characteristics.
For instance, this assumption implies that the consumption levels of one child do not depend
on age and/or presence of other children in the household, which is undoubtedly a quite strong
assumption. We relax this assumption in a very simple way including dummies for some age
groups in our model. When we allow for household composition, we show that the dierent age
categories can make a dierence in terms of impact conrming the problems in maintaining the
assumption above.
One of the ndings motivated the analysis of another issue explored here: we nd that while
the estimated calorie-age prole for females displays reasonable values in terms of per capita
daily calorie, the prole for the sample of males shows unreasonably low values (especially for
3PROGRESA, now known as Oportunidades, is an intervention targeting poor households in rural Mexico
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adults; see results in section 3.5). We argue that this can be the result of asymmetric information
within the family regarding food consumptions. In particular, when the respondent to the survey
questions is female (in our sample 85% of respondents) she might not hold a complete information
of intakes of adult male members of the household and therefore she might be understating their
food consumption. Some preliminary evidence conrms this pattern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes PROGRESA's program
design and evaluation sample. The methodology for inferring individual outcomes when only
household level data is available is described in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we present the
estimated nutrient-age/sex prole. Section 3.5 present and discusses our results on individual
caloric consumption. The results after allowing for household composition are discussed in
section 3.6. In section 3.7 we present some evidence of the possible presence of asymmetric
information regarding food consumptions. Finally, section 3.8 draws some concluding remarks.
3.2. Progresa (now Oportunidades): details of the program and evaluation sample
Program and data are already described at length in chapter 1 and 2 (see section 1.3 and section
2.2). Here, we only add some details on some of the components of the program.
The health and nutrition component of the program aims to improve the health and nutri-
tional status of all household members with a special attention for children and mothers' welfare.
PROGRESA pursues its ends by the following interrelated sub-components: a basic package of
primary health care services, nutrition and health education for families and communities, im-
proved supply of health services and nutritional supplement for pregnant and lactating mothers
and young children. The nutritional supplement has the objective of prevent malnutrition in
infants and small children. In order to achieve this end the program provide a food supplement
to pregnant and lactating women and to children between 4 months and 2 years old. However,
the food supplement is provided anyway if signs of malnutrition are still noticed in children
between age 2 and 5 and in non-PROGRESA children. There are 2 type of food supplement,
one specic for pregnant and lactating women and one for young children. They are distributed
in packages of grams each and are ready-to-eat after hydration. A 40 grams daily ration of the
package (of dry product) supplies approximately one recommended daily allowance of selected
micronutrients. The packages are distributed to health centres trough DICONSA, an opera-
tional arm of the Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL). About 18000 DICONSA stores
are spread in rural areas. In particular, mothers pick up a one-month supply of the supplements
for each targeted household member during one of their visits to the clinic (they have to visit the
clinic at least once a month). Plàticas provided in the clinics address the issues of appropriate
use of food supplements and optimal child feeding.
Community participation and promotion of a culture of preventive care are the underlying
assumptions that characterize PROGRESA health and nutrition component. Beneciaries are
asked to visit health centres on a scheduled timetable basis and to attend health and nutritional
talks, plàticas. Only those households who comply for these requirements are then eligible to
receive the cash grant for food consumption (125 pesos per month between July and December
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1999).
As in previous chapters, our estimates will be exploiting the unique feature of PROGRESA
evaluation sample: randomization of localities between treatment and control group: 506 lo-
calities selected 320 were assigned to the treatment group and 186 to the control group, this
assignment corresponding to a probability of being assigned to the treatment (control) group of
60% (40%).
3.3. From household level data to individual outcomes.
In order to estimate consumptions for individuals using the household level consumption we
observe we use a method developed in Chesher (1997). The description of this method, which
follows, will largely draw on section 3 and 4 of Chesher (1997). Its building block is a simple
model of household food intakes. Consider a household with P people each with a consumption
of a given nutrient cp, p=1,. . . .,P. The characteristic of person p (for example, age and sex)
are denoted by xp, household composition is measured by a vector x = (x1,. . . ,xp) which lists
the characteristics of all household members and z denotes household characteristics such as
income, living in urban or rural areas, or being a farm household and, in principle, could contain
functions of household composition x. The average rate of consumption by person p conditional
on household composition and household characteristics can be then written as a function of
individual and household characteristics:
E [cpjx; z] = f(xp; z) (3.1)
In an intake survey of individuals we would observe cp and we could estimate these functions
directly. Having only a survey of household intakes, the estimation of these functions requires
further steps. We rst notice that during a given recording period household nutrient consump-
tion c is just the sum of nutrient consumption by individuals, in expectation we have:
E [cjx; z] =
PX
p=1
f(xp; z) (3.2)
With data on household consumption the function f(xg; z) could be estimated by exploiting
the moment conditions
E
248<:c 
PX
p=1
f(xp; z)
9=; g(x; z)jx; z
35 = 0 (3.3)
which hold for arbitrary functions g(x,z ). Chesher (1997) stresses that when only household
totals are available all that is available for estimating individual specic rates of consumptions
is a method such as the one above.
Some more structure is needed as regards the nutrient consumption functions f (xp; z). The
simplifying assumption we make is that these functions can be written as multiplicatively sepa-
rable functions of individual and household characteristics: f (xp; z) = f (xp)u (z). This means
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that ratios of consumptions by identical individuals (that is, having the same xp) in households
with dierent characteristics are the same for all types of individuals. In other terms, a change in
household characteristics will have the same relative eect at each individual type. For instance,
if we have only two types of households, rich and poor, and xp= age, then this assumption
is implying that the consumption of a given individual type in a rich household is going to
be always the same proportion of the consumption of the same individual type (that is, of the
same age) in a poor household at any age (that is, at any xp). Undoubtedly this is a strong
assumption, which is required to identify the individual consumptions when only household level
intakes are observed.
The individual characteristics we consider are age (ap) and sex (sp) with sp=1 if person is
male and 0 otherwise) and we allow for dierent functions for males and females:
f(xp) = spfM (ap) + (1  sp)fF (ap)
where fM () and fF ()are age-intake functions for respectively males and females.
Household characteristics are modeled with a parametric form, u (z) = exp (z0).
A parametric specication would be dicult to achieve for the age-intake functions, as the
underlying relationship between intake and age is complex and high non-linear: demand for
nutrients varies substantially over the life-cycle and is aected by tastes which also vary through
the life-cycle. The same nonparametric approach as in Chesher (1997) is followed here. In
particular, a roughness penalty approach4 is pursed, which amounts to add terms
Ps = 2S
Z 
d2fs (x)
dx2
2
dx (3.4)
to the objective function whose minimization determines the estimator on interest. A further
simplication assures that the optimization of the resulting roughness penalized objective func-
tion does not become intractable. In particular, we write the fM () and fF () as step functions
with points of increase at integer years of age:
fM (ap) = w
0
p
MfF (ap) = w
0
p
F
where wp = (wp;0; :::; wp;97) is a vector of binary indicators with wp;a = 1[aap<a=1] and 
M = 
M
0
; :::; M
97

and F =
 
F
0
; :::; F
97

Ages go from 0 to 97 because this is the age span recorded
in our sample. The model for expected household nutrient intake can then be written as:
E [cjx; z] =
240 + PX
p=1
n
Spw
0
p
 
M

+ (1  Sp)w0p
 
F
o35 exp(z0)
=

0 + n
0
M
M + n
0
F
F

exp(z0) (3.5)
where n
0
M and n
0
F containing counts of household members at each integer year of age.
4See Green and Silverman (1994) for an exposition of this approach.
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The constant 0is included to capture intakes of nutrients that are unrelated to numbers
of household members, for example food bought for human consumption but then fed to pets.
In addition to this, also food given to visitors or any other person not residing permanently
with the households (say a daily labourer) should be captured by the constant. This issue is
potentially particularly relevant in our sample of poor rural areas in Mexico.
Finally, estimators for parameters , M and F can be dened as:
argmin
;M ;F
"
HX
h=1
n
ch  

0 + n
0
hM
M + n
0
hF
F

exp(z
0
h)
o2#
(3.6)
where h identied households in our sample.
In order to add the roughness penalty to the objective function we consider the discrete
analogue of the roughness penalty (3.4), which is the sum of squared second dierences of the
elements of M and F , or 2
 
AM
0  
AM

and 2
 
AF
0  
AF

where  controls the amount
of smoothing , with  = 0 meaning no smoothing and the matrix A is matrix which produces
second dierences of the vector to which it is applied (notice that we use the same  for females
and males.
It can be shown that for this particular problem, the addition of the roughness penalties to
the objective function is equivalent to append a set of additional observations to the original
survey data [refer to Chesher (1997) for more details].
In principle, one can relax the strong identication assumption above and write a model in
which some household characteristics enter in a non separable way in the nutrient consumption
functions. This also constitutes a simple way of assessing the original identication assumption.
In particular, we allow a household composition variable, the number of household members of
age less than 15, to enter the f (xp; z) in a non separable way. We do not impose any particular
structure of the relationship between individual intake and household composition, but we allow
vectors M and F to dier at each age according to a categorical variable that divides the
households in 4 groups: no children age less than 15, 1 child; 2 or 3 children, 4 or more.
The model for nutrient consumption becomes:
E [cjx; z] =
240 + PX
p=1
n
Spw
0
p
 
Mc

+ (1  Sp)w0p
 
Fc
o35 exp(z0)
=

0 + n
0
M
M
c + n
0
F
F
c

exp(z0) (3.7)
where c takes values from 1 to 4. Under this specication, the vectors Mc and Fc include 4
parameters at each age.
Estimators of parameters in (3.7) can be obtained following the same steps described above.
It has to be stressed that the possibility of estimating such a model depends on the availability
of a large enough sample5.
5Allowing for our household composition categorical variable raised the number of parameters to estimated
from 98 (ages from 0 to 97) * 2 (male and female vectors) = 196 to 98 * 4 (categories of household members age
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As our objective here is to estimate the program impact on the nutrient intake at each age
and sex, we extend the nutrient consumption model in such a way to be able to estimate the
nutrient intake parameters and the treatment eects. Let T = 1 if household are in a treatment
locality (in which the program is operating) and 0 if in a control locality, then (3.7) can be
extended as follows:
E [cjx; z] =

0 + 0T + 
T;M
c n
0
MT + 
T;F
c n
0
FT + n
0
M
M
c + n
0
F
F
c

exp(z0) (3.8)
Under this specication vectors Mand Fwould estimate the average nutrient consumptions
of individual types living in control localities, Mand F the impact of the program on these
consumption, and the sums M + Mand F + F would give the average nutrient consumption
of individuals in treatment localities.
3.4. Nutrient intake-age/sex proles
A convenient way of summarizing the results of the estimation is to plot nutrient intakes against
age for each sex, this gives a nutrient-age prole. Proles with age on the x-axis and daily caloric
intake on the y-axis are reported in gure 3.1 for females and males. These are estimated with
a model that includes all the households with available data in our sample, this means that we
pool waves Oct 98, May 99 and Nov 99. As household characteristics we included household
poverty score and adult-equivalent (male, age 25) household size in addition to a set of variables
included as dummies for each category: spouse education level, number of children age 0-15,
head speaking indigenous language, living in a treatment locality, being eligible for the program
(poor), change in poverty status wave (densicacion), wave and state.
It not clear a priori how to assess whether the estimated prole gives a meaningful represen-
tation of the underlying relationship between calories and age. One obvious question is whether
the estimated caloric intakes are in line with biological requirements and with the main patterns
to be expected from a mere nutritional point of view. Naska, Vasdekis and Trichopoulou (2001)
have compared age-gender specic food availability based on data collected at the household
level with individual nutrition surveys for the same population nding that the individualiza-
tion procedure seems to work quite well in practice6.
Patterns that are well documented in the nutritional literature are the peak of energy intake
at puberty, the rise of the intake into middle age and a fall in old age. Our proles seem to be
generally quite in line with these patterns.
Another possible way to validating the estimated proles is to compare them with existing
individual consumption data from similar settings. In table 3.1 we compare our estimated caloric
intake with individual data from sample of individuals in Mexico and Colombia. In these samples
not all the age ranges are surveyed and/or reported, however it seems that our estimated proles
fare reasonably well compared to these benchmarks.
less than 15) * 2 = 784.
6The study uses household budget surveys and individual nutrition surveys of four European countries: Bel-
gium, Greece, Norway and UK.
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3.5. Impact of PROGRESA on caloric consumption
At the household level, previous studies (see Hoddinott and Skouas, 2004) show that households
in PROGRESA localities consume around 200 kcal per capita (or 7%) more than poor people
in control localities.
Even if this is a substantial positive impact and it gives a rst indication that the program is
successful in improving nutritional status of eligible families, we stress that this rst result does
not tell anything about program impact at individual level. In particular, program might have
an heterogenous impact across dierent member/groups within the household; for example, by
its very design PROGRESA has a special focus on children and mothers. We cannot estimate
directly outcomes at individual level due to unavailability of data at this level of aggregation.
Estimation is carried both on the treated group (pobre=1 and in PROGRESA communities)
and on the control group (pobre=1 and not in PROGRESA communities). Figure 3.1 and
3.2 reports the predicted per capita caloric consumption-age relationship both for the treated
and control group respectively for females and males. One main pattern that emerges is that
for younger ages the estimated calorie intake for treated group is higher than control group's.
Another interesting nding is that while the estimated values for caloric intake for females (see
gure 3.1) are not far from meaningful values (for example, daily recommended intake for girls
age 0-5 is around 890 kcal and 2000 kcal for adults), the values for males (see gure 3.2) are not
in line with benchmark intakes (recommended intake for a male age 15-19 is 3000 kcal). This
issue is explored further below.
The program impact (in our case treatment eect on the treated, TT) is the dierence
between the estimated caloric intake for treatment and control group. We compute this dier-
ence both for females (see gure 3.3) and males (see gure 3.4) together with 2 standard error
pointwise condence bands.
Our main ndings are that program seems to have a positive and sizeable impact only for
younger ages, both for males and females. Particularly for females positive impact lasts till age
30. These results are remarkably in line with the very program design: PROGRESA wants
to have an impact on the nutritional status of poor families, particularly of children and their
mother.
As robustness check we also re-estimate the calorie-age prole not allowing any longer for a
dierent function between males and females; the estimated calorie intake prole is in gure 3.5
and the impact in gure 3.6. These pooled results are consistent with ndings above: impact is
positive and signicant only for younger ages.
3.6. Allowing for household composition
A strong assumption of the simple food consumption model used to derive individual consump-
tion from aggregate data is separability between individual and household characteristics. For
instance, this assumption implies that the consumption levels of one child do not depend on
age and/or presence of other children in the household, which is undoubtedly a quite strong
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assumption.
Here, we relax this assumption in a simple way: we allow nutrient consumption at each age
to vary with number of children in the household. In particular, we consider 4 categories: living
in a household with no children 0-15, 1 children, 2 or 3 children, 4 or more and extend the
model as explained above in section 3.3. We do not separate between males and females here to
have enough observations in each cell (age-age category group).
As said this is a very simple way of allowing for household composition, however some
insights can be gained from gure 3.7 and 3.8 where we report the results of this exercise.
Figure 3.7 reports the impact for the four age categories at all ages: it seems that the dierent
age categories can make a dierence in terms of impact. As impacts at older ages are only
imprecisely estimated, we can focus on ages under 40, as we do in gure 3.8, to have a clearer
picture.
One interesting nding is that there is a positive impact of the program for individuals
below age 15 only if they live in household with 2 or 3 children or with 4 or more, while there
is no impact for one child households. This seem to suggest that the impact of the program
is manifest only when its intensity is above a certain level: program's operation imply that
households with more children would receive a bigger total transfer. Obviously, household in
these dierent categories have dierent characteristics and some of these might be related to
the way they respond to the program: for example, households with only 1 child are expected
to consist of younger parents which may still have a very high daily caloric requirement (which
will be nanced with the program's transfer, possibly leaving little to spend on the only child),
compared to households with older parents whose caloric requirement are expected to be lower.
3.7. Measurement error in sample of males?
One issue left unaddressed above is the fact that for the male calorie-age estimated prole we
nd values that are not close to reasonable ones, for example to recommended daily intakes.
One possibility is that some type of measurement issue is biasing estimates for our sample of
males. Due to randomization we can safely assume that this possible bias is aecting treated
and control group in the same way , with this meaning that estimates of program impact are
still unbiased. However, it is interesting to explore further the issue. One possible explanation
is that there is asymmetric information regarding food consumptions; respondents (to food
consumption questions) might not have a good information of household activities made by
specic age-sex groups within the family. Our sample is very asymmetric in terms of who
responds since respondent is a woman in 85% of questionnaires. Accordingly, it might be that
respondent women do not hold complete information on intakes of adult male members within the
household and therefore they are understating their food consumption. A previous study (Boozer
and Goldstein, 2003) explores a similar issue with a dataset from Ghana where husbands and
wives were interviewed separately and each respondent was asked to report its own expenditure,
the expenditure of their spouse (cross-reporting), and the expenditure of any other person in the
household that was used for household consumption. A major nding is that some components
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of consumption are private in nature, and thus essentially unobserved in the cross reports.
We try to test whether this measurement issue is in operation in our sample with a simple
strategy: estimation is repeated in the samples only female respondents (see gure 3.9) and
only male respondents (see gure 3.10).
One interesting nding is that when respondent is male the shape is dierent (increasing for
adults) and caloric intake is higher with respect to samples with dierent respondents (somewhat
closer to reasonable values) for adults. In addition to this, shapes for younger ages do not seem
substantially dierent.
In conclusion, we found some evidence of under-reporting of food intake (caloric intake) of
other-sex adult members in the household. In particular, since most of the respondents are
females in our sample, women seem to have distorted information on food intake of male adults,
with this explaining the unreasonable low values we nd for the estimated calorie-age prole for
men.
We are aware that this explanation is tentative and preliminary, however it seems to make
a case for further research on this issue.
3.8. Concluding remarks
This paper has shown how to estimate the program impact on individual outcomes when only
aggregate household data is available. This can be useful because, while most development
policies target individuals, the estimation of the program impact might be a priori impossible
due to lack of individual level data on key variables. In particular, we estimate the impact of
PROGRESA on individual caloric intake. This impact complements the results of a positive
and signicant impact of PROGRESA on average household caloric availability which is well
established result in the literature. Our results show that the program is having a stronger
impact on caloric availability for younger ages (both male and females) and for females up to
age 30 (mothers). This result is remarkably in line with the very program design, which focuses
particularly on welfare of children and their mothers.
A strong assumption of the simple food consumption model used to derive individual con-
sumption from aggregate data is separability between individual and household characteristics.
For instance, this assumption implies that the consumption levels of one child do not depend
on age and/or presence of other children in the household, which is undoubtedly a quite strong
assumption. We relax this assumption in a very simple way including dummies for some age
groups in our model. When we allow for household composition, we show that the dierent age
categories can make a dierence in terms of impact conrming the problems in maintaining the
assumption above.
One of the ndings motivated the analysis of another issue explored here: we nd that while
the estimated calorie-age prole for females displays reasonable values in terms of per capita
daily calorie, the prole for the sample of males shows unreasonably low values (especially for
adults; see results in section 3.5). We argue that this can be the result of asymmetric information
within the family regarding food consumptions. In particular, when the respondent to the survey
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questions is female (in our sample 85% of respondents) she might not hold a complete information
of intakes of adult male members of the household and therefore she might be understating their
food consumption. Some preliminary evidence conrms this pattern.
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Table 3.1: Estimated intakes vs. other sources
Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males
0-4 706 823 736 791 896 941
5-9 1218 1203 … … 1223 1310
10-14 1459 1538 … … … 1478 1586
15-19 1479 1618 … 1536 … 1492 1841
20-24 1543 1618 … 1561 … 1444 1874
25-29 1577 1780 … 1503 … 1458 2123
30-34 1757 1846 … 1521 … 1291 2124
35-39 1696 1804 … 1489 … 1271 2111
40-44 1551 1858 … 1467 … 1578 1767
45-49 1641 1937 … 1332 … 1290 2058
50-54 1639 1893 … … 1157 … 1214 1698
55-59 1540 1784 … … 1363 … 925 1693
60-64 1446 1804 … … … … 1113 2161
65-69 1299 1712 … … … … … …
70-74 1147 1694 … … … … … …
75 and older 903 1298 … … … … … …
All 1325 1583 … … … … 1299 1537
Age groups
820
1214
1492
Progresa ENSIN 2005PALINN99
Notes: columns labeled "Progresa" refer to our estimated intakes; "ENN99"
refers to the Mexican Encuesta Nacional de Nutricion 1999 (in particular,
we are reporting the values for rural areas which are the most comparable to
Progresa's villages); "PAL" refers to the baseline wave (2003) of the evalua-
tion sample of Programa Apoyo Alimentario. Localities included in PAL are
expected to be more marginalized than those in Progresa.; "ENSIN 2005"
refers to the Colombian Encuesta Nacional de la Situacion Nutricional. In
particular, we report the value for areas with dispersed population (rural)
which are the most comparable to Progresa's villages).
Figure 3.1: Nutrient-Age Prole Females
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Figure 3.2: Nutrient-Age Prole Males
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Ca
lo
ric
 In
ta
ke
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Age
Treated Control
Treated vs Control − Poor − Males
Figure 3.3: Impact Females
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Figure 3.4: Impact Males
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Figure 3.5: Nutrient-Age Prole Pooled
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Figure 3.6: Impact Pooled
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Figure 3.7: Allowing for Household Composition - All ages
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Figure 3.8: Allowing for Household Composition - under 40
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Figure 3.9: Female Proles and Respondents
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Figure 3.10: Male Proles and Respondents
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CHAPTER 4
Community nurseries and the nutritional status of poor children.
Evidence from Colombia
In this paper, we use two dierent datasets and three dierent instruments to estimate
the impact of a long-established pre-school nursery program (Hogares Comunitarios) on the
nutritional status of beneciary children. As placement in the programme is endogenous, we
use variables related to cost (fee, distance to the nursery) and program availability (capacity
of the program in the town) as instruments. One of our datasets is representative of very
poor individuals living in rural areas of Colombia, while the other focuses in urban areas
and include individuals relatively less poor. We nd evidence that program participation
increases the height of participating children, with the size of the eect being remarkably
consistent across the three instruments and the two datasets, which is informative about the
external validity of our estimates. We also pay careful attention to scrutinize the internal
validity of the eects that we nd.
4.1. Introduction
Malnutrition amongst children is a very prevalent phenomenon in developing countries. Accord-
ing to Onis et al. (2000) approximately one third of children below the age of ve are stunted
in growth. Malnutrition and ill health in infanthood are not only welfare decreasing, but they
are associated with poor cognitive and educational performance (Behrman 1996, Strauss and
Thomas 1998, Glewwe et al. 2001, Alderman et al. 2001, Maluccio et al. 2006, Walker et
al. 2007) as well as low productivity later on in life (Strauss and Thomas 1998, Schultz 2005,
Hoddinott et al. 2008). Therefore, given the importance of early years status for subsequent
development, to establish which interventions are the most eective in improving child nutri-
tion and development in poor and middle income countries is an important research and policy
question (Bhutta et al. 2008, Engel et al. 2007, Horton et al. 2008).
The objective of this paper is to estimate how children's nutritional status is aected by
participating in Hogares Comunitarios (HC), a community nursery programme established by
the Colombian government to provide childcare and food to pre-school children. The programme
expanded rapidly since its introduction in 1986 and is currently one of the largest welfare pro-
grammes in Colombia: there are approximately 80,000 HC centres distributed across all munic-
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ipalities in the country and about one million children, from the poorest Colombian families,
attend a HC centre. The cost of the programme, which is nanced by a 3% tax on the wage
bill, is approximately 250 million US$, or almost 0.2% of Colombian GDP.
Programmes similar to HC are also being implemented in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru
and other countries. Their attractiveness arises from the fact that these programs use community
(human) resources and can be relatively inexpensive. Despite their importance, little is known
about their eect on children's nutritional status or development. Recent reviews on strategies to
improve child nutrition in developing countries are noticeably silent about their possible eects
(Bhutta et al. 2008). In this respect, HC is no exception: little is known about its impacts on
children nutritional status and development. Such lack of impact estimates is possibly associated
with the fact that many of these programmes were established a long time ago, at which time
an impact evaluation was not factored into their design, such as for instance by potentially
exploiting the roll out of the programme, as has been the case for recent conditional cash
transfer and micronutrient supplementation programs.
A credible evaluation of HC (or similar programmes) is challenging for all of the reasons for
which targeted programmes are dicult to evaluate. The comparison between children attend-
ing a community nursery and children not attending one is problematic because participants and
non-participants might be dierent in unobservable variables that, simultaneously, drive partic-
ipation and the outcomes of interest. Conducting a randomized trial, and randomly providing
HC to a subset of eligible children, would be challenging because the programme is by now so
widespread. Given this situation, we estimate the eect of HC using an instrumental variable
approach, using as instruments variables that proxy for the availability of the programme and,
therefore, drive participation but do not aect outcomes directly. In particular, we consider
several cost variables, including distance to the nearest HC, the fees charged and the number of
places available in a given municipality relative to the eligible population. Given our research
strategy, we discuss extensively the identication assumptions we make and pay particular at-
tention to issues of both the internal and external validity of the estimates we obtain.
We estimate the impact of HC using two dierent data sets. The rst was collected to
evaluate the impact of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme in Colombia (Familias en
Accion, from now on FeA sample) and includes small rural localities. The second is the 2005
Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud (ENDS sample), which is nationally representative,
and hence includes larger localities. Individuals in the ENDS sample are, on average, less poor
than those in the FeA sample. Estimating the eects on two datasets with dierent characteris-
tics and the availability of three dierent instruments constitutes an important strength of our
approach, as it allows us to address the external validity of our results.
We measure programme participation in two dierent ways: exposure (the fraction of a
child's life that is spent in a HC centre) and attendance (whether or not the child is attending
a HC centre at the time of the survey). We nd that the derivative of child's height with
respect to exposure is 95% of one standard deviation in the FeA sample and 123% for the ENDS
sample. We nd that attendance increases child's height by 50% of a standard deviation in the
FeA sample (80% in the ENDS sample). Our estimates imply that the programme has sizeable
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eects: a 60 month old child that has spent 24 months in a HC nursery would be 1.6% (2%)
taller in the FeA (ENDS) sample or 38% (49%) of one standard deviation of age-adjusted height.
These estimates are well within experimental estimates of nutrition interventions. A recent meta-
analysis concluded that provision of complementary food in food-insecure populations resulted
in average increase of 41% of one standard deviation of age-adjusted height (Bhutta et al. 2008).
Because policy-makers might favour a given increase in height if is obtained by improving
the lower tail of the distribution than by improving the upper tail, we also estimate quantile
treatment eects. We nd that the impact of the program is considerably higher for lower
quantiles and almost zero for the top quantiles.
It is well-known that if the eects of a programme are heterogeneous, instrumental variable
estimates identify the eect of the programme for those whose participation decision is sensitive
to the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). We use three dierent instruments (distance from
the household to the nearest nursery, fee charged to parents in the locality and local availability
of the places in community nurseries) but obtain extremely similar impacts with each of them
which favourably speaks of the external validity of our estimates.1 An attractive feature of
our instruments is that they constitute policy variables that policy makers could manipulate to
modify coverage of the program. Hence, our estimates are informative about the eect of the
programme on those individuals whose participation status might change as a result of a policy
decision.
As it is generally the case, the credibility of our results coincides with the credibility of
our identication assumptions. For this reason, we discuss at length the plausibility of our
instruments and our identication assumptions as well as the interpretation of our results. Our
main arguments are the following. First, we present a plausible model of individual behaviour
(sketched in Section 4.3), that justies the instruments we use and provide a clear interpretation
to the parameters we estimate. The model gives us a conceptual framework that we can use both
to spell out the assumptions that are necessary for the instrument to be valid and to interpret
the estimates we obtain. Second, as one of our instruments is the distance from the closest HC,
we present evidence that households do not move to be closer to HC nurseries, and that our
covariates adequately control for location eects. Third, while we use dierent instruments on
dierent data sets (partly because of the nature of the data and partly because of the dierent
contexts from which the dierent data are drawn), we obtain very similar results. Fourth, using
the same instruments, we run so-called placebo regressions on variables that should not be
aected by the program (such as birth weight) and show that indeed they are not. Fifth, we
also carry out a sensitivity analysis which shows that our conclusions are robust to substantial
violations of our identication assumptions.
The HC programme was established long time ago. While this presents its evaluation with
some dicult problems, it has also its advantages. In particular, provided our estimates are
credible, we are evaluating a programme in its maturity, after policy-makers have had time
to adjust it and modify it as necessary. As with any other program, it is probably true that
1Though fee and availability are correlated with each other, distance is basically uncorrelated with both fee
and availability.
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the programme is dierent now compared to when it started. The programme might have
deteriorated due to decreased motivation, corruption or program guidelines not being enforced.
Alternatively, policy-makers may have solved initial bottlenecks and the programme may in
fact work better now than at the beginning.2 Either way, we are estimating the impact of HC
after the programme has evolved for a long-time and probably reached its maturity. This is
hardly possible to do using a randomized experiment because it would be unethical to randomly
exclude communities from beneting of the program for a long time.3 Considering this long-
term assessment is particularly important in community based programmes because they draw on
community resources (which makes them relatively inexpensive to implement), but are dicult
to monitor and depend on the motivation of community members.
Our paper is related to at least two dierent strands of the literature. First, to the evaluation
of nutritional policies in developing countries. Within this literature, our paper is closest to
Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004) who considers a matching approach to evaluate PIDI, a
program very similar to HC implemented in Bolivia. Ruel et al (2006) and Cueto et al. (2009)
study another two nursery programs in Guatemala and Peru, respectively. We briey discuss
these studies in Section 4.6.3. Second, our ndings are also very relevant in the context of
the recent literature that highlights the importance of early child development (see for instance
Currie 2001, Heckman and Masterov, 2005 and Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). It is argued
that early childhood is the most cost eective period in a person's life in which to invest (Carneiro
and Heckman, 2005; Heckman and Masterov 2005; Engle et al. 2007). Indeed evaluations of
the Head Start programme in the US have shown that large-scale pre-school programs can have
impacts on later educational attainment (Currie and Thomas 1995 and 1999; Garces, Thomas,
and Currie 2002, Ludwig and Miller 2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we describe the operation of
the programme. In section 4.3, we provide a theoretical framework that helps us in choosing
an empirical strategy and in interpreting the results we obtain. We stress in particular that
the parameter we estimate identies the overall eect of the program, including both direct
and indirect eects. In section 4.4, we briey describe the two data sets we use to estimate
the impact of the programme. In Section 4.5, we present some evidence in support of our
identication strategy. Section 4.6 presents the main empirical results of the paper, section 4.7
provides support to the credibility of our identication strategy. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2. The Hogares Comunitarios programme
In the late 1970s, the Colombian government proposed a new nutrition intervention targeted
towards poor families. The programme, called Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar Familiar,
was legislated in 1979 as the development of previous initiatives that focussed on community
2See Banerjee et al (2008) for an example of a program that has positive impact in the rst six months but
the impact disappears after 18 months due to collusion between the authorities and the target of the program.
3Experiments would be useful to study how the program can be improved. See Attanasio et al (2010) for
experimental estimates of how improving the physical infrastructure of the nurseries aects children's nutritional
status.
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participation and initiatives to target nutrition and child development.
The programme started its operation between 1984 and 1986 and was run by the Instituto
Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF). At the beginning, the ICBF regional oce targeted
poor neighbourhoods and localities and encouraged eligible parents with children aged 0 to
6 to form `parents associations'. After a few meetings with programme ocials, the parents
association was registered with the programme and elected a madre comunitaria (or community
mother). This mother had to satisfy some criteria, such as having basic education and a large
enough house and would be certied by the regional oce of the ICBF. The madre comunitaria
would cook and take care in her house of up to 15 children aged 0 to 6. Each family would pay
a small monthly fee, which would be used to complement the madre comunitaria's salary. The
fee is negotiated between the parent's association and the madre comunitaria and is approved
by the local oce of the ICBF.
The ICBF provides the funds to purchase the food, which is kept at the madre comunitaria's
fridge. Children are fed three times daily: lunch and two snacks. The children would also
be given a nutritional beverage called bienestarina. According to ICBF, the food received by
the children (including the beverage) would provide them with 70% of the recommended daily
amount of calories.
Eligibility is proxy-means tested, using the so-called SISBEN categories. In Colombia, house-
holds are assigned a SISBEN category (which ranges from 1 to 6, with 1 being the poorest) on
the basis of the value of their SISBEN score, which is constructed using dierent indicators of
economic well being. Most welfare programmes in Colombia are targeted using the SISBEN
categories and SISBEN registries are periodically updated by the local authorities. Households
can request to be given a SISBEN test to be assigned to a SISBEN category. Children are
eligible to participate in HC if they belong to SISBEN 1 and 2 (although we do nd SISBEN 3
children in one of our data).
After the start of the programme and its rapid growth, the turnover among the madre
comunitarias was substantial. According to ocials of the ICBF, between 10 and 15% of the
existing HC are relocated in each year, in that a madre comunitaria ceases to be such and a
new madre starts to operate it. Moreover, if a household moves to a certain neighbourhood, it
can normally register its children in an existing HC, if there are spaces available. It seems that
over time, the HC have evolved into relatively mobile and informal nurseries and have lost some
of the tight connection with the original parents association. Nowadays, one parent association
is responsible for between 15 and 20 HC nurseries. However, Madres Comunitarias, have to be
certied by the ICBF, they have a constant contact with it and they have to provide the ICBF,
at least in theory, with records of children development and growth.
In rural and isolated areas, an apparently common problem is the diculty to set up a new
HC because the ICBF does not start a new centre unless there are a sucient number of children
who want to attend. This issue seems to be present in many communities. On the other hand,
in urban areas, the constraint seems to be the number of places available: in many situations
HC have waiting lists.
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4.3. Estimating the impact of Hogares Comunitarios on eligible children.
The main aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of the availability of the community
nursery on the nutritional status of eligible children who choose to attend them. This exercise
is a non trivial one for several reasons. First and foremost, as is common in the evaluation of
large programmes that have been operating for a long time, it is dicult to identify a credible
counterfactual that would allow us to measure the average nutritional status of eligible children
in the absence of the programme. The programme is widely available and many of the eligible
children that do not attend do so by choice. Second, the programme changes not only the
nutritional input the children who attend a HC, but also a variety of other variables that are
likely to aect their physical (and cognitive) development. In addition to food, the programme
provides child care, therefore making it easier for the mother to work (and therefore provide
additional resources to the household). The programme is not, by and large, free, so that
monetary resources are used for participating into it. Parents are likely to change the allocation
of resources and, in particular, food as a consequence of sending a child to an HC. A diculty
arises from the fact that in the data we use some of the determinants of children nutritional status
(that are likely to be aected by participation to HC) are not observed. Third, the programme's
impacts are likely to be dierent for dierent children and the decision to attend a HC is likely
to be driven by the perceived potential benet to the child. For instance, a child who lives in
a very poor household might experience an improvement in her environment when attending
an HC, while a child from a not too poor household might be experiencing a worsening of her
environment if she attends an HC. This heterogeneity in potential benets, therefore, might
aect our results and the interpretation of the estimates our identication strategy yields.
In addition to these conceptual and theoretical issues, there are also a number of practical
issues concerning the specication of our empirical exercise. We will be discussing these issues
in the second part of this section.
4.3.1  A conceptual framework.
To explain the empirical strategy we use to tackle these issues and, at the same time, provide an
interpretation of the results we will be presenting, it is worthwhile to sketch a simple model of
individual behaviour, along the lines considered in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). To discuss
the issues mentioned above, it is useful to consider a household that maximizes a utility function
that depends on consumption and children nutritional status:
MaxU (X;H; L) (4.1)
subject to the following restrictions:
H = H (A;F;L; z; ") (4.2)
X = Y   pF   qA+ w(L DA) (4.3)
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where H is the child's nutritional status, F is food fed to the child, X is other consumption, L is
female labour supply, A is attendance to the HC, p the price of food, q is the fee for attendance
to a HC, D is the distance from the household to an HC and Y is other income. The household
chooses A, F, and L. For expositional simplicity we are assuming here that all choice variables
are continuous. Equation (4.3) is the budget constraint that reects the importance of cost
variables (the distance to a HC and fee). Equation (4.2) is the production function of human
capital which is aected by the dierent inputs F and A, and by a vector of observable variables
z, which are assumed to aect the outcome of interest (i.e. maternal height and education).
The question about the impact of the programme can be framed in terms of the identication of
the production function (4.2) and, in particular, the partial derivative of the function H () with
respect to A, attendance to a HC, which is seen here as one possible input. The unobservable (to
the econometrician) random variable " reects other factors that aect the outcome of interest.
The three issues we considered above can be summarized in terms of the features of the model
considered. Suppose that the production function in equation (4.2) can be approximated by a
linear function:
Hi = #+ iAi + Fi + Li + zi + "i (4.4)
where the subscript i indicates the child. The rst problem discussed above arises from the
fact that the household chooses the variables A, F, and L. These choices will depend on the
exogenous variables of the model (p, q, z, D, Y, w and "). As a consequence, an OLS regression
of H on the inputs will not yield consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, even when
the coecient on A is constant, as households will react to information on ". The second issue
stems from the fact that in many data sets, we have no information on F. Finally, impact
heterogeneity is reected in the fact that the parameter i varies with i and might aect the
choice of the inputs.
We have written the model so that, at least for the case in which the coecient on A is a
constant, a relatively simple solution is oered by an Instrumental variable approach. Variables
that reect the cost of the various inputs, such as q, w, D and p, can plausibly be used as
`instruments' for the quantities F, L and A. To see this, one can solve for the optimal F, L and
A as a function of the exogenous variables and use such equations as a `rst stage', followed by
a `second stage' estimation of equation (4.4). The plausibility of this identication strategy will
then depend on the plausibility of the assumption that the variables used as instruments (D, q,
p, w and Y ) are exogenous and can be excluded from equation (4.4).
The fact that some of the inputs, such as F, are not observable implies that the coecient 
cannot be estimated. To see this, abstract from L and think of regressing H on A, instrumenting
the latter with `cost variables' (such as D or q). The omission of F from such a regression,
however, induces a correlation between the instruments used and the residual terms that includes
F. The latter is an alternative input that will react to A. Therefore, such a strategy will not
yield a consistent estimate of the coecient , the marginal productivity of A in the production
function for H. Indeed, such a coecient is not identied without strong and tight parametric
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assumptions about the separability of the utility function and of the production function. Notice
that this lack of identication does not depend on the nature of the instrument used and would
hold even with a perfect instrument, such as the random allocation of A across children with
perfect compliance. The problem stems from the unobservability of F.
What is identied in this context, and what we will be reporting in our empirical results,
is the overall impact of A, including the indirect eect that works through changes induced in
other inputs, such as F and L. To be more precise, write the demand function for F, and L
conditional on the optimal level of A as:
Fi = f (Ai; p; w; q;D; Y ) (4.5)
Li = l (Ai; p; w; q;D; Y ) (4.6)
and let dene fA =
@f
@A and lA =
@l
@A . The overall eect of A, neglecting for the time being its
possible heterogeneity across individual children, is given by + fA + lA which is composed
of a direct eect (measured by the marginal product of A in H (.) ) and the indirect eect
that works through changes in F and L. In order to estimate the overall eect of A, we will use
instrumental variables to estimate the coecient of Ai in the following regression:
Hi = e#+ eAi + ezi + e"i: (4.7)
where we have neglected again the possible heterogeneity of e.
Having claried the meaning of the parameters we will be estimating, we need to deal with
the last issue, which is the possible heterogeneity of the impacts that the HC program might
have. The problem, which is particularly serious when selection into the program depends
on the impact heterogeneity, is obviously not new, and has been described extensively in the
literature. In terms of our exercise, it aects the interpretation of the results we obtain from
our IV specication. In particular, we will be estimating the Local Average Treatment Eect
(LATE) which considers the eect for individuals whose treatment participation is sensitive to
the instrument used (see Imbens and Angrist 1994, Angrist and Imbens 1995). Since we will be
using three dierent instruments, we will estimate three dierent LATEs, which are going to be
estimates of the treatment eect for groups of individuals who are likely to be dierent as their
participation can be aected in a dierent way depending on the instrument used. As such, our
results are informative about treatment heterogeneity and the external validity of our results.
4.3.2  The empirical specications: treatment indicators and instruments
In sketching our conceptual framework, we have treated the use of the HC programme as a
continuous variable. In our empirical specication, however, we consider two alternative def-
initions of `treatment': attendance and exposure. Attendance is dened according to whether
or not the child is currently attending a HC nursery. Exposure is dened as the number of
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months in which the child has attended a HC during his or her life divided by the child's age
in months, therefore dening treatment as the fraction of his or her life spent in a HC nursery.
This indicator considers the intensity of treatment as in Angrist and Imbens (1995).
As instruments, we consider three variables: the ratio of the number of places available in
HC to the total number of children aged 2-64 from SISBEN 1 and 2 families in the locality
(an indicator of programme availability, which we will be referring to as `capacity'), distance
from the household to the nearest HC nursery and median fee paid by children to attend a
HC nursery in the locality (as indicators of cost of participation both in terms of time and
money). 5 We obtain the number of places available in each municipality directly from the
ICBF administrative data and consequently this instrument can be used with both datasets.
ICBF does not collect information on the fee paid by children in each locality and hence we
compute it using a household survey. Both fees and distance to the nearest nursery are only
available in the FeA survey. However, conversations with program ocial indicated that distance
is not an important constraint in large urban towns that make the most of the ENDS sample.
Descriptive statistics for the three instruments are shown in 4.6.3.
4.4. The data
The main data we use in this paper come from two household surveys. The rst covers small
towns and is part of the survey originally collected to evaluate a conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme called Familias en Acción. The second data source, which we use to evaluate the impact
of the programme in urban areas nationwide, is the Encuesta Nacional de Demograa y Salud,
the Colombian version of a Demographic and Health Survey.
4.4.1  The Familias en Acción Survey
Between 2001 and 2002, the Colombian government started a conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme, modelled after the PROGRESA programme in Mexico. This program, called Familias
en Acción (FeA from now on) has an education, and a health component and is directed to
the poorest families (in the SISBEN 1 category) living in the municipalities targeted by the
program. The targeted communities were relatively small towns (less than 100,000 inhabitants
and no departmental capitals) with a bank and enough education and health infrastructure.6
The households included in the survey had to satisfy the eligibility rules of FeA that is they had
to be registered as SISBEN 1 as of December 1999 and have children aged 0 to 17. This implies
that our sample is representative of the poorest households in small towns.7
4We chose age 2 to 6 because below age 2 only less than 20% of children enrol in HC. However, our results
are not sensitive to choice of the age range in the construction of the HC capacity variable.
5Tuition fees and distance to college has been used as an instrument for schooling by Card (1993), Kane and
Rouse (1993), Kling (2001), and Cameron and Taber (2004), Currie and Moretti (2002), Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytacil (2006).
6An additional condition (that turned out to be binding in some situations) was that the mayoral oce had
to process some documents and have a list of potential beneciaries ready.
7See Attanasio et al 2003 for more information on the survey. The data is publicly available from:
http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Programas/Sinergia/HerramientasyProductosdelSistema/Basesdedatos/tabid/226/Default.aspx
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As we are interested in evaluating the impact of the HC programme and we want to avoid
contaminations by FeA, in what follows we focus on the towns where FeA was not implemented
(towns to serve as controls in the evaluation of FeA). They were chosen as the most similar
to the treatment towns according to population size, population living in the urban part of
the municipality, and the value of the ocial synthetic index for Quality of Life. In the rst
(summer 2002) and second wave (between July and November 2003), there are 65 municipalities
where FeA was not implemented. Between the second and third wave (between December 2005
and March 2006) of data, the FeA programme started in 13 municipalities that were part of the
control group in the rst and second wave. So, only 52 municipalities are used in the third wave
of data. As a consequence, and because of the natural ageing of households, the third wave
includes considerably fewer children than the rst two.
In addition to a very large number of questions covering consumption, income, school atten-
dance, labour supply and a variety of other variables, the questionnaire also included a number of
questions about current and past attendance of each child to a HC. In particular, for each child,
we know whether he or she is currently attending a HC, and, for each year of the child's life,
how many months he or she had attended a HC. Finally, and importantly for our identication
strategy, if a child is attending a HC centre, we know the distance from the household to the HC
centre. If the child is not attending a HC centre, we know the distance to the nearest HC. For
each child that has ever attended a HC centre, we also ask for the fee that they currently pay or
that they used to pay when they attended. Children aged 0 to 6 were weighed and measured.
The fee paid for attending a HC centre and municipality wages as reported by the town
major were collected in the second and third wave of data but not in the rst one. For the rst
wave, we use the values collected in the second wave. We do not think that this is a major
problem as the rst and second wave were collected only 12 months apart. The distance to
the health centre and school was collected for the whole sample in the second and third wave
only. For the rst wave of data, we use distance to the health centre, and school collected in the
second wave of data.
4.4.2  Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud
The FeA survey gives us an important opportunity to estimate some of the impact of the
programme in small towns and rural areas. To explore the external validity of our estimates,
we also use the Encuesta Nacional de Demograa y Salud (ENDS from now on) and focus in
its urban sample. The ENDS includes information on basic household demographics, children
anthropometrics, and, importantly for us, participation in HC. The survey is less detailed than
the FeA survey in some aspects, and does not include information on the fee paid to attend a
HC centre, nor the distance from the household the HC nursery.8 Some other variables, such
as distance to other facilities (school, health centre, town hall) and some municipality level
variables are also missing from the ENDS (see Table 4.1 for details).
8The ENDS only asks distance to those that attend the HC nursery, but the question was skipped for non-users.
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4.4.3  Descriptive Statistics.
The sample of FeA and ENDS dier in two main dimensions: type of municipality and SISBEN
level. The towns in the FeA sample are reasonably small: the average population in 2001 was
25k and even the town at the 75th% percentile had less than 30k inhabitants. Only one town is
larger than 100k, and none of them are capital of departments. These localities are eminently
rural although 52% of the population live in the main part of the town rather than dispersed in
the countryside. For the towns included in the ENDS sample, the average population in 2005 was
127k. The ENDS includes large metropolitan areas as well as selected capitals of departments.
The population in the FeA sample is extremely poor, as they all belong to the lowest level
of SISBEN. The ENDS sample includes all levels of SISBEN but we constrain our sample to 3
or below because of the rules governing eligibility to HC.9 Hence, the population in the ENDS
sample is less poor than the FeA sample. Average family size is 7 (5.5) in the FeA (ENDS)
sample. In the FeA sample, most mothers (58%) have not nished primary education, while
most mothers (61.4%) nished secondary education in the ENDS sample. The value of a longer
list of variables is compared in Table 4.1.
As regards nutritional status indicators, we follow the literature in not using height directly,
but we construct the so-called z-scores for these variables standardizing them by age and sex
according to the World Health Organization/Centre for Disease and Control (WHO/CDC) ref-
erence population. In particular, the z-score for height per age is obtained from the height of a
child, subtracting the median height of and dividing by the standard deviation of height of the
WHO/CDC reference population of the same age and gender. A child is dened as `chronically
malnourished' if is her or his z-score for height per age is less than -2.
The children in our sample have a decit in height. The average height per age z-score (which
should be zero in a healthy sample) is -1.25 in the FeA sample and -0.77 in the ENDS sample.
Moreover, 23.7% and 11.2% of children are chronically malnourished in the FeA and ENDS
sample respectively. However, they do not have a decit in `weight per height' nor problem
of obesity.10 Height is thought to reect more accurately than other variables the `stock of
nutrition' and therefore is considered a good indicator of long run nutritional status. For these
reasons, we focus the analysis in what follows on the impact of the programme on child height.
In Table 4.2 we report the percentage of children who attend a HC by age. Two features
are worth stressing. First, attendance rates have an inverted U shape, being highest at age
3 and 4 for the FeA and ENDS sample respectively. They are particularly low for very young
children. Second, either the programme does not seem to be extremely popular or the availability
is limited, as attendance rates do not achieve 50%, even for children 3 or 4 years old.
Our surveys ask, for each child that does not attend an HC, the main reason for not attending.
In Table 4.3, we report the percentages reporting a specic reason, for dierent age groups. The
9Though in principle eligibility is constrained to levels 1 and 2, we nd that 31% of children with level 3
participate in the HC programme. Because of missing values in the responses to the SISBEN question, we
compute the SISBEN level using information in the survey and the SISBEN formula.
10The percentage of children acutely malnourished their weight is too low for their height- is only 1.2% and
1.5% in the rural and urban sample, respectively. The percentage of obese children is 1.9% and 0.6%..
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most common reason for not attending is the availability of child care at home. As to be
expected, this is particularly relevant for the youngest children. For the oldest children, the
importance of the `other' reasons is explained by the fact that a signicant proportion of these
children are in school. Interestingly for our analysis, the distance from the nearest HC is an
important reason for not attending a HC in rural areas but much less nationwide. Similarly,
the fee that has to be paid to attend a HC centre seems to be an important reason in the rural
sample, but not in the ENDS sample
In Table 4.4, we report the mean and three percentiles (25th, 50th and 75th) for our three
instruments. In the left-hand panel we consider the statistics computed over the whole sample,
while on the right hand panel, we restrict our attention to the sample of participants to HC. As
expected, participants tend to live close to HC centres
4.5. The identication strategy
Whether a child participates or not in HC is a choice that parents make, and, consequently,
we consider it endogenous. To tackle this problem we use an instrumental variable approach.
In section 4.3, we discussed a model that justies the use of cost variables (and indirectly
availability) as instruments and gave an interpretation to the estimates one gets following an
IV approach. The crucial assumption, of course, is that the instrumental variables do not enter
directly as determinants of H(.) in equation (4.7). In addition, the instruments must be drivers
of participation. The latter condition is easy to test using the rst stage equations; the former
condition remains an important assumption. We start this section providing the results on
the rst stage regressions, and we devote the rest of the section to justify our identication
assumption. In section 4.7, we provide more evidence to support our empirical strategy and our
identifying assumptions.
4.5.1  First Stage Regressions.
As discussed in section 4.3.2, we use two dierent variables to measure participation in HC
(attendance and exposure) and three dierent instruments: distance from the residence to the
nearest HC, the median fee in the locality, and the availability of HC places relative to eligible
children in the locality. The results of the rst stage regression are in table 4.5. Note that, for
each instrumental variable, we have included both linear and quadratic terms. Note also that,
in the case of distance, we use both the distance as measured in the most current survey and
as measured in the rst wave, as it might be possible to have some inertia in the participation
decision. Each regression includes a set of covariates, including the number of children 2-6 in
the locality, the distances to health centre, school and town hall, mother's and head's ages and
education levels and mother's height, as well as a variety of municipality level variables, which
are controlled for in the second step regression. The complete specications are reported in the
Appendix.
In the FeA sample, the three instruments are highly correlated with exposure and with the
expected signs. The F-statistic for the joint signicance of all the instruments is 47.87, The
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F-statistics for each set are also high (27.7 for capacity, 17.75 for distance, and 11.77 for the
fee). For attendance, the joint F-stat in the FeA sample is 14.7 which is larger than 10, the value
usually taken as evidence of a weak instrument problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997). However,
most of explanatory power is given by distance, with capacity and fee having F-statistics around
4 (this is partially because of the collinearity between fee and capacity, the F-statistic of fee
and capacity considered jointly is 8.10). This evidence is consistent with the fact that mothers
report that being too far away and cannot aord the fee are important reasons why their
children do not attend a HC (see Table 4.3). In the ENDS sample, we can only use `capacity'
as instrument. The F-statistic of capacity in the exposure regression is 20.49 and 9.95 in the
attendance regression. In general, our instruments are strongly correlated with exposure and we
can rule out a weak instrument problem with this treatment indicator. However, we must be
careful in interpreting the results associated with attendance in specications in which we do
not use distance as instruments.
The First stage regressions show some other interesting results. In particular, the results
indicate that the poorest individual are more likely to participate in the HC program (children
are less likely to participate if the mother has nished secondary education in the FeA sample,
or if the family is SISBEN 3 and the child leaves in a locality with a large fraction of the houses
being equipped with sewage in the ENDS sample). See Table A4 in the Appendix for details.
4.5.2  Do households move to be closer to a HC centre?
Distance from the household to the nearest HC centre would be correlated with the error term
of equation (4.7) if households who care about their children's nutrition or need more help
locate closer to a HC centre. However, given the evolution of the HC programme, we do not
think this constitute a problem. First, conversations with programme ocials indicated that,
especially in isolated rural areas, which make up a substantial proportion of our FeA sample,
there might be severe supply restrictions induced by the need of a minimum number of children
for ICBF to register a new HC. Moreover, after the rst few years of the program, the turnover
of madres comunitarias, induced by a variety of factors, contributed to substantially weaken the
link between the original parent association and the location of the HC nurseries. It seems
that many of the current clients of HC are households that move to a given neighborhood and
access an existing HC. Second, we can provide evidence that households do not move with the
purpose to be closer to a HC. Those households that moved location between two consecutive
waves of the FeA survey but were found and interviewed were asked the reason for changing
address. Although `moving closer to a HC' was explicitly listed as a possible reason to move,
only one of the 596 households that moved chose it as an answer.11 Moreover, comparing the
distance from the nearest HC for the movers and those who did not move, (which is done both
conditionally on the distance to the nearest school and health centre and unconditionally, see
table A6 in the appendix), we do not nd any statistically signicant dierence.
11Responses to the reasons to move are to nd a better equipped house (32%), for work related reasons
(14%), to be closer to a relative (8%), to be closer to a school (3%), violence related (2.68%), to be closer to the
town centre (0.5%), and to be closer to a HC centre (0.17%), and other reasons (39%).
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Finally, among the households who moved, we compare those who have children less than
7 to those who do not, as the latter are not eligible to participate. Once again the distance to
the nearest HC is not statistically dierent for the two groups.12 All these pieces of evidence
indicate that households do not seem to move to be closer to a HC centre, which could be partly
explained because of the high turnover of madres comunitarias that we described in section 4.2.
4.5.3  Relation between the instrument and other covariates
Our estimates of the eect of participating in HC would be inconsistent if the instruments
are correlated with unobserved determinants of child's height. While we cannot compute the
correlation between our instrument and unobserved variables, we can try to assess how realistic
our assumption is by analyzing the relation between the instrumental variables and observed
determinants of child's height. If we nd that our excluded variables are correlated with many
observed variables, it will be highly unlikely that it will not be correlated with unobserved
variables. More importantly, this exercise can be useful to help us think through the mechanisms
that determine the instruments, and hence helping us to assess the direction of the bias if any.
This type of argument has recently been proposed by Altonji, Todd and Taber (2005).
HC nurseries tend to be located close to health centers and schools. While we veried in the
subsection 4.5.2 that households do not move to be closer to a HC nursery (probably due to high
turnover of nurseries), they might live in areas closer to the town centre, schools, and health
centers. Typically, richer households will locate closer to these amenities. As HC nurseries also
tend to be located closer to these amenities, we would expect that households that are more
educated live closer to HC nurseries. This is what columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6 show. For
instance, a mother that nished secondary education lives in average 8 minutes closer to a HC
nursery than a mother that did not nish primary education. While this is obviously a potential
problem, we have to stress that our identication assumption states that the instrument we use
is uncorrelated with the unobserved components of children nutritional status, conditional on
the other variables we control for. For our strategy, then, it is important to condition on location
variables (whether the household lives in the centre of town, distance to health centre, school,
and town hall), for which, fortunately, we have information in our surveys. When we do this, in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.6, the correlation between education and distance to the nearest HC
nursery shrinks dramatically to zero. Conditional on the distance to other amenities, mothers
that nished primary education become undistinguishable in terms of distance to the nearest
HC nursery from mothers that nished secondary education. The only statistically signicant
dierence is that a mother that nished primary school lives 2 minutes closer to a HC nursery
than a mother that did not nish primary education (and it is statistically dierent only for
current distance but not for wave 1 distance). Other variables such as mother's and head's age
or birth order are uncorrelated with distance. There are some municipality level variables that
are correlated with distance but the size of the coecient also shrinks when we condition on
location variables (especially wages). In particular, households living closer to a HC tend to live
12Non-eligibles are on average 1.9 minutes (se=3.07) closer to a HC nursery.
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in towns with higher proportion of households with piped water and health insurance.
The regression of the median fee over the other covariates does not show much association
with other variables, except a negative correlation with the percentage of households with piped
water. From the regressions with capacity, we infer that poorer localities have higher capacity.
In the FeA sample, capacity is negatively associated with wages, while in the ENDS sample is
negatively associated with SISBEN 3 (which represents richer households than SISBEN 1 and
2).
4.5.4  How are the instruments correlated between themselves?
Having results obtained with dierent instrument sets would not be particularly valuable if these
instruments are highly correlated between themselves. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the graphs
of one instrument against another. There is a strong clear negative relationship between the
median fee paid in the municipality computed using the FeA survey and the capacity variable
computed using ICBF data (see Figure 4.1). Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 do not show any clear
association between either fee and distance or distance and capacity. The correlation between
distance and fee (distance and capacity) is 0.13 (-0.18) and its P-value is 0.36 (0.18). Overall,
though there is a strong and clear association between fee and capacity, the association between
fee and distance and capacity and distance seem rather weak.
4.6. Eects of the programme
In this section, we report and discuss our estimates of the eect of the HC programme on child's
height. First, we present average impacts and then we move to present results on selected
percentiles of the distribution.
4.6.1  Average Treatment Eects
In columns 1 to 5 of Table 4.8 (both top and bottom panel), we present our IV estimates of
equation (4.7), using as instruments the local availability of HC places (for both FeA and ENDS
sample), the fee in the locality and the distance from the household to the nearest HC nursery
(FeA sample). The dependent variable of equation (4.1) is the z -score for height per age. While
in the Table we report only the estimates of the programme's eects, in the regression, we also
include a large set of covariates at the individual, household, and community level. We report the
full set of results in Table A7, A9 and A11 in the Appendix. Among our covariates, we include
the distance from the household to the nearest school, nearest health centre, and the town
hall. In section 4.5.3, we showed how these variables were important to drastically decrease and
almost eliminate the correlation between distance to the nearest HC nursery and some observed
household characteristics, such as education. We also include the number of children aged 2-6
in the locality (the denominator of the capacity instrument) to ensure that we only exploit the
variability related to the number of HC available slots in the locality and not population size. In
general, the reason for our un-parsimonious specication for this equation is our worry that our
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instruments could capture some unobserved feature of the environment where the households
live and have a direct eect on the outcome of interest. All standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. We discuss further the robustness of our results in section 4.7.
The top panel of Table 4.8 (columns 1 to 5) shows IV estimates that uses as instrument
the non-linear prediction of the participation variable.13 These results show that the eect on
children's height of HC participation is positive and, in most specications, statistically dierent
from zero.
According to the estimates in column 1, obtained from the FeA sample, a child that spends
his/her entire life in a HC (so exposure equals 1) will be 94.5% of one standard deviation of
height taller; and a child that currently attends a HC will be, on average, 44.8% of one standard
deviation of height taller.14 These results are signicant not only from a statistical point of
view: they show that the programme might have a remarkable eect on its beneciaries.
While in column 1 we use the three instruments simultaneously, columns 2 to 4 report
estimates obtained with each set of instruments at a time, still within the FeA sample. . These
estimates are extremely similar to those in column 1. If the returns to program participation were
heterogeneous, the estimates in Table 4.8 should be equivalent to the so-called Local Average
Treatment Eect (LATE), which is sometimes criticised in terms of external validity. In this
particular case, we obtain very similar results with three dierent instruments (although we have
shown in Section 4.5.4 that they are not strongly correlated among themselves). This evidence
reinforces the external validity of our estimates. Of course, our results could arise because the
returns to program participation are not heterogeneous, or because individuals do not select into
the program according to their unobserved returns (Imbens and Angrist 1994, Heckman 1997,
Heckman et al 2006).15
Column 5 of Table 4.8 (top panel) reports the estimates of programme impact obtained in
the ENDS urban sample. These results are interesting per se, as they refer to a sample that is
substantially dierent from the FeA one, which is predominantly rural, and are also informative
about the external validity of the estimates in columns 1-4. The point estimate of the coecient
on exposure is roughly 20% higher in the ENDS than in the FeA sample, and almost twice as
large in the case of attendance (although note that, given the size of the standard errors, the
condence intervals overlap).16 Interestingly, we obtain very sizeable eects of the programme
13The prediction is computed after estimating a non-linear model (Probit for attendance and Tobit for exposure)
over the complete set of covariates and the variables excluded from equation (1): distance, fee, and capacity
according to the subheading of the column of Table 4.8 (see Table A4 in the appendix for the estimated parameters
of the models used to compute the prediction). This non-linear IV estimation procedure has a number of desirable
properties: the estimator is asymptotically ecient under homoskedasticity, it is consistent even if the functional
form of the prediction is misspecied, and the standard errors do not need to be corrected (see Wooldridge 2001,
pg. 623). Notice that this is not the prohibited regression as the prediction is only included in the matrix of
instruments, but not in the matrix of regressors.
14The average number of months attending a HC centre is 20 among those children currently attending. The
average exposure among those currently attending is 0.42.
15The sample size in the third wave is considerably smaller because of two main factors: (1) we do not use 13
municipalities in the third wave because FeA started to be implemented in those municipalities  see section 4.4,
(2) households have aged since the rst wave and they have fewer children between 0 and 6 years old.
16The ENDS sample is younger (by one year) than the FeA sample. This could potentially explain part
of the discrepancy in the attendance results because younger children tend to be more sensitive to nutrition
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in both datasets.
The bottom panel of Table 4.8 shows IV estimates using standard Two Stage Least Squares.
The results are reasonably similar to the ones in the top panel, but the standard errors for
attendance are much larger than those in the top panel (not surprisingly, given the eciency
properties of the non-linear IV estimates).17 This is why we favour the top panel estimates over
the bottom panel ones.
Under the assumption of homogenous treatment eects, the Hansen J-statistic can be used to
test the overidentifying restrictions in the FeA sample. The Hansen J-statistic is 2.72 (P=0.9)
for exposure, and 5.34 (P=0.62) for attendance, and consequently we cannot reject that the
exclusion restrictions are valid. This is hardly surprising because the estimates obtained with
each instrument separately are very similar. In section 4.7, we assess the robustness of our
results to violations of the exclusion restriction assumptions.
For comparison purposes, we also report OLS estimates of the parameters of interest in
columns 6 and 7 of Table 4.8. They show a negative correlation (and statistically dierent
from zero in the case of attendance) between program participation and child's height. The
negative bias of the OLS estimates relative to the IV ones is consistent with self-selection into
the programme by those individuals with poor nutritional status. An internal ICBF study by
Siabato et al. (1997) found that children attending HC were shorter than children of `similar
socio-economic background'. Indeed, the program guidelines explicitly say that children must
suer from economic vulnerability in order to be eligible.18 The rst stage equations also
conrmed that poorer children are more likely to participate (see section 4.5.1).
4.6.2  Treatment eects on conditional quantiles of the height distribution
In this section, we provide estimates of how the marginal distribution of height (conditional on
covariates) changes with participation in the HC programme. In order to consider the endo-
geneity of program participation within a quantile regression framework, we follow Lee (2007)
and estimate quantile regressions that are augmented by the residuals of the rst stage regres-
sion (control function). For both samples, we use a second degree polynomial in the estimated
residuals. Higher order polynomials were not signicant. The standard errors are estimated by
block bootstrap, with block dened as localities. Table 4.9 (full results are in table A12 to A14
in the Appendix) shows the estimates for selected quantiles.
In the ENDS sample, the results show much higher eects at lower quantiles. The point
estimate of the eect of the program at the 25th percentile is more than three times as large
as the estimate of the impact at the 75th percentile. This almost monotonic pattern indicates
that, in the absence of the program, the left tail of the height distribution would be considerably
longer, and consequently, the number of chronically malnourished children would also be larger.
interventions. The FeA sample is older because of natural ageing of the sample (the third wave was collected
after three years of the rst wave).
17There is little dierence in the standard errors of exposure. This is probably because the prediction generated
by the Tobit model is not very dierent from a linear prediction.
18http://www.icbf.gov.co/Tramites/primera_infancia.html#I
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We note that the estimates obtained in the ENDS are quite a bit larger than those obtained in
the FeA sample, but so are their standard errors.
4.6.3  Discussion
Our OLS regressions show that participants are slightly shorter than non-participants, but our
IV results show sizeable eects of the program. Clearly, the program is allowing the poorest
children (that self-select into the program) to almost catch-up with their better o peers, but
participants are still short according to international standards, and there might be room to
improve the program.
According to our estimates, the program show sizeable eects: a 60 month old child that
has spent 24 months in a HC nursery would be 1.6% taller in the FeA sample (2% in the
ENDS sample).19 Thomas and Strauss (1997) estimate that 1% increase in height leads to 2.4%
increase in adult male wages in Brazil.20 Our estimates are also plausible from the biological
point of view. In terms of z-scores, these gains in height correspond to 0.38 z-scores in the FeA
sample (0.49 in the ENDS sample). These estimates are well within experimental estimates of
nutrition interventions. A recent meta-analysis concluded that provision of complementary food
in food-insecure populations resulted in average increase of 0.41 height-for-age z-scores (Bhutta
el al 2008).
An interesting question is how our estimates compare to results obtained for similar programs.
As we mentioned above, the evidence on this type of programmes is very limited. However, some
estimates do exist, such as those for the Proyecto Integral de Desarrollo Infantil (PIDI) in Bolivia,
which is studied in Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004), and the Hogares Comunitarios program
in Guatemala studied by Ruel et al, (2006) and the Wawa Wasi programme in Peru, studied
by Cueto et al. (2009).
Similarly to HC, the PIDI provides day-care, nutritional, and educational services to children
between the ages of 6 and 72 months who live in poor, predominantly urban areas. Its evaluation
is based on non-experimental data and a generalized matching estimator, to control for the non-
random allocation of the program. Behrman, Chang and Todd (2004) do not nd signicant
eects of the programme on height. Notice, however, that a linear matching estimator, such as
the OLS estimates in Table 4.8, would also give zero or negative estimates in our application.
In the case of Hogares Comunitarios in Guatemala city, Ruel et al (2006) used a case-control
methodology to estimate the eect of the program on 250 beneciaries. They report that the
program signicantly improved children's diet, especially their intake of vitamin A, iron, and
zinc  essential micronutrients for physical and cognitive development and for protection from
infectious diseases, while no results are reported for height.
Finally, in the case of the Wawa Wasi program in Peru', its qualitative evaluation nds
that the centers are environments where children are kept safe and fed nutritious meals, freeing
19According to the WHO/CDC tables, the median height at 60 months for a boy is 109.93 cms and the standard
deviation is 4.59.
20The estimate is obtained using a regression of wages over height and education, correcting for selection into
employment. We are not aware of similar estimates for Colombia.
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mothers of worries and enabling them to work or study; we do not focus on the results of the
quantitative evaluation here as they are dicult to interpret being based on a sample of less
than 100 children (see Cueto et al., 2009).
4.7. Falsication exercise and sensitivity analysis
The credibility of our results and their internal validity relies on the assumption that the in-
struments are uncorrelated with the error term of equation (4.1). In this section, we investigate
this issue by: (i) conducting a falsication exercise using birth weight, and (ii) conducting a
sensitivity analysis along the lines of Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2008).
4.7.1  Falsication exercise using birth weight
Birth weight will be aected by many of the variables that determine child's height but, unlike
child's height, it cannot be aected by participation into HC. This makes it a good candidate
as an outcome variable for a falsication exercise.
To provide a sense of the plausibility of our identication assumption, we estimate a speci-
cation similar to those reported in Table 4.8, but using birth weight as an outcome a variable. If
we were to nd that our instrumental variable procedure indicates an eect of the programme on
birth weight, one would suspect that the instruments we are using are correlated with unobserv-
able determinants of nutritional status and are therefore invalid. It is likely that the unobserved
determinants of height per age are shared with the determinants of birth weight. Therefore a
correlation between these factors with the instruments we use would induce a similar bias both
in the specication for height and that for birth weight.
Table 4.10 replicates Table 4.8 but with birth weight as dependent variable (full results
are found in table A18, A20 and A22 in the appendix). None of the IV estimates in the FeA
sample are statistically dierent from zero. Perhaps more importantly, the sign of the point
estimate varies across instruments and our denition of `treatment' (exposure and attendance).
In particular, the point estimates in column 2 (that uses capacity as an instrument) are negative
for exposure and positive for attendance. The point estimates in column 3 (that uses fee as
instrument) are mostly negative, and the point estimates in column 4 (that uses distance as
instrument) are all positive. This variation in signs according to the instrument contrasts with
the consistency in the size of the eect on height per age that we reported in Table 4.8. Tables
4.8 and 4.10 taken together seem to indicate little scope for bias.
Column 5 of Table 4.10 reports the results for birth weight using the ENDS sample and the
capacity instrument. All the point estimates are negative and even statistically signicant at
10% when standard two stages least squares is used (bottom panel). This would indicate that, if
anything, the results reported for the ENDS would be biased downward, that is, that the results
in Table 4.8 constitute a lower bound. This corroborates our results in section 4.5.3 that poorer
households were associated with higher capacity levels.
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4.7.2  Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we present evidence on the robustness of our conclusions to deviations of our
main identication assumption: that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of
equation (4.7). In this regard, we follow the approach of Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2008) which
consists on estimating  in the following regression:
Hi = Ai + Zi + gIi + "i; (4.8)
where Ii is the instrument under scrutiny and g is a parameter that measures the direct impact
of the instrument on the outcome of interest (child's height). In the previous sections, we have
assumed that g is equal to zero. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2008) show how to obtain condence
intervals for  if one either assumes support restrictions on g or assumes a distribution (prior) for
g. For instance, in the case of distance, one might suspect that children from poorer households
live further away from various amenities and, therefore, g would be negative rather than zero,
introducing a bias in the estimate of .
In order to simplify the exposition, when we scrutinize instrument I we only use instrument I
to compute the prediction for the instrumental variable regressions. In particular, we do not use
the square of I.21 Moreover, we only analyze the eect of relaxing the orthogonality restriction
for distance and capacity, for which, in Section 4.5.3, there are intuitive support restrictions.
As we do not have a clear intuition of the sign of the possible correlation between fees and
unobserved components of height we do not scrutinize this instrument. Given that the results
do not vary much with the instrument we use, this is not particularly worrying.
In subsection 4.5.3, we showed that conditioning on the distance to other facilities (schools,
health centres, and town hall) was important to reduce the correlation between distance and
other covariates. However, one might worry that conditioning on the distance to other facilities
does not completely eliminate the correlation between the distance to the nearest HC centre and
the error term. In particular, one might worry that g is negative in equation (4.8).
Figure 4.4 and 4.5 shows the condence interval for  assuming that g lies in the interval
[k,0] for values of k ranging from 0 to -0.20.22 The gure also shows the point estimate for  if
g=k/2. The point estimate of  decrease slowly as g decreases. The lower bound of the 90%
condence interval for  crosses zero if k is smaller than -0.135 for attendance and -0.07 for
exposure.
Clearly, any assessment on whether our results on the HC program are robust or not depends
on whether or not these values for k (-0.135 and -0.07) are small or large. To assess this, we
run a reduced form regression: child's height over distance, capacity, fee and all the covariates
(but exclude their squares). In this reduced form regression, the coecient on distance to the
21This is the reason why our results in Table 4.8 dier slightly from those shown in the Figures 4.4 to 4.9 when
g=0.
22We thank Conley et al (2008) for making their code available on the web. For each value of k, the condence
interval is built as the union of the condence intervals obtained for a grid dened over [k,0]. On the basis of our
argument below, -0.20 is very small when we compare it with coecients on the distances to the health centre
and to the town hall.
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health centre is -0.05 (standard error = 0.077) and the coecient on distance to the town hall
is -0.07 (standard error = 0.057).23 It is reasonable to think that distance to health centre and
town hall will be more correlated to unobserved determinants of nutritional status than distance
to the nearest HC nursery (especially because there are many more HC nurseries than health
centres, and it is not uncommon that HC nurseries close because Madre Comunitarias do not
wish to continue). We conclude from this that our conclusions are robust to small and even not
so small violation of our identication assumption (g=0).
The inspection of the estimated coecients of the reduced form regression provides similar
insights. It is interesting to note that the coecient of distance to the HC nursery (-0.14,
standard error = 0.08) is about three times larger than the coecient of distance to the health
centre (-0.05, standard error= 0.077). Even if one believed that part of the partial correlation
between height and distance to the HC nursery is due to unobserved heterogeneity due to
location, we believe that unobserved heterogeneity associated with location should be stronger
for health centres, as there are far fewer of those than HC nurseries, and their location is much
more stable. As a result, even if one took the extreme assumption that the correlation between
height and distance to the health centre is purely due to unobserved heterogeneity related to
location, the fact that the coecient on distance to the HC nursery is much larger than the
coecient on distance to the health centre seems to support our interpretation of the results
that at least part of the correlation between distance to the HC nursery and height is due to the
participation in the HC programme and is therefore causal.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 (4.8 and 4.9) scrutinize the robustness of our conclusions for the capacity
instrument in the FeA (ENDS) dataset. We concentrate on negative values of k because subsec-
tion 4.5.3 concluded that capacity was positively correlated with observed indicators of poverty
(the results in Table 4.10 -birth weight regression- also seem to support this). Hence, we will
expect children living in localities with higher capacity to be shorter. Figures 4.6 to 4.9 show
that, if k is negative, our results in Table 4.8 underestimate the eect of the HC program as the
point estimate of  increases as k becomes more negative.
4.8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied one of the largest welfare programme in Colombia Hogares Comu-
nitarios, which is a community nursery programme, that costs about 250 million US$ per year,
using two datasets: one representative of very poor children living in rural areas of Colombia
(FeA survey) while the other (ENDS survey) focussing on urban areas and including children
relatively less poor. Similar programs exist in Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala and México. Despite
their importance, little is known about the eects of these types of programs.
Our focus is on how program participation aects child's height, which is a good indicator
of long-run nutritional status. Our results show that, among eligible children, those from the
poorest families are more likely to participate in the program. We also nd that program
participation has zero or negative correlation with child's height. To correct for the obvious
23We do not use distance to school because its coecient is positive.
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selection bias in giving a causal interpretation to the simple comparison between participants
and non participants, we use an IV approach, where we use as instruments variables that are
related to the availability of the program, such as cost variables: the distance from the household
residence to the nearest HC, the ratio of places in a municipality to the number of eligible children
and the average level of fees paid in a municipality. Unlike the OLS results, the IV estimates
of program participation on child's height are positive and show sizeable eects of program
participation. The eects are remarkably similar across three dierent instruments (distance
from the household to the nearest HC nursery, the median fee in the municipality, and the
capacity of the HC programme in the municipality). If we consider that results from dierent
instruments are dierent Local Average Treatment Eects, our results indicate that either the
eect of the program is homogenous or households do not self-select into the program based on
unobserved gains. This reinforces the external validity of our estimates.
We provide an array of evidence to support the internal validity of our estimates. (1) house-
holds do not move to be closer to a HC, probably because of the high turnover of HC nurseries,
(2) we show that controlling for distance to health centres, schools and town halls (as we do in
our empirical specications) dramatically shrinks the partial correlation between distance to the
HC centre and household variables that are related to economic well being, (3) distance to the
HC centre is uncorrelated with the other two instruments (fee and capacity) which strengthens
our case, given that we obtain very similar results with any of the three instruments, (4) when
we perform the same exercise on birth weight, which should not be aected by the program,
we do not obtain any signicant eect (5) capacity seems to be higher in poorer towns which
implies that our IV estimates that use capacity as instruments are lower bound estimates, (6)
we would obtain positive and statistically signicant eects of the program on child's height
even if we allow for moderate direct eects on child's height of distance to the nearest HC, and
(7) our eects are biologically feasible and lie well within experimental estimates of nutrition
interventions with complementary food in food-insecure populations.
Programs evolve with time: sta motivation, accountability; monitoring, guidelines, etc are
likely to be dierent at the start of a program than in the longer term after it has evolved.
Contrary to recent evaluations of conditional cash transfer programs, this paper estimates the
eect of a program that was established long-ago. While this creates challenges in terms of both
internal and external validity of the results, it has the advantage of providing results that are
likely to be representative of the programme as it will run in the future.
Our results are credible, economically signicant and important. The program, which has
been operating for 20 years and which is targeted to the poorest 30 per cent of Colombian
households, seems to improve the nutritional status of the poorest of the eligible children. The
nutritional status of children attending HC is only slightly lower than the nutritional status of
other eligible children that do not attend. However, as the attendees are from the poorest of
the eligible families, their status would be considerably worse in the absence of the program.
0.8 of a standard deviation in height per age is a large and substantive dierence that can
have important long run consequences for the development of these children. This result is also
important because the programme relies on community resources and it is therefore relatively
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cheap to run.
These considerations do not mean that the HC nurseries are a perfect program. The pro-
gram takes the poorest of the poor Colombian children and brings them up to a level that is
considerably higher than the level that would prevail in the absence of the program, but is still
far from satisfactory. Many of the children attending HC are stills stunted in growth and suer
from a number of other problems. There is therefore scope for interventions that try to improve
the functioning of such an intervention and their evaluation as well as for the consideration of
alternatives that might turn out to be more cost eective.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Table4.1DescriptiveStatistics
Variable
label Mean SD Mean SD
age_head Householdhead's ageinyears dividedby100 0.39 0.11 0.42 0.15
age_mot Mother's ageinyears dividedby100 0.32 0.07 0.28 0.07
age_m Childageinmonths 48.9 23.2 35..53 21.3
altitude Altitudeinthousandmeters 0.45 0.68 0.62 0.81
asis_hc 1ifthechildis attendingaHCcentre,0otherwise 0.24 0.43 0.32 0.47
capacity
Numberofplaces inHCcentres inthetowndividedbynumberofchildren2to6
years old 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.17
numchildren Numberofchildren2to6years oldinthetown,dividedby10000 0.26 0.26 3.23 6.6
edu_m_a 1ifmotherdidnotcompleteprimaryeducation,0otherwise 0.58 0.49 0.03 0.16
edu_m_b
1ifmothercompletedprimaryeducationbutdidnotcompletesecondaryeducation,
0otherwise 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48
edu_m_c 1ifmothercompletedsecondaryeducation,0otherwise 0.06 0.25 0.61 0.49
edu_h_a 1ifhouseholdheaddidnotcompleteprimaryeducation,0otherwise 0.65 0.47 0.1 0.29
edu_h_b
1ifhouseholdheadcompletedprimaryeducationbutdidnotcompletesecondary
education,0otherwise 0.29 0.45 0.55 0.49
edu_h_c 1ifhouseholdheadcompletedsecondaryeducation,0otherwise 0.05 0.22 0.35 0.48
exposure
Numberofmonths thatthechildhas attendedaHCcentredividedbytheageofthe
childinmonths 0.18 0.24 0.1 0.19
female 1ifchildis female,0ifchildis male 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.5
haz Child’s height.Unit:zͲscores Ͳ1.25 1.01 Ͳ0.77 0.98
birthweight Child's weightatbirth: 3.37 0.66 3.29 0.54
hc_fee
MedianfeetoattendaHCnurseryinthemunicipality.Colombianpesos dividedby
1000.
3.82 3.18 . .
height_mot Mother’s heightinmetres 1.54 0.06 1.55 0.56
hosp 1ifthereis ahospital inthetown,0otherwise 0.71 0.48 . .
insur_mun Proportionofchildrenwithformal healthinsuranceinthemunicipality 0.62 0.22 . .
ln_age_head Logarithmofhouseholdhead's ageinyears dividedby100 Ͳ0.96 0.26 Ͳ0.15 0.35
ln_age_mot Logarithmofmother's ageinyears dividedby100 Ͳ1.17 0.22 Ͳ0.97 0.24
ln_order Logarithmoforderofkidinthehousehold 1.15 0.53 0.71 0.62
order Orderofkidinthehousehold 3.6 1.74 2.47 1.66
pipe Percentageofhouseholds withpipedwaterinthemunicipality 0.85 0.14 0.89 0.31
price_index Foodpriceindex 0.92 0.13 . .
rural 1ifhouseholdl ives inthemainpartofthetown,0otherwise 0.52 0.5 0 .
sewage Percentageofhouseholds withsewageconnectioninthemunicipality 0.44 0.37 0.75 0.43
time_hc Distance(minutes dividedby100)tothenearestHC 0.21 0.32 . .
time_hc_b sameas time_hcbutinthefirstwaveofdata 0.23 0.33 . .
time_alc Distanceinminutes tothetownhall,dividedby100 0.51 0.64 . .
time_hea Distanceinminutes tothenearesthealthcareprovider,dividedby100 0.41 0.55 . .
time_sch Distanceinminutes tonearestschool,dividedby100 0.14 0.15 . .
time_alc_mun Averageoftime_alc inthemunicipality 0.52 0.38 . .
time_hea_mun Averageoftime_hea inthemunicipality 0.3 0.27 . .
time_sch_mun Averageoftime_sch inthemunicipality 0.1 0.05 . .
wage_fr
Rural femalewageinpesos as indicatedbythetownmajordividedby1000in
Colombianpesos (December2003) 0.91 0.36 . .
wage_fu
Urbanfemalewageinpesos as indicatedbythetownmajordividedby1000in
Colombianpesos (December2003) 0.98 0.34 . .
Statistics arerestrictedtoestimationsample:2345children(Feawave1)and6189(ENDS)
Definition
FeAsample ENDS
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Table 4.2: Percentage of children attending Hogares Comunitarios
Table4.2ͲPercentageofchildrenattendingHogaresComunitarios
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
FeA
Boys 4 16 44 44 34 20 8
Girls 3 20 39 46 36 16 7
ENDS
Boys 2 17 38 48 49 45 38
Girls 2 15 39 46 49 42 40
Observations:5717(FeA),9031(ENDS)

Table 4.3: Reasons for not attending HC
Table4.3ͲReasonsfornotattendingHC
 Age0Ͳ1 Age2Ͳ4 Age5Ͳ6
FeA
Availablecaregiverathome 63% 39% 16%
NoHCfacilityortoofar 16% 26% 13%
Cannotaffordfee 4% 8% 3%
Doesnotlikefood 1% 4% 3%
Other 16% 23% 65%
ENDS
Availablecaregiverathome 84% 79% 72%
NoHCfacilityortoofar 2% 3% 3%
Cannotaffordfee 1% 3% 2%
Doesnotlikefood 1% 3% 3%
Other 2% 10% 20%
Observations:4221(FeA),5988(ENDS)
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Table 4.4: Distribution of the instruments
Table4.4Distributionoftheinstruments
 EntireSample Participants
 Distance
(mins.)
Fee
(Pesos) Capacity Capacity
Distance
(mins)
Fee
(pesos) Capacity Capacity
25
th
Perc 5 1651 18% 15% 3 1000 21% 16%
Median 10 3000 27% 23% 5 3000 33% 25%
Mean 21 3821 31% 25% 10 3059 38% 27%
75
th
Perc 25 5254 37% 32% 15 4000 53% 33%
Survey FeA FeA FeA ENDS FeA FeA FeA ENDS
ObservationsͲEntiresample:5717(FeA),9031(ENDS),Participants:1391(FeA),3043(ENDS)
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Figure 4.1: Relation between Capacity and Fees
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Figure 1: Relation between Capacity and Fees
Figure 4.2: Relation between Distance and Fee
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Figure 2: Relation between Distance and Fee
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Figure 4.3: Relation between Capacity and Distance
0
.2
.4
.6
M
in
u
te
s
 d
iv
id
e
d
 b
y
 1
0
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Capacity=Vacancies/Eligible Children 2 to 6 years old
Correlation=-0.18, P-Value=0.18
Each plot represents the average value in a town
Figure 3: Relation between Capacity and Distance
Figure 4.4: 90% condence intervals for Attendance
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: FeA
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(distance) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 4: 90% Confidence intervals for Attendance
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Figure 4.5: 90% condence intervals for Exposure
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: FeA
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(distance) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 5: 90% Confidence intervals for Exposure
Figure 4.6: 90% condence intervals for Attendance
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: FeA
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(capacity) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 6: 90% Confidence intervals for Attendance
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Figure 4.7: 90% condence intervals for Exposure
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: FeA
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(capacity) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 7: 90% Confidence intervals for Exposure
Figure 4.8: 90% condence intervals for Attendance
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: ENDS
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(capacity) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 8: 90% Confidence intervals for Attendance
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Figure 4.9: 90% condence intervals for Exposure
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Assumed that g belongs to [k,0]. Point estimate is if g=k/2. Dataset: ENDS
Confidence intervals are built using union of confidence intervals following Conley et al (2008)
If g*(capacity) enters directly in the outcome equation
Figure 9: 90% Confidence intervals for Exposure
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CHAPTER 5
Nutrient consumption and household income in rural Mexico
We estimate income elasticities for a variety of macro- and micro-nutrients using a sample
of poor rural households in Mexico. The nutrient-income elasticity is estimated using both
parametric methods and a semi-parametric approach. A special focus is placed on the non
linearity of the relationship between nutrient intake and income and on measurement error
and endogeneity issues. One major nding is that income elasticity for calories is close to
zero when we control for measurement error issues. For some nutrients, namely fats, vitamin
A and C, calcium and heme iron we nd a sizeable positive income elasticity robust to the
choice of the estimator and percentiles at which is evaluated. Interestingly, these nutrients
are also those for which we nd the largest deciency in our sample. In addition to this,
we nd that for a particularly vulnerable group in our sample (poorer households, at the
bottom 25% of per capita expenditure) a deciency of total energy, protein and zinc is not
accompanied with estimated positive income elasticity.
5.1. Introduction
Deciencies in nutrientssuch as iron, zinc, vitamins A and C, and iodineare increasingly rec-
ognized as an important nutrition problem that aects millions of children and adults in the
developing world. The consequences of child malnutrition during the preschool period have been
studied extensively (Beaton, et al., 1993, Bhutta, et al., 1999, Bleichrodt and Born 1994, Lozo
and Wachs 2000, Pelletier, Frongillo and Habicht 1993, Pelletier, et al., 1995, Rose, Martorell
and Rivera 1992, Wachs 1995). It is estimated that about half of all deaths in developing coun-
tries in children less than ve years of age are due to the interaction between malnutrition and
common infections such as diarrheal diseases, respiratory infections and measles. These infec-
tions kill children easily only in the presence of malnutrition, which impairs immune function
and lowers resistance to infections. Two nutrient deciencies, iodine deciency and anemia, have
been shown to be important causes of poor cognitive development, particularly when they aect
children under two years of age (e.g. Horton and Ross, 2003).
In view of the negative consequences of a diet poor in nutrients, the potential of social
programs to improve the nutrition of vulnerable populations is of particular concern to pol-
icy makers. The interventions available for resolving nutrient deciencies range from multiple
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nutrient supplementation in young children, which are more useful in the short-run, to food for-
tication and diet diversication that are more eective in the long-run. This paper contributes
in this area by providing estimates of the extent to which nutrient consumption at the household
level responds to increases in household income. Cash transfer programs, frequently combined
with conditions on some specic behavior such as attending nutrition workshops and regular
visits to health centers, provide an increasingly popular approach towards alleviating poverty
and malnutrition.1 The income elasticity for a specic nutrient, the parameter that summarizes
the percentage change in the consumption of a specic nutrient corresponding to a one percent
change in household income, is critical to understanding one of the key determinants of con-
sumption of nutrients. As household income increases, households may change the composition
of their food consumption, and thus their nutrient intake. If increases in income result in changes
in the diet of households, towards foods with higher nutrient content (for example, eating more
vegetables/fruits and meat), then nutrient deciencies may fall.
In much of the economic development literature nutrition problems are practically synony-
mous to the inadequacy of energy as measured by the availability or consumption of calories
(Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Strauss and Thomas, 1995, 1998). Unfortunately, irrespective
of the size of the estimated income elasticity for calories, there is nothing that can be inferred
about the consumption of essential nutrients. A signicantly positive relationship between calo-
ries and income does not necessarily imply a higher consumption of nutrients since a higher
income may simply result in households buying food items with a higher caloric content, but
not higher nutrient content. A similar argument applies when the income elasticity for calories
is very small or zero. When household income decreases, household calories may be maintained
more or less constant through substitutions within and between food groups while the con-
sumption of essential nutrients may decrease dramatically as households consume less meat,
vegetables, eggs and milk.
Thus, even though there is an abundance of estimates on the income elasticity for calories,
empirical evidence on the nutrient income elasticity is relatively scarce (Behrman, 1995). In
addition, the evidence that does exist suggests substantial dierences in nutrient-income elas-
ticities (e.g. Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987; Bouis, 1991). In Indonesia, for example, Pitt and
Rosenzweig (1985), using data from farm households, report very low nutrient-income elastici-
ties (below 0.03) for many of the same nutrients considered in the present study (i.e., calories,
protein, fat, carbohydrates, calcium, iron, vitamin A, and vitamin C). Another study using
data from rural and urban areas in Indonesia reports much higher nutrient income elasticities
(for example, from 0.70 to 1.20 for the lower 40 percent of the population by expenditure on
Java, see Chernichovsky and Meesook, 1984). Similarly diverse estimates are reported for other
countries. Behrman and Deolalikar, (1987), for example, using data from ICRISAT report in-
come elasticity estimates of 0.06 to 0.19 for protein (depending on whether level estimates or
dierences over time are used), 0.30 to 0.22 for calcium, -0.11 to 0.30 for iron, 0.19 to 2.01 for
carotene, -0.08 to 0.18 for thiamine, 0.69 to 0.01 for riboavin, -0.15 to 0.21 for niacin, and 0.15
1The Oportunidades program of the Mexican government is one such program aimed at increasing the invest-
ments of poor households in human capital.
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to 1.25 for ascorbic acid. The Nicaraguan study (Behrman and Wolfe, 1987) reports signicant
income elasticity estimates in the range of 0.04 to 0.11 for calories, protein, iron, and vitamin
A (with statistically signicant, but quantitatively small, nonlinearities). The Philippine study
(Bouis, 1991) reports an iron-income elasticity of 0.44, a calorie income elasticity of 0.16, and
insignicant income elasticities for vitamin A and vitamin C. To date, to our knowledge, there
are no estimates of the income elasticity for nutrients in Mexico.
The objective of this paper is to provide some of the rst estimates of the income elasticity
for key micronutrients in Mexico, such as vitamin A and C, folate, iron, zinc and calcium
as well as for energy (kcal), and all the macronutrients (protein, saturated, monounsaturated
and polyunsaturated fat, and carbohydrates). Given that the consumption of ber can inhibit
the absorption of some essential nutrients, such as zinc and iron, we also examine the income
elasticity for dietary ber. Reliable elasticity estimates can help policy makers determine ex-
ante whether a cash transfer program, and/or economic growth per se can be at all eective
at increasing nutrient consumption among poor households or whether dierent interventions
altogether may be needed. Considering the frequency at which poor rural areas in Mexico are
aected by natural disasters such as oods, it is also useful to know how eective cash transfers
could be as an instrument for maintaining (if not improving) the nutritional status of aected
households.
The study of the nutrient consumption patterns and the relationship between nutrients and
income are particularly important for Mexico. On the one hand, the 1999 National Nutrition
Survey of Mexico identies zinc and iron deciency as a major nutritional problem in Mexican
children (Barquera et al., 2003a). On the other hand, Mexico, like a number of developing
countries during the last fteen years, appears to be experiencing important reductions in the
prevalence of infections and undernourishment, accompanied by large increases in the incidence
of chronic diseases and overnourishment (Rivera et al. 2002, Bobadilla et al. 1993; Frenk et al.
1991, Popkin, 1994;, Drewnoski and Popkin, 1997; Murphy et al., 1992; and Zeitlin, Ghassemi
and Mansour, 1990). In such a context, it is critical to have a better understanding of the
eects of increases in household income on the composition of household diet, in general, and
the consumption of nutrients in particular.
In line with the recent trend in the literature2 on the calorie income elasticity, our study places
particular emphasis on the heterogeneity and sensitivity of the elasticity estimates. In particular,
we are interested in whether, and to what extent, income elasticity varies across relevant groups of
the population under study. Our econometric methodology consists of both parametric methods
and a semi-parametric approach. Parametric methods will allows us to control properly for
biases due to measurement error in consumption and endogeneity issues. In particular, we
use a standard linear regression approach that imposes a linear relationship between nutrient
consumption and income, which in turn results in a nutrient income elasticity that is constant and
independent of the level of income. Then, we adopt two dierent exible specications, still linear
in parameters, but that allow elasticity to change with income. Finally, we explore heterogeneity
2Recent published studies include Gibson and Rozelle (2002), Abdulai and Aubert (2004), and Skouas (2003).
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of the response of nutrient to income with a quantile regression approach. In addition to this,
we try to explore whether the presence of zero consumption for specic nutrients in our sample
can be a source of bias for the estimates. On the other hand, the semi-parametric approach
will allow the income elasticity for nutrients to vary in the most exible manner possible with
the level of household income but it only allows a restricted set of controls to be included in a
tractable way in the estimation. An alternative approach would be to estimate a fully specied
food demand system which would allow us to impose all the relevant restrictions imposed by
economic theory and to study the degree of substitution between nutrients as prices of foods
change. However, given our focus is on the income elasticity we do not pursue this approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes in more detail the
data used and discusses some descriptive evidence on the nutrient consumption in the sample.
Section 5.3 presents and discusses the results from linear regression approach that imposes
constant elasticity. Section 5.4 illustrates the parametric and semi-parametric approaches based
on non linear specications. In section 5.4, we sum up our results and put forward some policy
implications.
5.2. Data and Macro and Micro-Nutrient consumption patterns
The data we use is based on a sample of 7553 households in 240 poor rural localities from eight
Mexican states (Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and
Yucatan), surveyed between October 2003 and April 2004 . This sample has been collected for
the purposes of evaluating the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL). 3 This program has as
its major objective the improvement of the nutritional status of poor households living in rural
localities of Mexico and it is targeted to localities that are not covered by other food programs,
or programs with a substantial nutrition component, such as Oportunidades and Abasto Social de
Leche. 4 In order to be incorporated into the program the localities have to meet some require-
ments such as having a population of less than 2500, having at least one household with a poor
nutritional status (according to the criterions established by SEDESOL, Secretaria de Desarrollo
Social, that is the social development arm of the Mexican government), being accessible (not
more than 2.5km from a road), and close enough (not more than metricconverterProductID2.5
km2.5 km) to a DICONSA5 store.
The support provided is either in-kind transfers (value of food provided is of 150 pesos) or
cash transfer of 150 pesos according to what the program administrators think it is the more ap-
propriate in the specic case. While the major component of the program is food support, other
complementary operations are being provided, such as health assistance, nutritional education
classes and support to build oors and latrines.
3Since one of the purposes of the evaluation of PAL is studying is impact on the nutrition of children of age
less than 5, it was decided from the beginning that 40% of households interviewed in each locality had to have
children less than 5.
4For instance, the localities that do not fulll the requirements in terms of education and health infrastructures
in order to be included in Oportunidades can be included in PAL.
5DICONSA is the Mexican government' agency that manages the supply of food (through its stores) to rural
and marginalized localities.
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The analysis in this paper is based on the baseline survey round that took place before
the start of the program. The nutrient income elasticity estimates derived here can thus serve
as benchmark estimates for the impact of the cash component of the program on nutrient
consumption at the household level. The survey collects extensive socioeconomic information,
as well as information about food and non food expenditures. Specically, the consumption
module collects information on the quantity consumed (including that out of own production)
in the last seven days for sixty one food items.6
In much of the development literature estimates of the demand for nutrients are typically
derived through an indirect approach. Since consumption of nutrients is determined by what
foods and how much of those foods are consumed, good estimates of the demand system param-
eters for food can be used, by applying nutrient-to-food conversion factors (Pitt, 1983, Strauss,
1984). However, for such an indirect procedure to lead to good estimates of the demand for
nutrients, the estimates of the food demand system must be good in a variety of respects. Sim-
ilarly, deriving direct estimates of nutrient demand, it is important to use food groups that are
not aggregated too much or else important within food group substitutions may be missed.
For example, Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) suggest that the indirect approach of estimating
systems of demand for food groups with food groups being fairly broad aggregates of individual
foods, may lead to nutrient income elasticities that are considerably biased (Subramanian and
Deaton, 1996).
Mindful of these considerations we adopt a exible approach that simply examines the total
consumption of major nutrients in rural poor households in Mexico by aggregating the nutrient
contents of the sixty one food items contained in the PAL survey. We use a food composition
database compiled by the National Institute of Public Health of Mexico (INSP) that contains
information on the nutrient content per metricconverterProductID100 grams100 grams of all
the major food items in Mexico to convert the quantity consumed of each of the sixty one food
items by each household into its equivalent content of calories, protein, fat, carbohydrates, and
micronutrients. The quantity of each nutrient consumed is then aggregated at the household
level.
In order to shed some light on the nutrient consumption patterns in our sample, it is useful
to conduct a descriptive analysis of nutrient consumption. This oers a status quo picture of
macro and nutrient consumption. The behavior-related issues, such as the response of nutrient
consumption to changes in income are discussed in the next section.
Table 5.1 reports some descriptive statistics (mean, median and interquartile range) for
a list of macronutrients and major micronutrients (ber, protein, fat, cholesterol, saturated,
monounsaturated and polyunsaturated fat, carbohydrates, vitamin A and C, folate, iron and
heme iron, zinc and calcium). These descriptive statistics and all the estimations below are
computed on a sample that excludes households with a value of per capita caloric consumption
6We did not use the information collected on purchases of food, as this would provide information on nutrient
availability instead of consumption. The PAL questionnaire also contains a module based on the alternative
approach of measuring food consumption through a 24 hour recall survey, whereby respondents are asked to
recall all the foods consumed by each household member during the previous day.
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that is extremely low (<500 kcal) or extremely high (>4500 kcal). Iron is of particular interest
since iron deciency determines to a large degree the prevalence of anemia, so widely present
in Mexico. (see Barquera et al., 2003a). Inorganic (or nonheme) iron is a mineral widely
present in relatively inexpensive foods such as beans and spinach. Mexican diets are very rich
in nonheme iron, but the quality of it is poor, so nutrient absorption is poor. Heme iron, on
the other hand, has a much better absorption rate, but its sources are animal-products, which
are expensive. More importantly, it is the lack of heme iron that determines the prevalence
of anemia. We present separate results for heme iron since ndings for this nutrient are much
better understood and applied (than those for total iron).
Since one of our main purposes is to study whether nutrient consumption changes between
poorer and richer households we present the statistics for three groups of households: all house-
holds, households at the bottom 25% of the distribution of per capita expenditure (PCE), and
households at the top 25% of PCE. We use PCE, and not current income as a measure of house-
hold welfare and income because, in general, current expenditure and consumption tend to be a
more reliable estimate of a household's permanent income than current income7. PCE is derived
by dividing total food and nonfood expenditures by household size. Total household expenditure
(per month) is dened as the sum of value of food consumption, value of meals consumed away
from home and total expenditure for goods other than food (excluding expenditures on health
services). Deaton and Zaidi (2002) stress that in cases in which the amount of food consumed
can be distinguished from food purchased (as is the case with our data), it is the value of food
consumed that should go into the consumption aggregate. The value of food consumed at home
is constructed, following the guidelines above, using the quantity of food consumed at home and
expressing it in monthly value using as prices the median unit value for each food at the locality
level8.
One general pattern that is obvious in table 5.1 is that the value for the mean is bigger
than the median value for all the nutrients considered here. This means that the distribution
of each nutrient is positively skewed rather than symmetric and that considering only the mean
would lead to an overestimation of nutrient consumption. For this reason we also present the
interquartile dierence (IQ=Q75-Q25) as a measure of the standard deviation in the consumption
of nutrients. Both the median and the interquartile range are better summaries of a distribution
when the data are skewed or contain outliers. Another remarkable nding is the dierence
between the consumption for the top 25% PCE and the bottom 25% PCE population (for
example, the top 25% PCE households displays a calorie consumption that is 64% bigger than
the bottom 25% PCE group; the comparison for calcium is even more striking since the top
25% PCE population's consumption is around four times bigger than the bottom 25% PCE's).
Iron and heme (blood) iron present a contrasting pattern: while top 25% PCE's consumption
for total iron is only around 1.2 times bigger than bottom 25%'s, the proportion is around 6.5
7It can be argued that for very poor households' dierences in current expenditure and current income might
be less pronounced (see De la Torre, 2005).
8We also have the information of the market price for the food items at the locality level. However, we do not
have the market price for all the food items that are included in the list of foods consumed (either some items
are not included in the market price list or the denition of the food item is dierent).
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times when it comes to heme iron. These descriptive results seem to suggest that changes in
income can aect nutrient consumption, even in a sample of households which overall is quite
poor and by rst appearances not very heterogeneous.
One implication of this result is that on average households in the top 25% group could have
a nutrient consumption adequacy9 above 100% while those in the bottom 25%'s could be far
below 100% with this completely dierentiating the possible interventions to be designed for
the two groups. We study the nutrient consumption adequacy in table 5.2, which reports for
some selected nutrients the ratio between the median intake (as shown in table 5.1) and the
recommended daily intake (RDI; constructed from nutritional tables10).
For the median person in our sample, the biggest nutrient deciencies are about vitamin A,
iron, and calcium. When we consider the sample of those at the bottom 25% of PCE this list has
to be enlarged so as to include fat and vitamin C: intakes are well below the benchmark values.
Richer households continue to have insucient intake of vitamin A, iron and calcium while
displaying values above 100% for the other nutrients. On average calorie intake is close to the
reference level (94.9%), though poorer households are only consuming 70.8% of the recommended
intake. Some nutrients display remarkably high adequacy ratios across all the samples, these
are carbohydrates and folate. Intake of protein seem not to be the biggest nutritional problem
in this sample, but poorer households are below the benchmark level (adequacy ratio is 78.7%).
Overall gures in table 5.2 are suggesting that while calorie intake is a problematic issue
only for very poor households, there are major deciencies of key nutrients, which both poorer
and richer households are facing (especially for vitamin A, iron, and calcium).
While our focus here is on the consumption of nutrients, it is worth giving a brief descriptive
picture of the food consumption patterns in our sample. Changes in nutrient intakes can be
ultimately linked to changes in food consumptions, therefore it will guide the reader having
a grasp of which foods are consumed in our sample and how this consumption changes with
income. In table 5.5 we rst report the percentage of calories that households are getting from a
specic food group11 (see column labeled average percentage of calories from:) and we notice
that on average almost half of the calories are coming from maize (42.4%). Other food groups
that provide a substantial percentage of the total calories are oils, meat, sh and dairy, sugars,
and beans. Another interesting exercise is to assess which foods households are using to get
their caloric intake from, one rst way to do that is to study the percentage of households
that are consuming a positive amount of a specic food group (that implies they are using it
as a source of calorie) and how this changes with deciles of PCE. In table 5.5 we see that on
average (see column labeled all sample) almost all households (98.9%) get part of their calories
from maize, but only around 59% use wheat as source. More interesting patterns arise when
we consider dierent samples according to deciles of PCE: groups such as wheat and fruit are
consumed by, respectively, only 22% and 56% of the households in the rst decile of PCE sample.
9The nutrient intake adequacy is typically expressed as the ratio between the household's nutrient consumption
and an appropriate reference intake.
10The recommended intake used in our calculation takes into account the dierent age and gender composition
of the 3 samples we use: all households, bottom 25% of PCE, top 25% of PCE.
11See notes in table 5.5 for the list of foods included in each food group.
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However, as we consider higher income deciles these percentages rise dramatically and for the
top income deciles sample we have around 79% and 94% of the households using wheat and
fruit, respectively, as a source of calories.
Another interesting indicator is the number of dierent foods households use to get their
calories from (we call it variety index; see last row in table 5.5): households add almost 2 food
groups to their diet passing from the lowest decile of PCE (they consume 7.43 foods on average)
to the highest (9.29).
We then study how calories taken from each food change as income rises: in gure 5.1 we
plot the percentage of calories coming from the dierent food groups at each decile of PCE. One
clear pattern arises: richer households tend to substitute maize and beans with meat, sh and
dairy, wheat and fruit as their source of calorie. Interestingly, the contribution of vegetables to
the total caloric intake remains very low also for rich households.
Finally, we give some descriptive statistics of PCE, which we use here as our measure of
income. In table 5.4 we report statistics for the sample of all households we have available (see
row all sample) and for several sub-samples, dened according to PCE, which are relevant
for the analysis below. In addition to this, we also report for each of these sub-samples the
proportion of poor households (the headcount ratio, P0, is reported in the table) according to
both an absolute and a relative poverty line (see the notes in table 5.4 for details on how the
poverty line is dened). For example, households that have a PCE between the 25th and the
75th percentile of PCE have a median (average) PCE of 430 (435) monthly pesos and 14% of
households in the same group are poor according to an absolute poverty line (22% according to
a relative poverty line).
5.3. Nutrient  Income Elasticity: linear specication
We estimate here the nutrient-income elasticity with a linear regression approach. Some of the
benets of the linear regression model include the ability to control for a large set of control
variables, including village or municipality specic xed eects, and to take into account with
standard econometric methods the possible biases due to measurement error and endogeneity
issues. The cost, on the other hand, is that the conditional relationship between nutrient and
income is assumed to be linear, or in other terms, the elasticity nutrient-income is constant.
This is a quite restrictive assumption, whose validity will be tested in next section in which
we explore the non linearity of the relationship between nutrient consumption and income with
several approaches.
Here, for each nutrient, we estimate a linear regression of the form:
lnNUTi;v = 0 + 1FEv + Zi;v +  lnPCEi;v + "i;v (5.1)
where NUT is per capita nutrient consumption in household i in locality/municipality v, FE is a
vector of binary variables summarizing village or municipality-specic xed eects, Z is a vector
of household characteristics and " is an error term.
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The inclusion of area-specic xed eects, FE, is intended to control for village or municipality-
specic characteristics that may have also a direct impact on nutrient consumption12. The vec-
tor Z includes age-sex household composition ratios, age and educational level of the household
head and of his/her spouse, count of how many assets (of a list including radio, television, VCR,
phone, computer, washing machine, heater, motorcycle and car) the household owns (included
as binary variables for each category from 1 to 5 assets and one binary variable for owns 6
or more assets), binary variables for dirt oor, wall material is cardboard, palm, reed or
bamboo and roof material is cardboard, palm or word tiles and binary variables indicating
whether the household head and his/her spouse speak an indigenous language. Moreover, we
include the locality price for 40 food items as recorded in the locality module of the PAL survey.
The results of the OLS estimation of (5.1) are presented in table 5.5 (in the rst column). One
clear pattern that emerges is that the estimated elasticities for the sample of all households are
all positive, quite high and signicant for all macro and nutrients. The calorie income elasticity
is 0.44, remarkably similar to 0.35 calorie income elasticity estimate of Subramanian and Deaton
(1996) for India, and the 0.43 estimate of Skouas (2003) for Indonesia. The nutrients with the
highest income elasticity are vitamin A (1.26) and vitamin C (1.11). Thus a 1 % increase in
income is likely to result in an increase of more than 1% in the consumption of vitamins A and C.
These estimates are much higher than the income elasticities reported by Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1985) for the same nutrients using a sample of farm households.13 One possible explanation
for the lower elasticity estimates obtained by these authors is the fact that nutrient conversion
factors were applied at twelve aggregated food groups rather at the individual food item level
as in this study. As Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985) acknowledge, this approach may be responsible
for their low elasticity estimates since it ignores possible substitutions within food groups.
Among the nutrients examined, remarkably high values are also displayed by calcium, choles-
terol, and iron heme. The income elasticity for iron, folate, and zinc ranges from 0.315 (iron) to
0.415 (zinc). 14
In this study the measurement of nutrient consumption is done by converting food quantities
into nutrient availability using food composition tables. While this method has the advantage
of being easily implemented, it suers from several potentially important sources of systematic
error. Major drawbacks are that this method assumes that no food is wasted (and this will cause
problems in case very low-income households waste less than those that are better o), does
not take into account explicitly meals given to guests or employees and meals received in-kind
(however, this issue can be addressed if the survey collects information about it) and meals taken
12In the OLS we include locality dummies (there are 235 localities in our sample). In the IV approach we
include municipality dummies (there are 108 municipalities in our sample and each of them includes on average
2.16 localities) as we use instruments that vary at the locality level.
13Their prot elasticity estimates are 0.0245 and 0.0274 for vitamins A and C, respectively.
14In the literature several estimates have been provided: among others, Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) that
using data from ICRISAT report elasticity estimates of 0.06 to 0.19 for protein, 0.30 to -0.22 for calcium, -0.11
to 0.30 for iron (depending on whether level estimates or dierences over time are used); Behrman and Wolfe
(1987) study Nicaragua and nd elasticities in the range 0.04 to 0.11 for calories, protein, iron and vitamin A;
Bouis (1991) reports an iron-income elasticity of 0.44, a calorie-income's of 0.16 and insignicant elasticities for
vitamin A and C.
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away from home (this can be a source of bias since, for example, it is not necessarily true that
meals taken away from home have the same caloric consumption of meals eaten at home).
Accordingly, it is likely that measurement error in nutrient consumption will be correlated
with PCE, with this being a source of bias in estimates of nutrient-PCE elasticities. In par-
ticular, as rst noted by Bouis and Haddad (1992), the possibility that measurement errors in
nutrient consumption are likely to be positively correlated with measurement errors in household
consumption implies that this type of measurement error is not the classical errors-in-variables
problem where coecients are likely to be biased towards zero (attenuation bias). In the context
of correlated measurement errors in the dependent and independent variables of a regression, the
upward bias from the correlated errors will typically outweigh the standard downward attenua-
tion bias from the measurement error in total consumption, leaving a net upward bias in income
elasticity estimates obtained using OLS methods. However, even assuming that consumption is
perfectly measured several other factors can potentially bias our estimates: unobserved variables
could be correlated both with nutrient intake and income. In addition to this, a reverse causality
argument applies here as high nutrient consumption might bring better health that itself causes
higher income. With this in mind we estimate specication (5.1) also with an instrumental
variable (IV) approach. Choice of a valid instrument is always a quite complicated task. Ide-
ally, we would like to have a variable that is correlated with PCE but not with unobservables
that drive nutrition. We try four dierent instruments: locality median non food expenditure,
locality mean non food expenditure (we assign a value to each household that is the locality
mean calculated not considering the same household), count of how many assets the household
owns (as a binary variable for each category) and locality median of PCE. Each of them has
its own strengths and weaknesses, a priori we prefer the rst 2 as they are not aected by the
measurement error issue of using the same quantities for constructing the nutrient intakes and
the expenditure measure. Following this same argument, locality median (or mean) PCE is a
less valid instrument. In this and in the following section we will always present both the OLS
and the IV results, even if we will mostly focus on the IV results when we discuss and interpret
our ndings.
In table 5.5, we report the results with these dierent variables as instrument for ln PCE15.
All the instruments seem to have enough power as the F-test reported at the bottom of table
5.5 suggests. One general pattern from the IV results is that most of the estimated elasticities
are lower than those from OLS (and often not signicant), with this supporting the story of
upward biased OLS estimates. If we focus on the IV with locality median non food expenditure
as an instruments, a notable result is that the elasticity calorie-income is very small and not
signicant (and this is robust to the choice of the instruments; only when locality median PCE
is used the elasticity is positive, but much smaller than OLS, and signicant). The same pattern
arises for key macro and nutrients such as ber, protein, carbohydrates, folate and zinc. On the
contrary, remarkably high elasticities are displayed by the IV estimate for cholesterol and fats
in general, vitamin A and C, and calcium. Interestingly, these results are very consistent with
15When the instrument is the locality mean or median, also its square is included in the rst stage regression.
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the adequacy ratios (see table 5.2): bigger IV elasticities are associated with nutrients with low
adequacy ratios. In other terms, increase in income seems to be the most eective exactly for
those nutrients for which the average person in our sample is the most decient.
One issue we did not address explicitly in the estimation above is that of zero intakes. Some
nutrients may be only present in some particular foods, and in case these foods are not consumed
by the households, consumption of these nutrients will be zero. Households may be facing non-
negativity constraints which at current income and prices make it optimal to consume only
some foods, i.e. zero expenditures reect corner solutions. Estimation of the income elasticity of
nutrient consumption on a sample that does not include zero consumption (as in our case since
we use variables in logs) might lead to biased estimates, especially for the sample of households
at the bottom part of the distribution of PCE. While the bias might depend upon dierent
factors other than zero consumption (such as endogeneity of PCE), simple intuition suggests
the presence of a downward bias of the estimated elasticity: provided that households with
zero intakes are those at a corner solution (i.e., poorer households) the selected sample of those
with positive intake will consist of better-o families for which we expect the nutrient-income
elasticity to be lower. In our sample, only two nutrients show a relevant fraction of zero values:
cholesterol and heme iron16. Hence, we estimate the income elasticity of these two nutrients
with 4 estimators that take into account the presence of zero values: censored least absolute
deviation estimator (CLAD), CLAD-IV, TOBIT and TOBIT-IV. The CLAD relies on much
weaker distributional assumptions than the TOBIT method, but it cannot easily control for
endogenous regressors.17 Our ndings suggest that the presence of zero intakes is a very mild
source of bias in the estimation of the elasticity cholesterol-income (estimated coecients with
CLAD and TOBIT are quite close to those from OLS and IV. On the contrary, not taking into
account zero intakes seems to bring to a sizeable downward bias of the OLS and IV estimates
for heme iron: for example, the TOBIT-IV estimator yields an income elasticity of 1.353 as
compared to an elasticity of 0.411 with the linear IV. This result is going to be taken into
account when interpreting ndings about heme iron in what follows.
5.4. Nutrient-income elasticity: non linear specication
We explore potential nonlinearities in the relationship between nutrients and income in four
dierent ways. First, we use two exible specications, still linear in parameters, but that allow
elasticity to change with income. In particular, we estimate specication (5.2) ,log PCE +
inverse PCE, and (5.3) log PCE + log PCE squared.
lnNUTi;v = 0 + 1FEv + Zi;v + 0 lnPCEi;v + 1
1
PCEi;v
+ "i;v (5.2)
16This nding is consistent with the 1999 National Nutrition Survey of Mexico identies zinc and iron deciency
as a major nutritional problem in Mexican children (Barquera et al., 2003a).
17Our IV approach is to use the residuals (third order polynomial) from a rst stage (OLS of ln PCE on our
instruments) in the CLAD and TOBIT regression in the second stage. For a more intuitive explanation of the
CLAD see Deaton (1997). Blundell and Powell (2004) provide a description of more recent developments.
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lnNUTi;v = 0 + 1FEv + Zi;v + 0 lnPCEi;v + 1 (lnPCEi;v)
2 + "i;v (5.3)
Nutrient-income elasticity will be as in (5.4) and (5.6) for specication (5.2) and (5.3) re-
spectively.
d lnNUT
d lnPCE
= 0   1 1
PCE
(5.4)
d lnNUT
d lnPCE
= 0 + 21 lnPCE (5.5)
Obviously this represents only a basic way to deal with nonlinearities, but it allows estimation
of (5.2) and (5.3) with standard linear econometric tools.
Results are in table 5.6 and 5.7, for specication (5.2) and (5.3), respectively. We report the
elasticity for each nutrient computed at three percentiles of the PCE distribution: 25th, median
and 75th. Both the OLS and IV (using as instrument locality median non food expenditure and
its square) results are shown.
If we focus on the IV results for specication (5.2) (see table 5.6; these are very similar
to those for specication (5.2)) some interesting patterns arise: for some nutrients (namely
calcium, vitamins A and C) income elasticity is positive, very high and signicant across the
entire PCE distribution; in particular it remains very high also at the 75th PCE percentiles.
For fats (fat, cholesterol, saturated, monounsaturated and polyunsaturated fats) the pattern is
a sizeable elasticity at the 25th PCE percentile that is decreasing as PCE increases and it is
never signicantly dierent from zero at the 75th percentile (see the results for IV).
One important nding is that even at the bottom of PCE distribution energy does not
seem to increase with income (IV estimate for 25th percentile is 0.041 and not signicant) and
elasticity is negative at median and 75th percentile. Intake of carbohydrates would never go
up as PCE increases according to our IV results. Estimated negative elasticity increases in
magnitude at higher PCE percentiles, though it is never signicant. Protein and Zinc show
a similar pattern as income elasticity is increasing with PCE, but the estimated elasticity is
not signicantly dierent from zero. Finally, the behavior of iron heme is quite peculiar as the
elasticity goes from a being negative for the 25th PCE percentile to a very high positive value
for the 75th percentile. Obviously, the zero intake issue (potentially biasing downwards the IV
estimate) is particularly relevant for the 25th percentile sample.
A more general approach to capture non linearities of the nutrient-income relationship is
to estimate an income spline specication, which is a specication that includes intercept and
interaction dummies for relevant segments of the PCE distribution. In particular, we include
dummies and their interactions with ln PCE for the 4 population quartiles based on the distri-
bution of PCE. In this exercise we try to deal with endogeneity of PCE with a control function
approach in which the residuals from the rst stage regression (as a 6th order polynomial; esti-
mated from a regression of ln PCE on controls and locality median non food expenditure and its
square) are included in the regression of ln nutrient intake on intercept dummies, interactions
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with ln PCE and other covariates.18 Results are in table 5.8, where the estimated coecients
for each quartile are reported both for OLS and the IV approach19. Findings are remarkably
in line with those from the exible specication exercise above. Income elasticity for calories is
higher for poorer households (those in quartile 1) but not signicant in the IV approach. Fats,
vitamins and calcium display a sizeable, positive and signicant elasticity no matter which seg-
ment of the PCE distribution is considered, that is decreasing at higher quartiles. Elasticity for
protein is never signicant, even if the point estimate is generally quite large (0.139 for quartile
1). Carbohydrates and zinc seem not to respond to income increases at any quartile and the
point estimates are negative at higher quartiles for carbohydrates. Finally, iron heme show a
large and signicant elasticity at all quartiles (that is not signicant for the rst quartile, but
once again we stress that the downward bias from the zero intake issue is expected to be much
more relevant for poorer households).
Next, we address non linearity in the relationship between nutrients and income by means of
a quantile regression approach. Besides providing a richer characterization of the data, quantile
regression is more robust to outliers than least-squares regression and quantile regression estima-
tors can be consistent under weaker stochastic assumptions than with least-squares estimation
(see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). We estimate a conditional quantile linear model for percentiles
10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. This means that the estimator will t a line through the observations
that are at the same percentile of the nutrient intake distribution conditional to the regressors.
The dierence of the estimated income elasticity for the dierent percentiles will give us a sense
of the heterogeneity of the response of nutrition to income among groups that are at dierent
parts on the distribution of nutrient intake. We deal with the endogeneity of PCE with a control
function approach, which follows Lee (2007). In particular, we use a two-step estimator in which
the rst step is the estimation of residuals from a quantile regression of ln PCE on a set of
covariates20 and the ln locality median non food expenditure and its square (our instruments for
PCE) and the second step consist of a quantile regression of the ln nutrient on covariates and a
3rd order polynomial of the residuals estimated in the rst step. Standard errors are obtained
bootstrapping this procedure with 300 replications.
In table 5.9 we report the results of the quantile regression linear approach (that is, not
taking into account endogeneity of PCE) in the rst set of columns and of our IV approach
in the last set of columns for 5 selected percentiles. The IV approach results oer several
interesting ndings: energy intake (kcal) is unaected by increase in income for households at
low percentiles of the conditional distribution (below the median) with this conrming the results
above. However, energy intake will decrease as PCE increases at the top percentiles (75th and
18For more details on the control function approach see, among others, Florens et al. (2007) and Wooldridge
(1997, 2003).
19As they are more easily interpreted, we report the estimated coecient for each quartile and not the dierence
with the omitted category. For example, the 0.368 for energy, quartile 2 in the OLS estimation in table 5.8 refers
to the slope of the income spline for quartile 2 (and not to the dierence between the slope of quartile 2 and the
omitted quartile, quartile 1).
20In particular, we include age and gender composition dummies (number of males and females in age groups
0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-54 and above 55), age of head and spouse, education of head and spouse, dummy for head and
spouse speaking indigenous language, and locality prices 40 food items.
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90th). As regards another macronutrient, proteins, intake would decrease with PCE at the very
top of the conditional distribution (90th percentile) and would not increase at low percentiles
(point estimates are sizeable but not signicant). A completely dierent pattern is displayed
by the fat group (see rows in table 5.9 from Fat to Polyunsaturated fat) as no matter which
percentile we consider the eect of PCE is always signicant and very high. In addition to this,
the coecient of ln PCE is quite similar across the percentiles considered, with the exception
of cholesterol for which the eect of PCE is much larger at the 10th percentile. A similar
pattern applies for vitamins A and C and calcium as they show extremely high elasticities at low
percentiles which tend to become smaller at higher percentiles, but still quite high and signicant.
One important result is the one about carbohydrates: the intake will decrease no matter which
percentile is considered and the eect tends to be larger at higher percentiles. Finally, intake of
iron heme would always increase with PCE across the percentiles of the conditional distribution.
Lastly we deal with non linearity in a semi-parametric way. This approach gives full exibility
as regards the function linking PCE to nutrient intake, but it comes with the cost of allowing
only a restricted set of controls to be included in a tractable way in the estimation. As we do
not explicitly take into account the endogeneity of PCE in this exercise, the ndings here should
just be taken as giving a very general picture of the relationship between nutrient intake and
PCE.
The model we estimate below is a partially linear model:
yi = zi +m (xi) + "i (5.6)
where yi denotes the ln of the nutrient intake, ziis a vector of the variables that we would like
to control for in a linear fashion,  is a vector of parameters and m(x) is a nonlinear function of
x, here ln PCE.
This model has been traditionally estimated with the Robinson (1988) estimator, which is
especially suitable for the estimation of the vector  in (5.6). Since we are primarily interested
in the estimation of m(x) we implement an estimator based on a dierencing approach (rst
suggested by Yatchew, 1997, and discussed by DiNardo and Tobias, 2001). The procedure for
estimating (5.6) consists of the following steps: rst, the data are sorted by ascending values
of the x variable (in our case ln PCE) and the m-th order21 dierences are calculated on the
sorted data. The idea here is that if xiand xi 1 are close enough in the sorted data, then so will
m (xi)and m (xi 1). Accordingly, the dierenced version of the model (5.2) on the sorted data
will remove the nonparametric component m (xi). Then the vector  can be estimated with a
regression of the dierenced y's on the dierenced z's. With the estimated vector ^ in hand it
is then possible to derive a new adjusted dependent variable net of the linear eect of the z
variables, i.e.,
21As noted in Yatchew (1997) the dierencing order is important as far as the eciency of the estimator is
concerned. In order to maximize the eciency of the estimator, we use the optimal dierencing weights, as
tabulated in Yatchew (1997), to compute dierences of the sorted data. We set the dierencing order to 3 to
compute dierences in the semi-parametric estimation. We also tried other dierencing orders and the results
did not change substantially.
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yadjusted = yi   zi^ (5.7)
The nal step is to perform a local linear regression using the variable dened in (5.7) as
dependent variable. In particular, we use a smooth local regression technique similar to that
used by Subramianan and Deaton (1996). Their procedure works as follows. At any given point
of x, we run a weighted linear regression of the logarithm of the dependent variable yadjusted on
ln PCE. The weights are chosen to be largest for sample points close to x and to diminish with
distance from x ; they are also set so that, as the sample size increases, the weight given to the
immediate neighborhood of x is increased so that, in the limit, only x is represented. In our
case, for the local regression at x, observation i gets the (quartic kernel) weight
wi (x) =
15
16
"
1 

x  xi
h
2#2
(5.8)
if  h  x xi  h and zero otherwise. The quantity h is a bandwidth that is set so as to trade o
bias and variance (in general a small bandwidth brings smaller variance but higher bias while a
large h determines a small bias but higher variance). Our main objective is to plot the regression
function and its slope so that, instead of calculating local regressions for each point in the sample,
we use an evenly spaced grid of 60 points in the distribution of ln PCE and calculate a local
regression for each grid. The estimate of m(x) is the predicted value from the local regression at
x, while the local estimated slope coecient provides an estimate of the slope m'(x). Given that
both y and x are expressed in log form, the derivative of the regression function, m'(x), is an
estimate of the elasticity of the demand for nutrients with respect to income. Then a graph of
the nutrient-income elasticity estimate against the level of (log) income allows one to determine
easily the extent to which the elasticity varies with income. The bandwidth h for the quartic
kernel weight is set to 0.5 after inspection of alternative plots. This value for h seems to be
appropriate with respect to the trade o between bias and variance of the estimated regression
function. The vector z in eq. (5.6) includes the age and gender composition of the household
expressed as ratios of the total family size. Specically, the age and gender groups are males
and females between age 0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 54 and more than 55.
Figure 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the slope of the estimated functions that link the nutrients and
ln PCE (we do not show the estimate functions themselves for the sake of brevity). In general
the relationship between nutrient intake and PCE seems not to far from being linear around the
median of ln PCE (indicated by the vertical line in the plots) but not at the extremes of PCE.
Two main patterns seem to be prevalent in the income elasticity of nutrients. For some
nutrients (namely ber, protein, folate, zinc, calcium) the elasticity is either gently decreasing
or constant at low values of ln PCE, then it becomes constant around the median of ln PCE for
starting to decrease only a quite high value of ln PCE. Most of the other nutrients (particularly
fats and vitamins) show a much more steady decrease of the estimated elasticity as ln PCE
increases. Not a completely clear pattern arises when it comes to elasticity of energy to ln PCE
as the slope of the estimated regression function is uctuating quite a lot. However, elasticity of
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energy is spanning a much smaller range than in the case of the other nutrients. From gures
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 it can be gained that the average elasticity below the median of ln PCE (the
horizontal line in the plot) is larger than the average elasticity above the median. Heme iron
shows a remarkably ample uctuation at low levels of ln PCE, then it stays constant around the
median and there is only a quite small drop at very high values of ln PCE.
5.5. Concluding remarks: putting together the results and policy implications
This paper provides estimates of the extent to which nutrient consumption at the household
level responds to increases in household income. The income elasticity for a specic nutrient,
the parameter that summarizes the percentage change in the consumption of a specic nutrient
corresponding to a one percent change in household income, is critical to understanding one of
the key determinants of consumption of nutrients. As household income increases, households
may change the composition of their food consumption and thus aecting both the intake of
total energy (kcal) and of specic nutrients. If increases in income result in changes in the
diet of households towards foods with higher nutrient content (for example, eating more vegeta-
bles/fruits and meat), then nutrient deciencies may fall.
An obvious starting point in interpreting our results is the discussion of the size of the income
elasticity for calories. As discussed above estimated elasticity for calories in previous literature
span a very large range, going from zero to a quite sizeable positive number, with these dierences
depending on the estimation method, type of food survey and geographic area of interest. As
such, these estimates have very little policy content as the implications of a small vs. a large
income elasticity are completely dierent. Here, we nd a calorie-income elasticity close to zero:
our preferred estimates (IV with locality median non food expenditure as instrument) gives a
not statistically signicant elasticity of 0.029 (see table 5.5). When we use a exible parametric
specication we nd that the elasticity is bigger for households at the 25th percentile of PCE
(between 0.04 and 0.07; see IV results in table 5.6 and 5.7) but still not signicantly dierent
from zero. In addition to this, the quantile regression (see IV approach in table 5.9) results show
a zero elasticity at low percentiles and a negative and signicant elasticity at the 75th and 90th
percentile. A zero elasticity for calories is quite consistent with the adequacy ratios in table
5.2, which show that on average households do not have a deciency of energy intake (that is
around 95% of the recommended daily intake). However, we would expect poorer population in
this sample to have a decient intake of calories (and this is the case: household in the bottom
25% of PCE have an adequacy ratio of only around 71%) and our results are suggesting that
elasticity is not dierent from zero also for this group of more vulnerable households. A zero
calorie-income elasticity suggests that households are relatively successful in maintaining energy
levels constant as their income varies. This result is consistent with the ndings of a recent paper
that studies the consequences of the world food price crisis on nutrition in China (see Jensen
and Miller, 2008). They nd that the food price increase did not have an eect on the calorie
intake of poor households in two Chinese provinces mainly because these households were able to
substitute to cheaper foods and because the domestic prices of staple foods remained relatively
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insulated from the world price increase due to government intervention in grain markets. From
a policy perspective, this would require policies to focus more on the way (which macro and
micronutrients) households obtain their calories. In terms of research focus, this supports the
idea that the behavior of specic macro and micronutrients when income or price changes is
probably a more interesting research topic than what happens to aggregate calorie intake.
For a group of nutrients  namely fats (fat, cholesterol, saturated, monounsaturated, and
polyunsaturated fat), vitamin A and C, heme iron and calcium  our ndings are remarkably
consistent across dierent specications and estimation methods: elasticity is positive, very high
and statically signicant. In addition to this, it is generally extremely large for lower percentiles
and it tends to decrease at higher percentiles but still remaining quite sizeable in magnitude.
Interestingly, these nutrients are also those for which we nd the largest deciency in our sample;
for example, on average the intake of vitamin A is only 23.5% of the recommended intake and
that of calcium only 48.1% and even households in the top 25% of PCE do not aord an adequacy
ratio of 100%. As regards heme iron, it has to be noticed that the zero intake issue is particularly
relevant for this nutrient with this meaning that the estimates presented might be aected by
a downward bias, especially for the poorer population. Overall, increases in household income
seems to translate into greater intake of these nutrients, which is probably capturing the eect
of changes in the diet from one made mostly of cereals to one with more meats, vegetables and
fruits.
Elasticity for carbohydrates and ber are either zero or negative but never signicant in
the IV and exible specication exercise. In the quantile regression a neater pattern arises as
elasticity is negative and signicant for all the percentiles considered and the magnitude tends
to increase at higher percentiles. As the adequacy ratio for these two nutrients is well above
100%, also for the poorer population, this result seems to give additional evidence to the results
above about fats, vitamins and calcium: households might be substituting away from cereals.
Findings are more mixed for protein and zinc: in the IV estimation elasticity is not signi-
cantly dierent from zero. Results from the exible specication exercise show an elasticity that
is close to zero or even negative at the 25th percentile of PCE and then it tends to increase at
higher percentiles, but still it is not signicant. The quantile regression's results suggest that
elasticity is signicantly negative at higher percentiles (90th for protein, above median for zinc).
As we would expect the poorer population to face deciency of protein and zinc (as it is the
case: for households at the bottom 25% of PCE the adequacy ratio for protein and zinc is below
80%), this results is suggesting that increase in income might not be enough to foster an increase
in intake of these nutrients for the most vulnerable groups.
Some policy implications can be put forward on the basis of the results above. Overall, our
estimates establish that increases in income are associated with signicant and sizeable increases
in the consumption of vital nutrients among poor households in rural Mexico, namely vitamins
A and C, heme iron, calcium and fats.
Thus, increases in household income resulting from participation in poverty alleviation pro-
grams that provide direct (and unconditional) cash transfers, or economic policies that result in
higher rural wages, and increased protability of agricultural production might be particularly
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successful in achieving increases in the consumption of key nutrients at the household level.
On the other hand, intake of other nutrients seem not to respond to income or show a negative
elasticity. This can be exactly in line with policymakers' objectives in case of nutrients for which
there is an over-intake behavior (as it is the case for carbohydrates and ber in our sample),
even among poorer population. However, in some other cases a zero response of nutrient intake
to income could be more generally indicating a limit of interventions that only focus on transfer
of money. For instance, we nd that for a particularly vulnerable group in our sample (poorer
households, at the bottom 25% of PCE) a deciency of total energy, protein and zinc is not
accompanied with an estimated positive income elasticity. In other terms, increase in income
does not seem to be a policy tool that can remedy the deciency in energy, zinc and protein for
poorer households.
Finally, our study focused on the estimation of income elasticity at the household level. As
such, it is leaving unanswered the critical question of whether increases in nutrient consumption
at the household level translate to increases in the intake of key nutrients by infants and other
vulnerable children to nutrient deciencies. Perhaps alternative approaches that are more direct
may be more eective. For example, in-kind transfers of key food items that provide the es-
sential nutrients may be more eective than direct cash transfers to their parents at decreasing
malnutrition among infants and young children. It is hoped that future research as well as the
data collected over the next rounds for the evaluation of the PAL program will be able to shed
more light on this issue.
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Table 5.2: Adequacy ratios
Nutrient All  bottom 25% of PCE  top 25% of PCE 
Energy (kcal) 94.9  70.8  120.4 
Fiber (g) 118.0  101.8  133.7 
Protein (g) 110.3  78.7  147.9 
Fat (g) 89.8  36.4  133.5 
Carbohydrates (g) 257.7  211.3  300.6 
Vitamin A (mcg ER) 23.5  8.0  48.3 
Vitamin C (mcg) 94.2  35.9  179.8 
Folate (mcg) 243.1  182.7  306.4 
Iron (mg) 63.6  57.5  70.1 
Zinc (mg) 96.7  77.5  117.2 
Calcium (mg) 48.1  17.8  91.4 
Adequacy ratio= ratio of median intake (as in table 1) to recommended daily intake (from nutritional tables); 
Recommended daily intake was calculated taking into account the different age and gender composition of the 3 
samples: all, bottom 25% of PCE, top 25% of PCE. 
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Table 5.5: Income elasticity of nutrients: linear specication
Nutrient OLS IV IV IV IV 
Loc median non food
Loc mean 
nonfood+
Count of 
assets 
Loc median 
PCE
Energy 
0.440*** 0.029 -0.104 0.101 0.174*** 
(0.013) (0.061) (0.102) (0.120) (0.055) 
Fiber
0.304*** -0.166 -0.446* -0.184 0.238 
(0.020) (0.143) (0.258) (0.309) (0.188) 
Protein
0.495*** 0.098 -0.050 -0.058 0.446*** 
(0.017) (0.113) (0.209) (0.240) (0.159) 
Fat
0.522*** 0.514*** 0.656*** -0.032 0.789*** 
(0.019) (0.115) (0.218) (0.251) (0.185) 
Cholesterol 
0.923*** 1.004*** 1.294*** 0.706*** 0.878*** 
(0.031) (0.141) (0.240) (0.164) (0.110) 
Saturated fat 
0.665*** 0.778*** 1.006*** 0.078 1.015*** 
(0.021) (0.125) (0.232) (0.249) (0.180) 
Monounsaturated fat 
0.565*** 0.491*** 0.641*** 0.358*** 0.541*** 
(0.019) (0.070) (0.125) (0.118) (0.061) 
Polyunsaturated fat 
0.517*** 0.727*** 1.158*** 0.076 0.912*** 
(0.032) (0.160) (0.280) (0.272) (0.222) 
Carbohydrates
0.338*** -0.060 -0.221 -0.289 0.214* 
(0.016) (0.094) (0.170) (0.208) (0.122) 
Vitamin A 
1.259*** 1.470*** 1.741*** 1.202*** 1.444*** 
(0.036) (0.163) (0.281) (0.233) (0.147) 
Vitamin C 
1.109*** 1.549*** 1.874*** 0.451* 1.711*** 
(0.036) (0.152) (0.274) (0.242) (0.178) 
Folate
0.381*** -0.022 -0.272 0.236 0.316* 
(0.020) (0.163) (0.284) (0.273) (0.174) 
Iron
0.319*** -0.186* -0.426** -0.350 0.142 
(0.019) (0.112) (0.201) (0.247) (0.136) 
Iron heme 
0.852*** 0.411*** 0.321 0.367* 0.494*** 
(0.028) (0.137) (0.248) (0.217) (0.107) 
Zinc 
0.427*** -0.037 -0.234 -0.190 0.316** 
(0.019) (0.114) (0.208) (0.249) (0.151) 
Calcium
0.780*** 0.675*** 0.823*** 0.961*** 0.991*** 
(0.022) (0.169) (0.292) (0.259) (0.195) 
     
F-test instrument  87.21 20.65 3.08 340.27 
p value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.0000 
      
Obs 5343 5343 5321 5343 5343 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,, ***  significant at 1%; Standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered at the locality level; + for each household this is the locality average of all the other 
households in the same locality. 
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Table 5.6: Income elasticity of nutrients: exible specication log
inverse
Nutrient
p25  Median  p75 
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
Energy 
0.432*** 0.041  0.412*** -0.040  0.400*** -0.091 
(0.014) (0.069)  (0.013) (0.134)  (0.016) (0.207) 
Fiber
0.303*** -0.205  0.269*** 0.018  0.249*** 0.155 
(0.022) (0.165)  (0.022) (0.254)  (0.027) (0.388) 
Protein
0.487*** 0.056  0.470*** 0.293  0.459*** 0.439 
(0.019) (0.129)  (0.019) (0.197)  (0.024) (0.297) 
Fat
0.551*** 0.533***  0.494*** 0.385*  0.459*** 0.293 
(0.021) (0.111)  (0.020) (0.208)  (0.025) (0.313) 
Cholesterol 
1.025*** 1.137***  0.847*** 0.647***  0.738*** 0.345 
(0.043) (0.215)  (0.026) (0.210)  (0.035) (0.365) 
Saturated fat 
0.708*** 0.803***  0.637*** 0.613***  0.593*** 0.496 
(0.023) (0.120)  (0.022) (0.217)  (0.028) (0.329) 
Monounsaturated fat 
0.600*** 0.551***  0.528*** 0.142  0.484*** -0.111 
(0.021) (0.068)  (0.019) (0.134)  (0.024) (0.202) 
Polyunsaturated fat 
0.593*** 0.786***  0.456*** 0.342  0.372*** 0.069 
(0.042) (0.153)  (0.028) (0.270)  (0.036) (0.430) 
Carbohydrates
0.342*** -0.050  0.297*** -0.122  0.270*** -0.167 
(0.018) (0.097)  (0.017) (0.174)  (0.021) (0.261) 
Vitamin A 
1.389*** 1.555***  1.162*** 1.012***  1.023*** 0.677* 
(0.046) (0.187)  (0.031) (0.251)  (0.041) (0.397) 
Vitamin C 
1.228*** 1.538***  1.060*** 1.611***  0.957*** 1.656*** 
(0.041) (0.163)  (0.033) (0.258)  (0.042) (0.395) 
Folate
0.383*** -0.122  0.358*** 0.466*  0.343*** 0.829** 
(0.026) (0.224)  (0.021) (0.250)  (0.026) (0.404) 
Iron
0.315*** -0.217*  0.280*** -0.044  0.259*** 0.062 
(0.021) (0.128)  (0.021) (0.214)  (0.025) (0.331) 
Iron heme 
0.803*** -0.214  0.837*** 0.631***  0.858*** 1.151*** 
(0.029) (0.303)  (0.028) (0.181)  (0.037) (0.350) 
Zinc 
0.415*** -0.073  0.397*** 0.134  0.386*** 0.262 
(0.021) (0.124)  (0.020) (0.209)  (0.025) (0.316) 
Calcium
0.806*** 0.642***  0.764*** 0.859***  0.739*** 0.992** 
(0.027) (0.196)  (0.025) (0.266)  (0.031) (0.411) 
         
F-test log PCE 21.56 
p-value 0.0000 
         
F-test (1/PCE) 21.02 
p-value 0.0000 
         
Obs 5343 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,, ***  significant at 1%; Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered 
at the locality level; Instrument for ln PCE is ln locality median non food expenditure and its square.
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Table 5.7: Income elasticity of nutrients: exible specication log
squared
Nutrient
p25  Median  p75 
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
Energy 
0.435*** 0.067  0.418*** -0.020  0.402*** -0.101 
(0.016) (0.087)  (0.012) (0.108)  (0.016) (0.224) 
Fiber
0.311*** -0.276  0.278*** -0.038  0.247*** 0.185 
(0.025) (0.204)  (0.021) (0.207)  (0.030) (0.418) 
Protein
0.492*** -0.019  0.474*** 0.234  0.458*** 0.470 
(0.021) (0.155)  (0.018) (0.163)  (0.027) (0.319) 
Fat
0.569*** 0.580***  0.508*** 0.422**  0.450*** 0.273 
(0.023) (0.133)  (0.020) (0.170)  (0.029) (0.336) 
Cholesterol 
1.068*** 1.265***  0.891*** 0.765***  0.726*** 0.297 
(0.049) (0.273)  (0.027) (0.166)  (0.036) (0.388) 
Saturated fat 
0.732*** 0.864***  0.654*** 0.660***  0.581*** 0.471 
(0.026) (0.146)  (0.022) (0.178)  (0.032) (0.354) 
Monounsaturated fat 
0.623*** 0.681***  0.546*** 0.243**  0.473*** -0.166 
(0.023) (0.080)  (0.018) (0.109)  (0.027) (0.217) 
Polyunsaturated fat 
0.631*** 0.927***  0.491*** 0.453**  0.359*** 0.010 
(0.049) (0.206)  (0.029) (0.212)  (0.039) (0.467) 
Carbohydrates
0.354*** -0.027  0.309*** -0.104  0.266*** -0.177 
(0.020) (0.115)  (0.016) (0.143)  (0.023) (0.281) 
Vitamin A 
1.447*** 1.724***  1.220*** 1.146***  1.009*** 0.606 
(0.053) (0.239)  (0.032) (0.202)  (0.042) (0.426) 
Vitamin C 
1.271*** 1.515***  1.103*** 1.593***  0.947*** 1.666*** 
(0.048) (0.202)  (0.032) (0.211)  (0.044) (0.426) 
Folate
0.390*** -0.309  0.364*** 0.320  0.341*** 0.907** 
(0.030) (0.289)  (0.021) (0.203)  (0.028) (0.437) 
Iron
0.322*** -0.273*  0.289*** -0.087  0.259*** 0.085 
(0.023) (0.161)  (0.020) (0.173)  (0.028) (0.356) 
Iron heme 
0.809*** -0.327  0.830*** 0.447***  0.849*** 1.171*** 
(0.034) (0.352)  (0.026) (0.155)  (0.039) (0.362) 
Zinc 
0.419*** -0.139  0.402*** 0.082  0.387*** 0.289 
(0.023) (0.149)  (0.020) (0.172)  (0.028) (0.339) 
Calcium
0.823*** 0.574**  0.773*** 0.805***  0.727*** 1.021** 
(0.031) (0.246)  (0.024) (0.218)  (0.034) (0.443) 
         
F-test log PCE 21.56 
p-value 0.0000 
         
F-test (log PCE)^2 21.01 
p-value 0.0000 
         
Obs 5343 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,, ***  significant at 1%; Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered 
at the locality level; Instrument for ln PCE is ln locality median non food expenditure and its square.
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Table 5.8: Income elasticity of nutrients: income spline specica-
tion
Table 8: Income elasticity of nutrients: income spline specification 
Nutrient
OLS  IV approach 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Energy 
0,481*** 0,368*** 0,456*** 0,459***  0,097 -0,054 0,045 0,074 
(0,035) (0,075) (0,076) (0,047)  (0,063) (0,097) (0,097) (0,081) 
Fiber
0,385*** 0,286** 0,256* 0,236**  -0,079 -0,202 -0,204 -0,196 
(0,051) (0,124) (0,146) (0,099)  (0,147) (0,189) (0,179) (0,185) 
Protein
0,543*** 0,432*** 0,534*** 0,478***  0,139 0,026 0,156 0,145 
(0,041) (0,094) (0,114) (0,090)  (0,115) (0,144) (0,136) (0,151) 
Fat
0,652*** 0,548*** 0,553*** 0,420***  0,603*** 0,518*** 0,536*** 0,424*** 
(0,049) (0,104) (0,145) (0,104)  (0,116) (0,159) (0,165) (0,156) 
Cholesterol 
1,322*** 1,142*** 0,550*** 0,891***  1,247*** 1,202*** 0,627*** 0,972*** 
(0,118) (0,199) (0,163) (0,094)  (0,180) (0,246) (0,231) (0,174) 
Saturated fat 
0,838*** 0,768*** 0,720*** 0,569***  0,899*** 0,852*** 0,798*** 0,683*** 
(0,056) (0,115) (0,146) (0,111)  (0,126) (0,173) (0,172) (0,167) 
Monounsaturated fat 
0,711*** 0,632*** 0,625*** 0,486***  0,591*** 0,528*** 0,531*** 0,440*** 
(0,052) (0,096) (0,095) (0,084)  (0,078) (0,120) (0,119) (0,100) 
Polyunsaturated fat 
0,885*** 0,649*** 0,674*** 0,228*  0,960*** 0,831*** 0,891*** 0,420** 
(0,108) (0,166) (0,188) (0,121)  (0,173) (0,234) (0,239) (0,188) 
Carbohydrates
0,426*** 0,271*** 0,312*** 0,265***  0,038 -0,147 -0,086 -0,105 
(0,043) (0,099) (0,117) (0,074)  (0,097) (0,137) (0,140) (0,126) 
Vitamin A 
1,838*** 1,670*** 1,161*** 1,151***  1,922*** 1,793*** 1,290*** 1,347*** 
(0,129) (0,188) (0,175) (0,097)  (0,207) (0,246) (0,240) (0,203) 
Vitamin C 
1,559*** 1,305*** 0,971*** 0,986***  1,912*** 1,659*** 1,317*** 1,358*** 
(0,111) (0,195) (0,187) (0,129)  (0,183) (0,246) (0,237) (0,216) 
Folate
0,475*** 0,484*** 0,464*** 0,285***  0,069 0,065 0,069 -0,096 
(0,062) (0,125) (0,128) (0,093)  (0,179) (0,201) (0,179) (0,189) 
Iron
0,400*** 0,263** 0,320** 0,280***  -0,083 -0,257* -0,188 -0,201 
(0,047) (0,114) (0,126) (0,093)  (0,114) (0,156) (0,154) (0,152) 
Iron heme 
0,653*** 0,915*** 0,789*** 0,828***  0,240 0,478** 0,364* 0,467*** 
(0,084) (0,177) (0,146) (0,118)  (0,163) (0,222) (0,193) (0,177) 
Zinc 
0,467*** 0,371*** 0,460*** 0,399***  0,015 -0,103 0,008 -0,009 
(0,046) (0,108) (0,123) (0,089)  (0,116) (0,155) (0,149) (0,152) 
Calcium
0,876*** 1,114*** 1,023*** 0,614***  0,718*** 0,993*** 0,925*** 0,556*** 
(0,060) (0,128) (0,139) (0,096)  (0,183) (0,207) (0,197) (0,190) 
F-test instrument      21.56 
p-value      0.0000 
Obs 5343 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,, ***  significant at 1%; Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered 
at the locality level; Instrument for ln PCE is ln locality median non food expenditure and its square.
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Figure 5.1: Proportion of calories from food groups and per capita expendi-
ture
Maize
Oils
Meat..
Sugars
Beans
Other cereals
Wheat
Fruit
Vegs
Other foods
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Deciles of PCE
Foods included in the groups: Maize (maize tortilla, maize in grains, maize flour); Oil (vegetable oil); Meat, Fish 
and Dairy (chicken, beef, pork, goat, seafood, sardines, tuna, eggs, milk, yogurt, cheeses, lard, cold meats); 
Sugars (sugar); Beans (kidney beans); Other cereals (pasta soup, biscuits, breakfast cereals); Wheat (white bread, 
sweet bread, loaf of bread, wheat flour, wheat tortilla); Fruits (guava, mandarins, papaya, oranges, bananas, 
apples, lemons, watermelon); Vegetables (tomatoes, onions, potatoes, carrots, leafy vegetables, pumpkin, 
chayote, chili, edible cactus); Other foods (rice, sweets, carbonated beverages, coffee) 
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Figure 5.2: Semiparametric estimation of the relationship between log daily
per capita nutrient and log per capita expenditureand log per capita expenditure 
The horizontal line in the right panel is the mean slope below the median; all values in logarithmic scale
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Figure 5.3: Semiparametric estimation of the relationship between log daily
per capita nutrient and log per capita expenditure: continued
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Figure 5.4: Semiparametric estimation of the relationship between log daily
per capita nutrient and log per capita expenditure:continued
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Conclusions
Despite a strong theoretical case supporting investments in human capital and the evidence on
positive return to these investments, investments in human capital are still dramatically low in
developing countries. In addition, the debate about the best timing of these investments is still
not closed. A well established theoretical case supports investments at early stages of one's life.
However, it is still an open question whether this case is conrmed empirically in developing
contexts and which type of intervention is the most eective. These are questions which have
to be answered empirically.
This thesis presents evidence of the impact of dierent types of policy interventions on
demand for human capital in Latin America, specically rural Mexico and Colombia. Most of
the results are based on the evaluation of Oportunidades, which is a conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program targeting poor households in rural Mexico. This type of program has proved
successful in breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty and has been extensively
evaluated given its unique experimental evaluation design.
In particular, in chapter 1 we focus on the unintended consequence (spillover eects) of the
Oportunidades program. This chapter oers interesting contributions on two dimensions: rst,
we show that the program has an indirect eect on cervical cancer screening rates of women
who were not eligible for the program but lived in areas where the program was in operation.
These eects  health externalities  can dramatically change the assessment of the impacts of a
program as well as considerations about its design. The other contribution of chapter 1 is about
underlying mechanisms through which programs work. In general, study of spillover eects
naturally leads to attempts to unveil program channels as the researcher typically might have
only a limited idea a priori of how the program works in terms of its unintended eects. Here,
we show evidence of the mechanism through which the program operates being the weakening
of the social norm of husbands' opposition to their spouses being screened by male doctors.
In Chapter 2 we show that Oportunidades is bringing families out of poverty, which is con-
sidered here as a necessary condition to allow them to invest in human capital. In addition to
this, we discuss why CCT programs can have perverse incentives on the labor supply of eligible
individuals and show that the program is not having this eect.
In chapter 3 and 4 we contribute to the evidence on the impact of ECD interventions. In
chapter 3 we discuss how conditional cash transfers can increase the caloric intake of very young
children and young mothers. This chapter also has some methodological content, in that it
shows how to apply a technique for estimating individual caloric intake when only household
aggregate data is available to a program evaluation setting. Result show that Oportunidades is
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successful at increasing the caloric intake of young children and young mothers, while it does
not seem to have an eect at other age ranges.
Chapter 4 focuses on the evaluation of the impact of a preschool nursery program in Colom-
bia: Hogares Comunitarios. When compared to a CCT program, this program can be thought
as a direct attack to children development, as participants (kids age 0 to 6) in the Hogares Co-
munitarios receive daycare services and food at the house of a community mother. Our evidence
shows that this program can have a positive and sizeable eect on child growth, with this result
being robust to dierent instruments for participation into the program and dierent samples.
In chapter 5 we deal with the long-standing debate about in-kind transfers vs. cash transfers
and with how this relates to child nutrition. In particular, we study how nutrient intake responds
to changes in income in a sample of rural Mexican households. This increase in income can
be thought as an unconditional cash transfer to households. Our evidence is mixed: while
consumption of some key nutrients (vitamins A and C, heme iron, calcium and fats) responds
positively to an increase in income, other nutrients (energy, zinc and protein) seem not to be
aected by a change in income, with this supporting the case for conditionalities and/or in-kind
transfers.
While this thesis focuses almost exclusively on interventions which try to aect the demand
for human capital, several results suggest solutions which have to be sought on the supply side.
For instance, the evidence on the social norm in Oportunidades localities seem to make a case
for supplying more female doctors in rural health centers. Other results point to the quality of
the supply: if availability of more resources does not necessarily translate into consumption of
better nutrients, one policy option is to give a more specic training to health sta on how to
advice rural households on consumption of more nutritious foods.
These issues are consistent with the literature on CCTs which shows that CCTs have been
very successful at increasing demand for education and health services, but quality of services
oered did not necessarily improve. Another open question in the literature is about long-term
impacts of CCTs, being the evidence so far almost exclusively on short-term impacts (see, among
others, Fizsbein and Schady, 2009). A related issue is that all the results in this thesis are about
reduced form policy impacts, hence missing the interconnections with local markets in which
individuals and households whose demand behavior is changing live. Interestingly, Levy (2009)
makes the point that CCTs in Mexico can only have a lasting eect on the generation of children
intervened if they are accompanied with labor market and scal reforms.
To continue the work developed in this thesis, we plan to focus on some these issues above
in our future research. In particular, we plan to deal with sustainability of the impact of CCT
programs. We are currently involved in a research project to study the long-term impact of Red
de Proteccion Social, a CCT in rural Nicaragua. Among other things, this project will allow
us to assess the impact of a typical CCT program on young adults who started to receive the
programs 10 year earlier (and who were exposed to it for only 3 years). In addition, we are
going to be able to dierentiate the impact between kids who received the intervention when
they were age 0-3 vs. kids who received it at age 4-6.
Another topic we plan to study refers to the role of information in these types of interventions.
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This continues to be a black box of the evaluation of CCTs. Even with the Oportunidades
experimental design it has not been possible to disentangle the eect of information from other
program's eects.22
Finally, we plan to address the issues of which conditions allow investment in human capital to
be productive in the long run. CCTs, and other similar interventions, are creating a generation of
young adults which are substantially more productive in the labor market (thanks to investment
in health and education), however this increased productivity might not have any value if it is
not accompanied by incentives to create and accept higher productivity jobs.
22One of the component of the program is to deliver talks (platicas) about nutritional and health practices
to which the recipient of the transfer are required to attend as a conditionality of the program. However, both
beneciaries and non-beneciaries are free to attend the talks.
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Appendix to Chapter 1: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Appendix: Propensity scores for Female and Male headed house-
holds
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Note:
The propensity score is based on the following observable characteristics - age of household
head, household composition ratios (male and females for age groups 0-4, 5-10, 11-14,
15-19, 20-34, 35-54 and over 55), household poverty index and its square, distance from a
SSA provider, the percentage of eligibles in the village, variables for sex related behaviour
of female respondents (number of pregnancies, dummy variables for whether they ever
used contraception methods and whether they ever had a PAP test), female status index,
dummy variables for whether the household head is working, is literate, speaks the
indigenous language, whether the household owns land, whether there is an electricity
supply, and state xed eects. The variables are elicited either in October 1997 or March
1998
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Table A1: Household composition and the demand for health, DD
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
Non-eligibles with no women over 45
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Center
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.129*** 0.221*** 0.203*** -0.042
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
T -0.008 0.010 0.000 0.008
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
T*98o 0.054** -0.028 0.003 -0.021
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 8343 8481 8557 8893
Non-eligibles with at least one woman over 45
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Center
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.124*** 0.209*** 0.183*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
T 0.009 0.043 0.051** 0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
T*98o 0.051** 0.019 0.009 0.004
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 9272 10575 10647 11105
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The amounts are expressed in pesos at October
1997 values. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta
method. All specications also control for the variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4.
Appendix to Chapter 4: Additional Tables
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Table A2: PROGRESA and the demand for health, DD for non-eligibles
Marginal eects from probit estimations, standard errors are clustered by village
Cerv. Cancer Blood Sugar Blood Pressure Health Center
screening screening screening visit
98o 0.125*** 0.203*** 0.180*** -0.051***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
T -0.011** 0.022 0.023 0.003
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
T*98o 0.053** 0.001 0.011 0.000
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
log visit fee -0.010 -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.020***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
SSA clinic 0.035 0.023 0.012 -0.004
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014)
IMSS Solid. clinic 0.002 0.093** 0.075** 0.069**
(0.045) (0.041) (0.037) (0.034)
IMSS clinic -0.145*** -0.063 -0.103*** -0.005
(0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.019)
Private doctor -0.059 -0.015 -0.069*** 0.009
(0.040) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016)
Medical aid 0.038** 0.026* 0.043*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Mobile unit 0.012 0.016 0.000 -0.011
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 16042 17389 17530 18270
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial
eects. Standard errors are derived using the delta method. Log visit fee is the log of the village average consultation
fee paid by non-eligibles.
Table A3: Learning in cervical cancer: Eect of initial information
Marginal eects from ivprobit estimations,
bootstrapped standard errors are clustered by village
Full Sample Male Head Female Head
Peer group screening rate 0.463*** 0.492*** 0.005
(0.124) (0.123) (0.417)
No contraception -0.112*** -0.118*** -0.050
(0.013) (0.012) (0.046)
Peer group screening rate* no contraception 0.205** 0.170* 0.474*
(0.094) (0.099) (0.288)
Observations 9061 8258 803
Cragg Donald Test 53.711 48.485 4.232
Cragg Donald 2 215.558 194.623 17.563
Note: *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The peer group is dened by all the households in
the village whose eldest children's age is within a 2 year dierence range. The level of initial information is proxied
by the dummy for having never used any method of contraception, as recorded in March 1998. The IV strategy
exploits the the treatment eect, the average number of payments received by the eligibles in the peer group and
their interaction as the instrument. The IV probit is calculated using a two stage procedure based on the control
function approach. Marginal eects are calculated as average partial eects. Standard errors are calculated with
200 bootstrap repetitions clustered at village level. The Cragg Donald test for the validity of the rank condition is
reported. All specications also control for the variables included in the regressions presented in table 1.4.
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Table A4: First Stage Regressions
FirstStageRegressions
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
VARIABLES Linear.
Exposure
Linear.
Attendance
NonLinear.
Exposure
NonLinear.
Attendance
Linear.
Exposure
Linear.
Attendance
NonLinear.
Exposure
NonLinear.
Attendance
FeA FeA FeA FeA ENDS ENDS ENDS ENDS
capacity Ͳ0.0575 0.217 0.254 1.714 0.321*** 0.610*** 0.814*** 2.025***
[0.147] [0.228] [0.354] [1.121] [0.0544] [0.142] [0.127] [0.503]
capacity2 0.377** 0.12 0.152 Ͳ0.649 Ͳ0.151*** Ͳ0.313*** Ͳ0.408*** Ͳ1.028***
[0.171] [0.270] [0.425] [1.355] [0.0366] [0.0954] [0.0912] [0.350]
hc_fee Ͳ0.0144*** Ͳ0.00835 Ͳ0.0234** Ͳ0.0235
[0.00524] [0.00905] [0.0118] [0.0396]
hc_fee2 0.000423 Ͳ2.20EͲ05 0.000479 Ͳ0.000754
[0.000304] [0.000527] [0.000696] [0.00231]
time_hc Ͳ0.154*** Ͳ0.328*** Ͳ0.403*** Ͳ1.449***
[0.0338] [0.0704] [0.0911] [0.426]
time_hc2 0.0729*** 0.133*** 0.127* 0.304
[0.0170] [0.0392] [0.0660] [0.345]
time_hc_b Ͳ0.143*** Ͳ0.165** Ͳ0.338*** Ͳ0.747*
[0.0438] [0.0783] [0.110] [0.395]
time_hc_b2 0.0556** 0.0719 0.0675 0.262
[0.0240] [0.0434] [0.0671] [0.250]
female 4.40EͲ05 0.00948 0.00065 0.0252 Ͳ0.000487 Ͳ0.0113 Ͳ0.00823 Ͳ0.0379
[0.00657] [0.00983] [0.0119] [0.0375] [0.00424] [0.00967] [0.0126] [0.0333]
age_m 0.00881*** 0.0233*** 0.0287*** 0.110*** 0.00633*** 0.0224*** 0.0394*** 0.111***
[0.000927] [0.00200] [0.00149] [0.00691] [0.000520] [0.00125] [0.00177] [0.00547]
age_m2 Ͳ0.00699*** Ͳ0.0273*** Ͳ0.0235*** Ͳ0.127*** Ͳ5.07eͲ05*** Ͳ0.000200*** Ͳ0.000371*** Ͳ0.00106***
[0.000873] [0.00228] [0.00149] [0.00788] [5.96eͲ06] [1.57eͲ05] [2.05eͲ05] [6.37eͲ05]
ln_age_h Ͳ0.0313 Ͳ0.0244 Ͳ0.0705* Ͳ0.0998 Ͳ0.0268*** Ͳ0.0827*** Ͳ0.0956*** Ͳ0.306***
[0.0196] [0.0301] [0.0374] [0.120] [0.00710] [0.0175] [0.0219] [0.0626]
ln_age_m Ͳ0.0139 Ͳ0.0384 Ͳ0.0404 Ͳ0.128 Ͳ0.0280** Ͳ0.0681** Ͳ0.0935** Ͳ0.259**
[0.0215] [0.0377] [0.0415] [0.152] [0.0129] [0.0325] [0.0383] [0.122]
height_mot Ͳ0.0692 Ͳ0.0458 Ͳ0.139 Ͳ0.289 Ͳ0.029 0.0363 Ͳ0.045 0.071
[0.0718] [0.119] [0.138] [0.510] [0.0376] [0.0898] [0.116] [0.315]
ln_order 0.0247** 0.0186 0.0336* 0.076 0.0102** 0.0128 0.0229 0.0414
[0.0105] [0.0140] [0.0189] [0.0590] [0.00491] [0.0126] [0.0143] [0.0442]
edu_m_b 0.0141 Ͳ0.0034 0.0212 Ͳ0.0232 Ͳ0.0165 0.01 Ͳ0.017 0.037
[0.0115] [0.0165] [0.0211] [0.0677] [0.0183] [0.0456] [0.0389] [0.146]
edu_m_c 0.0159 Ͳ0.0466 0.0151 Ͳ0.224* Ͳ0.01 0.0314 0.0105 0.114
[0.0204] [0.0333] [0.0391] [0.136] [0.0184] [0.0478] [0.0396] [0.155]
edu_h_b 0.0119 0.0212 0.0259 0.0888 Ͳ0.00529 Ͳ0.0145 Ͳ0.0176 Ͳ0.0544
[0.0121] [0.0163] [0.0207] [0.0618] [0.00813] [0.0166] [0.0233] [0.0583]
edu_h_c Ͳ0.0332 Ͳ0.0256 Ͳ0.0669 Ͳ0.0834 Ͳ0.00159 0.00554 Ͳ0.00282 0.00584
[0.0289] [0.0444] [0.0483] [0.171] [0.0101] [0.0212] [0.0282] [0.0743]
centretown 0.0162 0.0209 0.0348 0.0696
[0.0162] [0.0208] [0.0316] [0.0841]
time_hea Ͳ0.0129 0.0389 Ͳ0.0406 0.0112
[0.0353] [0.0399] [0.0620] [0.191]
time_hea2 0.0194** 0.0139 0.0215* 0.0326
[0.00749] [0.0157] [0.0122] [0.0527]
time_sch Ͳ0.0724 Ͳ0.142 0.114 0.169
[0.0574] [0.113] [0.134] [0.490]
time_sch2 0.129* 0.225 0.0026 Ͳ0.184
[0.0689] [0.169] [0.171] [0.672]
time_hea_sch 0.0323 0.0658 0.217 1.462***
[0.0434] [0.0752] [0.144] [0.543]
time_alc 0.0398 0.0173 0.0886 0.135
[0.0431] [0.0490] [0.0614] [0.199]
time_alc2 0.00828 0.0201* 0.00831 0.0920**
[0.00773] [0.0112] [0.0107] [0.0386]
timealchea Ͳ0.0264* Ͳ0.0353* Ͳ0.0239 Ͳ0.110**
[0.0144] [0.0188] [0.0187] [0.0510]
timealcsch Ͳ0.0911 Ͳ0.142 Ͳ0.407** Ͳ1.738***
[0.0579] [0.105] [0.164] [0.608]
time_sch_mun 0.417*** 0.282 0.766*** 1.164
[0.106] [0.209] [0.206] [0.919]
time_hea_mun Ͳ0.0627** Ͳ0.0801 Ͳ0.0818 Ͳ0.247
[0.0258] [0.0502] [0.0523] [0.208]
time_alc_mun Ͳ0.0176 Ͳ0.0214 Ͳ0.0265 Ͳ0.0781
[0.0285] [0.0513] [0.0507] [0.204]
hosp 0.00585 0.011 0.0108 0.0284
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Table A5: First Stage Regressions: continued
[0.0117] [0.0225] [0.0220] [0.0854]
pipe Ͳ0.0321 Ͳ0.0638 Ͳ0.0347 Ͳ0.246 0.0156 0.00267 0.0173 Ͳ0.0279
[0.0511] [0.0897] [0.109] [0.386] [0.0176] [0.0497] [0.0399] [0.167]
sewage 0.0172 0.00491 0.0854* 0.109 Ͳ0.0982*** Ͳ0.199*** Ͳ0.237*** Ͳ0.595***
[0.0212] [0.0339] [0.0513] [0.148] [0.0262] [0.0678] [0.0551] [0.226]
insur_mun 0.164 0.335 0.528** 1.417
[0.123] [0.203] [0.246] [0.932]
insur_mun2 Ͳ0.0965 Ͳ0.22 Ͳ0.337 Ͳ0.883
[0.108] [0.182] [0.226] [0.813]
numchildren 0.0221 Ͳ0.0267 Ͳ0.00175 Ͳ0.125 Ͳ0.00101 Ͳ0.00723** Ͳ0.00461 Ͳ0.0238**
[0.0180] [0.0357] [0.0325] [0.129] [0.00125] [0.00339] [0.00413] [0.0117]
altitud Ͳ0.0463 Ͳ0.0448 Ͳ0.113* Ͳ0.161 0.0208 0.0345 0.0496 0.0788
[0.0294] [0.0566] [0.0671] [0.265] [0.0248] [0.0602] [0.0579] [0.217]
altitud2 0.0133 0.0185 0.0306 0.0677 0.00101 0.00383 0.00585 0.0203
[0.0105] [0.0218] [0.0254] [0.102] [0.0111] [0.0245] [0.0235] [0.0884]
wage_fu Ͳ0.0025 0.00282 Ͳ0.00629 Ͳ0.0143
[0.0306] [0.0461] [0.0687] [0.201]
wage_fr Ͳ0.0186 Ͳ0.0629 Ͳ0.0534 Ͳ0.229
[0.0274] [0.0418] [0.0584] [0.176]
price_index 0.0804 0.311* 0.386** 1.558**
[0.0698] [0.155] [0.191] [0.678]
sisben2 Ͳ0.00561 Ͳ0.0147 Ͳ0.0223 Ͳ0.0469
[0.00841] [0.0202] [0.0218] [0.0705]
sisben3 Ͳ0.0181* Ͳ0.0530** Ͳ0.0660*** Ͳ0.187**
[0.00923] [0.0223] [0.0249] [0.0803]
Observations 5719 5719 5719 5719 6170 6179 6170 6179
RͲsquared 0.256 0.204  0.169 0.221 
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets,***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

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Table A6: Dierence in Distance



DifferenceindistancetothenearestHCaccordingtowhetherornotthehousehold
moved
 Withoutadditional
covariates
Withdistancetoother
facilitiesascovariates
Moved(1ifhousehold
movedaddress,0
otherwise)
Ͳ2.2 0.453
(1.86) (1.511)
Samplesizeis3095.Standarderrorsshowninparenthesisareclusteredatthetown
level.



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Table A7: Eect on Child's Height Linear IV FeA
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightUsingLinearIVͲFeA
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VARIABLES OLS IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance OLS
IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance
exposure Ͳ0.00439 0.997*** 1.002* 0.722 1.001
[0.0895] [0.349] [0.528] [0.588] [0.619]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0913** 0.611** 0.709 0.621 0.533
[0.0443] [0.251] [0.445] [0.486] [0.361]
female 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.141***
[0.0342] [0.0320] [0.0324] [0.0328] [0.0324] [0.0347] [0.0321] [0.0320] [0.0314] [0.0332]
age_m Ͳ
0.0284*** Ͳ0.0373***
Ͳ
0.0373***
Ͳ
0.0349***
Ͳ
0.0373***
Ͳ
0.0263*** Ͳ0.0428***
Ͳ
0.0451***
Ͳ
0.0430***
Ͳ
0.0410***
[0.00330] [0.00436] [0.00522] [0.00581] [0.00667] [0.00334] [0.00669] [0.0102] [0.0113] [0.00947]
age_m2 0.0249*** 0.0319*** 0.0319*** 0.0300*** 0.0319*** 0.0225*** 0.0416*** 0.0443*** 0.0419*** 0.0395***
[0.00312] [0.00381] [0.00441] [0.00484] [0.00551] [0.00325] [0.00742] [0.0118] [0.0130] [0.0107]
ln_age_h 0.264*** 0.293*** 0.293*** 0.285*** 0.293*** 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.281*** 0.279*** 0.277***
[0.0799] [0.0868] [0.0909] [0.0874] [0.0869] [0.0797] [0.0850] [0.0894] [0.0871] [0.0845]
ln_age_m 0.327*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.323*** 0.352*** 0.356*** 0.352*** 0.349***
[0.115] [0.124] [0.127] [0.124] [0.125] [0.115] [0.119] [0.126] [0.124] [0.120]
height_mot 5.555*** 5.645*** 5.646*** 5.620*** 5.646*** 5.548*** 5.604*** 5.612*** 5.605*** 5.598***
[0.453] [0.445] [0.459] [0.448] [0.450] [0.452] [0.468] [0.486] [0.471] [0.471]
ln_order Ͳ0.277*** Ͳ0.306*** Ͳ0.306*** Ͳ0.298*** Ͳ0.306*** Ͳ0.275*** Ͳ0.293*** Ͳ0.295*** Ͳ0.293*** Ͳ0.291***
[0.0370] [0.0422] [0.0455] [0.0393] [0.0452] [0.0369] [0.0406] [0.0429] [0.0395] [0.0415]
edu_m_b 0.123** 0.109** 0.109** 0.113** 0.109* 0.123** 0.124** 0.124** 0.124** 0.124**
[0.0538] [0.0532] [0.0535] [0.0530] [0.0554] [0.0540] [0.0526] [0.0534] [0.0533] [0.0533]
edu_m_c 0.232*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.221*** 0.217*** 0.228*** 0.257*** 0.261*** 0.258*** 0.254***
[0.0752] [0.0755] [0.0772] [0.0754] [0.0771] [0.0750] [0.0768] [0.0789] [0.0811] [0.0780]
edu_h_b 0.0834 0.07 0.0699 0.0737 0.07 0.0855 0.0689 0.0665 0.0686 0.0707
[0.0582] [0.0537] [0.0545] [0.0555] [0.0548] [0.0583] [0.0572] [0.0586] [0.0593] [0.0581]
edu_h_c 0.218** 0.246** 0.246** 0.239** 0.246** 0.217** 0.231** 0.233** 0.231** 0.230**
[0.0913] [0.103] [0.102] [0.102] [0.107] [0.0904] [0.0993] [0.102] [0.102] [0.1000]
centretown 0.0137 Ͳ0.0295 Ͳ0.0297 Ͳ0.0176 Ͳ0.0297 0.0193 Ͳ0.0252 Ͳ0.0314 Ͳ0.0258 Ͳ0.0203
[0.0641] [0.0668] [0.0729] [0.0739] [0.0658] [0.0630] [0.0670] [0.0769] [0.0807] [0.0653]
time_hea 0.0812 0.14 0.141 0.124 0.141 0.0771 0.111 0.115 0.111 0.107
[0.105] [0.0962] [0.0999] [0.109] [0.0997] [0.106] [0.0977] [0.100] [0.107] [0.0994]
time_hea2 0.0436 0.0218 0.0216 0.0278 0.0217 0.0456 0.0295 0.0272 0.0292 0.0313
[0.0396] [0.0388] [0.0429] [0.0408] [0.0385] [0.0394] [0.0412] [0.0453] [0.0431] [0.0407]
time_sch Ͳ0.201 Ͳ0.0302 Ͳ0.0293 Ͳ0.0772 Ͳ0.0294 Ͳ0.227 Ͳ0.0215 0.00733 Ͳ0.0188 Ͳ0.0443
[0.244] [0.245] [0.232] [0.253] [0.284] [0.244] [0.262] [0.256] [0.271] [0.289]
time_sch2 0.508 0.323 0.322 0.374 0.322 0.535* 0.319 0.289 0.317 0.343
[0.306] [0.314] [0.302] [0.312] [0.354] [0.305] [0.343] [0.337] [0.343] [0.369]
time_hea_sch 0.217 0.0514 0.0505 0.097 0.0506 0.244 0.0322 0.00252 0.0294 0.0557
[0.236] [0.265] [0.257] [0.274] [0.295] [0.231] [0.273] [0.271] [0.309] [0.296]
time_alc Ͳ0.183* Ͳ0.238** Ͳ0.239** Ͳ0.223** Ͳ0.239** Ͳ0.179* Ͳ0.210** Ͳ0.214** Ͳ0.210* Ͳ0.206**
[0.0967] [0.0973] [0.102] [0.111] [0.0969] [0.0968] [0.0967] [0.102] [0.110] [0.0952]
time_alc2 0.0790** 0.0668** 0.0667** 0.0701** 0.0667** 0.0815*** 0.0617* 0.0590* 0.0615** 0.0639*
[0.0296] [0.0303] [0.0300] [0.0288] [0.0329] [0.0298] [0.0320] [0.0316] [0.0299] [0.0349]
timealchea Ͳ0.146*** Ͳ0.121*** Ͳ0.121*** Ͳ0.128*** Ͳ0.121*** Ͳ0.149*** Ͳ0.123*** Ͳ0.119** Ͳ0.122*** Ͳ0.126***
[0.0349] [0.0384] [0.0414] [0.0373] [0.0405] [0.0346] [0.0400] [0.0447] [0.0411] [0.0411]
timealcsch Ͳ0.0596 0.175 0.177 0.111 0.177 Ͳ0.0951 0.186 0.225 0.189 0.154
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[0.303] [0.345] [0.336] [0.352] [0.389] [0.293] [0.367] [0.371] [0.410] [0.396]
time_sch_mun Ͳ1.844*** Ͳ1.868*** Ͳ1.868*** Ͳ1.861*** Ͳ1.868*** Ͳ1.859*** Ͳ1.750*** Ͳ1.735*** Ͳ1.749*** Ͳ1.762***
[0.599] [0.541] [0.547] [0.557] [0.549] [0.605] [0.566] [0.579] [0.588] [0.572]
time_hea_mun Ͳ0.197 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.149 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.203 Ͳ0.156 Ͳ0.15 Ͳ0.156 Ͳ0.161
[0.125] [0.143] [0.144] [0.145] [0.150] [0.123] [0.144] [0.147] [0.152] [0.146]
time_alc_mun 0.208* 0.167 0.166 0.178 0.166 0.210** 0.188* 0.185 0.187 0.190*
[0.104] [0.108] [0.108] [0.110] [0.113] [0.104] [0.111] [0.113] [0.116] [0.112]
hosp 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.150***
[0.0456] [0.0416] [0.0422] [0.0421] [0.0421] [0.0465] [0.0430] [0.0435] [0.0436] [0.0438]
pipe 0.343 0.298 0.298 0.31 0.298 0.344 0.337 0.336 0.336 0.337
[0.244] [0.222] [0.226] [0.236] [0.224] [0.247] [0.225] [0.227] [0.229] [0.229]
sewage 0.172 0.159 0.159 0.162 0.159 0.173 0.161 0.16 0.161 0.163
[0.105] [0.100] [0.102] [0.102] [0.101] [0.105] [0.107] [0.110] [0.109] [0.107]
insur_mun Ͳ0.93 Ͳ1.145* Ͳ1.146* Ͳ1.086* Ͳ1.146* Ͳ0.901 Ͳ1.130* Ͳ1.162* Ͳ1.133* Ͳ1.104
[0.732] [0.618] [0.603] [0.624] [0.670] [0.750] [0.658] [0.618] [0.617] [0.706]
insur_mun2 0.699 0.799 0.799 0.772 0.799 0.686 0.791 0.806 0.792 0.779
[0.602] [0.511] [0.505] [0.522] [0.538] [0.616] [0.544] [0.525] [0.525] [0.571]
numchildren Ͳ0.0536 Ͳ0.0303 Ͳ0.0302 Ͳ0.0367 Ͳ0.0302 Ͳ0.0616 0.000609 0.0093 0.00143 Ͳ0.00629
[0.0819] [0.0801] [0.0828] [0.0822] [0.0803] [0.0821] [0.0861] [0.0998] [0.103] [0.0846]
altitud 0.157 0.277** 0.277** 0.244* 0.277** 0.148 0.222* 0.233* 0.223 0.214
[0.138] [0.123] [0.135] [0.143] [0.136] [0.141] [0.128] [0.137] [0.137] [0.132]
altitud2 Ͳ0.0938** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.119** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.0911* Ͳ0.113*** Ͳ0.116** Ͳ0.113** Ͳ0.110**
[0.0460] [0.0404] [0.0445] [0.0476] [0.0427] [0.0470] [0.0428] [0.0457] [0.0463] [0.0437]
wage_fu 0.151 0.155 0.155 0.154 0.155 0.152 0.146 0.145 0.146 0.147
[0.0959] [0.102] [0.103] [0.100] [0.103] [0.0960] [0.0984] [0.101] [0.0997] [0.0988]
wage_fr Ͳ0.16 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.124 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.170* Ͳ0.0934 Ͳ0.0827 Ͳ0.0924 Ͳ0.102
[0.0985] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.110] [0.0986] [0.102] [0.101] [0.115] [0.110]
price_index 0.338 Ͳ0.076 Ͳ0.078 0.0377 Ͳ0.0778 0.395 Ͳ0.0587 Ͳ0.122 Ͳ0.0647 Ͳ0.00835
[0.243] [0.240] [0.319] [0.326] [0.294] [0.243] [0.251] [0.374] [0.381] [0.289]
Observations 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717
RͲsquared 0.191 0.154 0.154 0.171 0.154 0.192 0.13 0.112 0.128 0.143
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Table A9: Eect on Child's Height Nonlinear IV FeA
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightUsingnonlinearIVͲFeA
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VARIABLES OLS IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance OLS
IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance
exposure Ͳ0.00439 0.945** 0.977 1.016 1.090**
[0.0895] [0.366] [0.599] [0.656] [0.507]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0913** 0.448** 0.450* 0.496** 0.504**
[0.0443] [0.190] [0.240] [0.229] [0.229]
female 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142***
[0.0342] [0.0325] [0.0325] [0.0324] [0.0323] [0.0347] [0.0330] [0.0329] [0.0327] [0.0329]
age_m Ͳ0.0284*** Ͳ0.0368*** Ͳ0.0371*** Ͳ0.0375*** Ͳ0.0381*** Ͳ0.0263*** Ͳ0.0390*** Ͳ0.0390*** Ͳ0.0401*** Ͳ0.0403***
[0.00330] [0.00573] [0.00737] [0.00814] [0.00707] [0.00334] [0.00675] [0.00756] [0.00772] [0.00776]
age_m2 0.0249*** 0.0315*** 0.0317*** 0.0320*** 0.0325*** 0.0225*** 0.0372*** 0.0372*** 0.0385*** 0.0387***
[0.00312] [0.00489] [0.00612] [0.00676] [0.00592] [0.00325] [0.00726] [0.00832] [0.00842] [0.00845]
ln_age_h 0.264*** 0.292*** 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.296*** 0.262*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.276***
[0.0799] [0.0877] [0.0918] [0.0911] [0.0890] [0.0797] [0.0839] [0.0848] [0.0845] [0.0843]
ln_age_m 0.327*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.344*** 0.345*** 0.323*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.347*** 0.347***
[0.115] [0.122] [0.122] [0.121] [0.122] [0.115] [0.117] [0.117] [0.117] [0.117]
height_mot 5.555*** 5.641*** 5.644*** 5.647*** 5.654*** 5.548*** 5.591*** 5.591*** 5.595*** 5.595***
[0.453] [0.448] [0.453] [0.448] [0.447] [0.452] [0.468] [0.471] [0.471] [0.469]
ln_order Ͳ0.277*** Ͳ0.304*** Ͳ0.305*** Ͳ0.306*** Ͳ0.309*** Ͳ0.275*** Ͳ0.289*** Ͳ0.289*** Ͳ0.290*** Ͳ0.290***
[0.0370] [0.0425] [0.0456] [0.0445] [0.0441] [0.0369] [0.0396] [0.0399] [0.0398] [0.0401]
edu_m_b 0.123** 0.109* 0.109* 0.108* 0.107* 0.123** 0.124** 0.124** 0.124** 0.124**
[0.0538] [0.0546] [0.0549] [0.0552] [0.0558] [0.0540] [0.0533] [0.0533] [0.0533] [0.0533]
edu_m_c 0.232*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.228*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.253***
[0.0752] [0.0763] [0.0769] [0.0764] [0.0772] [0.0750] [0.0760] [0.0767] [0.0777] [0.0766]
edu_h_b 0.0834 0.0707 0.0703 0.0698 0.0688 0.0855 0.0727 0.0727 0.0716 0.0714
[0.0582] [0.0561] [0.0572] [0.0581] [0.0566] [0.0583] [0.0584] [0.0586] [0.0590] [0.0587]
edu_h_c 0.218** 0.245** 0.246** 0.247** 0.249** 0.217** 0.228** 0.228** 0.229** 0.229**
[0.0913] [0.104] [0.104] [0.106] [0.108] [0.0904] [0.0974] [0.0966] [0.0976] [0.0986]
centretown 0.0137 Ͳ0.0272 Ͳ0.0286 Ͳ0.0303 Ͳ0.0335 0.0193 Ͳ0.0149 Ͳ0.015 Ͳ0.0179 Ͳ0.0184
[0.0641] [0.0682] [0.0753] [0.0765] [0.0694] [0.0630] [0.0665] [0.0693] [0.0699] [0.0666]
time_hea 0.0812 0.137 0.139 0.142 0.146 0.0771 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.105
[0.105] [0.0967] [0.100] [0.106] [0.0981] [0.106] [0.0996] [0.100] [0.102] [0.0999]
time_hea2 0.0436 0.0229 0.0222 0.0213 0.0197 0.0456 0.0332 0.0332 0.0321 0.0319
[0.0396] [0.0390] [0.0429] [0.0429] [0.0388] [0.0394] [0.0410] [0.0424] [0.0425] [0.0413]
time_sch Ͳ0.201 Ͳ0.039 Ͳ0.0335 Ͳ0.0269 Ͳ0.0143 Ͳ0.227 Ͳ0.0692 Ͳ0.0688 Ͳ0.0552 Ͳ0.053
[0.244] [0.259] [0.255] [0.272] [0.282] [0.244] [0.261] [0.251] [0.263] [0.273]
time_sch2 0.508 0.332 0.326 0.319 0.306 0.535* 0.37 0.369 0.355 0.353
[0.306] [0.331] [0.327] [0.343] [0.354] [0.305] [0.341] [0.327] [0.339] [0.354]
time_hea_sch 0.217 0.06 0.0546 0.0482 0.036 0.244 0.0813 0.0809 0.0669 0.0646
[0.236] [0.280] [0.284] [0.305] [0.301] [0.231] [0.273] [0.271] [0.288] [0.286]
time_alc Ͳ0.183* Ͳ0.235** Ͳ0.237** Ͳ0.239** Ͳ0.244** Ͳ0.179* Ͳ0.203** Ͳ0.203** Ͳ0.205** Ͳ0.205**
[0.0967] [0.100] [0.107] [0.114] [0.103] [0.0968] [0.0968] [0.0984] [0.101] [0.0970]
time_alc2 0.0790** 0.0674** 0.0670** 0.0665** 0.0656** 0.0815*** 0.0663** 0.0663** 0.0650** 0.0648*
[0.0296] [0.0308] [0.0302] [0.0301] [0.0319] [0.0298] [0.0317] [0.0305] [0.0305] [0.0326]
timealchea Ͳ0.146*** Ͳ0.122*** Ͳ0.121*** Ͳ0.120*** Ͳ0.118*** Ͳ0.149*** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.127*** Ͳ0.127***
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[0.0349] [0.0386] [0.0412] [0.0409] [0.0401] [0.0346] [0.0388] [0.0396] [0.0397] [0.0397]
timealcsch Ͳ0.0596 0.163 0.171 0.18 0.197 Ͳ0.0951 0.121 0.121 0.14 0.143
[0.303] [0.370] [0.380] [0.407] [0.399] [0.293] [0.366] [0.362] [0.381] [0.384]
time_sch_mun Ͳ1.844*** Ͳ1.866*** Ͳ1.867*** Ͳ1.868*** Ͳ1.870*** Ͳ1.859*** Ͳ1.775*** Ͳ1.775*** Ͳ1.768*** Ͳ1.767***
[0.599] [0.552] [0.551] [0.551] [0.548] [0.605] [0.570] [0.570] [0.566] [0.565]
time_hea_mun Ͳ0.197 Ͳ0.134 Ͳ0.132 Ͳ0.129 Ͳ0.124 Ͳ0.203 Ͳ0.167 Ͳ0.167 Ͳ0.164 Ͳ0.163
[0.125] [0.141] [0.143] [0.147] [0.146] [0.123] [0.138] [0.137] [0.140] [0.141]
time_alc_mun 0.208* 0.169 0.167 0.166 0.163 0.210** 0.193* 0.193* 0.191* 0.191*
[0.104] [0.108] [0.108] [0.110] [0.110] [0.104] [0.109] [0.108] [0.109] [0.110]
hosp 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
[0.0456] [0.0421] [0.0421] [0.0421] [0.0423] [0.0465] [0.0435] [0.0434] [0.0436] [0.0437]
pipe 0.343 0.3 0.299 0.297 0.294 0.344 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338
[0.244] [0.224] [0.224] [0.225] [0.221] [0.247] [0.231] [0.231] [0.230] [0.229]
sewage 0.172 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.158 0.173 0.164 0.164 0.163 0.163
[0.105] [0.103] [0.104] [0.104] [0.103] [0.105] [0.107] [0.108] [0.108] [0.107]
insur_mun Ͳ0.93 Ͳ1.134* Ͳ1.141* Ͳ1.149* Ͳ1.165* Ͳ0.901 Ͳ1.077 Ͳ1.077 Ͳ1.092* Ͳ1.095
[0.732] [0.639] [0.617] [0.618] [0.644] [0.750] [0.676] [0.657] [0.652] [0.678]
insur_mun2 0.699 0.794 0.797 0.801 0.808 0.686 0.767 0.767 0.774 0.775
[0.602] [0.524] [0.510] [0.509] [0.522] [0.616] [0.558] [0.549] [0.545] [0.558]
numchildren Ͳ0.0536 Ͳ0.0315 Ͳ0.0308 Ͳ0.0299 Ͳ0.0281 Ͳ0.0616 Ͳ0.0138 Ͳ0.0137 Ͳ0.00957 Ͳ0.00891
[0.0819] [0.0825] [0.0861] [0.0874] [0.0848] [0.0821] [0.0854] [0.0901] [0.0911] [0.0868]
altitud 0.157 0.270** 0.274* 0.279* 0.288** 0.148 0.205 0.205 0.21 0.211
[0.138] [0.125] [0.140] [0.142] [0.130] [0.141] [0.131] [0.135] [0.134] [0.132]
altitud2 Ͳ0.0938** Ͳ0.127*** Ͳ0.128*** Ͳ0.129*** Ͳ0.132*** Ͳ0.0911* Ͳ0.108** Ͳ0.108** Ͳ0.109** Ͳ0.109**
[0.0460] [0.0405] [0.0448] [0.0453] [0.0412] [0.0470] [0.0435] [0.0447] [0.0445] [0.0436]
wage_fu 0.151 0.154 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.152 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147
[0.0959] [0.102] [0.103] [0.103] [0.104] [0.0960] [0.0980] [0.0979] [0.0984] [0.0986]
wage_fr Ͳ0.16 Ͳ0.113 Ͳ0.111 Ͳ0.109 Ͳ0.106 Ͳ0.170* Ͳ0.111 Ͳ0.111 Ͳ0.106 Ͳ0.105
[0.0985] [0.104] [0.102] [0.104] [0.108] [0.0986] [0.100] [0.0963] [0.0994] [0.103]
price_index 0.338 Ͳ0.0545 Ͳ0.0678 Ͳ0.0839 Ͳ0.114 0.395 0.0465 0.0456 0.0156 0.0108
[0.243] [0.270] [0.370] [0.386] [0.308] [0.243] [0.257] [0.301] [0.296] [0.273]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0913** 0.448** 0.450* 0.496** 0.504**
[0.0443] [0.190] [0.240] [0.229] [0.229]
Observations 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717
RͲsquared 0.191 0.158 0.156 0.153 0.147 0.192 0.155 0.155 0.149 0.148
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Table A11: Eect on Child's Height ENDS
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightUsinglinearandnonlinearIVͲENDS
 1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES OLS.DHS OLS.DHS NonͲLinearIV:
Capacity.DHS
NonͲLinearIV:
Capacity.DHS
LinearIV:Capacity.
DHS
LinearIV:Capacity.
DHS
exposure Ͳ0.0694 1.227*** 0.751
[0.0553] [0.365] [0.692]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0651*** 0.826*** 0.442
[0.0250] [0.192] [0.381]
female 0.0379* 0.0372* 0.0389* 0.0475** 0.0385* 0.0431**
[0.0197] [0.0195] [0.0206] [0.0216] [0.0201] [0.0211]
age_m Ͳ0.0358*** Ͳ0.0348*** Ͳ0.0440*** Ͳ0.0547*** Ͳ0.0410*** Ͳ0.0461***
[0.00214] [0.00212] [0.00296] [0.00458] [0.00493] [0.00888]
age_m2 0.000369*** 0.000360*** 0.000434*** 0.000537*** 0.000410*** 0.000460***
[2.71eͲ05] [2.69eͲ05] [3.19eͲ05] [4.55eͲ05] [4.52eͲ05] [8.21eͲ05]
ln_age_h 0.00776 0.00451 0.0402 0.0756* 0.0283 0.0449
[0.0404] [0.0405] [0.0419] [0.0452] [0.0456] [0.0537]
ln_age_m 0.757*** 0.755*** 0.789*** 0.811*** 0.777*** 0.787***
[0.0752] [0.0752] [0.0795] [0.0851] [0.0793] [0.0830]
height_mot 5.390*** 5.386*** 5.435*** 5.362*** 5.418*** 5.372***
[0.238] [0.237] [0.240] [0.254] [0.238] [0.244]
ln_order Ͳ0.326*** Ͳ0.326*** Ͳ0.338*** Ͳ0.336*** Ͳ0.334*** Ͳ0.332***
[0.0268] [0.0267] [0.0273] [0.0279] [0.0282] [0.0276]
edu_m_b 0.181** 0.183** 0.206** 0.179* 0.197** 0.180*
[0.0841] [0.0832] [0.0914] [0.104] [0.0881] [0.0938]
edu_m_c 0.178** 0.182** 0.194** 0.157 0.188** 0.167*
[0.0850] [0.0840] [0.0921] [0.107] [0.0885] [0.0963]
edu_h_b Ͳ0.0298 Ͳ0.0325 Ͳ0.0207 Ͳ0.0162 Ͳ0.024 Ͳ0.0232
[0.0492] [0.0490] [0.0485] [0.0501] [0.0491] [0.0500]
edu_h_c Ͳ0.127** Ͳ0.131** Ͳ0.125** Ͳ0.135** Ͳ0.126** Ͳ0.133**
[0.0624] [0.0624] [0.0609] [0.0624] [0.0612] [0.0615]
pipe Ͳ0.0342 Ͳ0.0285 Ͳ0.0391 Ͳ0.0119 Ͳ0.0373 Ͳ0.019
[0.0728] [0.0729] [0.0793] [0.0881] [0.0757] [0.0779]
sewage Ͳ0.076 Ͳ0.0884 0.0677 0.107 0.0149 0.0226
[0.104] [0.103] [0.124] [0.138] [0.136] [0.144]
numchildren 0.0141** 0.0132* 0.0120* 0.0152** 0.0128* 0.0144**
[0.00712] [0.00709] [0.00701] [0.00724] [0.00724] [0.00691]
altitud 0.0507 0.055 0.0262 0.0224 0.0352 0.0365
[0.111] [0.109] [0.115] [0.123] [0.114] [0.116]
altitud2 Ͳ0.0939** Ͳ0.0963** Ͳ0.0968** Ͳ0.0992** Ͳ0.0958** Ͳ0.0980**
[0.0430] [0.0422] [0.0451] [0.0484] [0.0437] [0.0446]
sisben2 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.160*** 0.161***
[0.0435] [0.0441] [0.0451] [0.0441] [0.0443] [0.0438]
sisben3 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.313*** 0.335*** 0.303*** 0.313***
[0.0493] [0.0498] [0.0490] [0.0456] [0.0490] [0.0488]
Observations 6170 6179 6170 6179 6170 6179
RͲsquared 0.215 0.216 0.165 0.075 0.195 0.17
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1








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Table A12: Eect Quantiles FeA Exposure
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightatdifferentquantilesͲFeAͲExposure
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
 Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
exposure 1.7377 0.8639 2.01 1.8838 0.7138 2.64 1.4562 0.6144 2.37 0.5106 0.5973 0.85 0.0507 0.7518 0.07
res_exp Ͳ1.749 0.89 Ͳ1.97 Ͳ1.956 0.7323 Ͳ2.67 Ͳ1.688 0.6162 Ͳ2.74 Ͳ0.679 0.6084 Ͳ1.12 Ͳ0.092 0.7938 Ͳ0.12
res_exp2 Ͳ0.216 0.546 Ͳ0.39 Ͳ0.071 0.3051 Ͳ0.23 Ͳ0.423 0.3502 Ͳ1.21 Ͳ0.572 0.4633 Ͳ1.23 0.508 0.6585 0.77
female 0.0585 0.0596 0.98 0.1687 0.0442 3.82 0.1484 0.0398 3.73 0.1516 0.0365 4.15 0.1601 0.0446 3.59
age_m Ͳ0.03 0.0106 Ͳ2.82 Ͳ0.044 0.009 Ͳ4.85 Ͳ0.042 0.0067 Ͳ6.28 Ͳ0.037 0.0064 Ͳ5.83 Ͳ0.034 0.0069 Ͳ4.98
age_m2 0.0255 0.009 2.83 0.0385 0.0077 4.98 0.0357 0.0057 6.24 0.0328 0.0057 5.73 0.0282 0.0062 4.53
ln_age_h 0.3405 0.1371 2.48 0.331 0.1102 3 0.2742 0.1097 2.5 0.2759 0.1038 2.66 0.2297 0.1344 1.71
ln_age_m 0.2225 0.2118 1.05 0.2729 0.1512 1.81 0.3293 0.1384 2.38 0.3043 0.1389 2.19 0.5022 0.154 3.26
height~t 6.0717 0.6509 9.33 6.0958 0.5171 11.79 5.2466 0.4656 11.27 5.4274 0.5382 10.09 5.3417 0.6461 8.27
ln_order Ͳ0.3 0.061 Ͳ4.92 Ͳ0.349 0.0552 Ͳ6.33 Ͳ0.29 0.044 Ͳ6.58 Ͳ0.268 0.0476 Ͳ5.63 Ͳ0.237 0.0581 Ͳ4.08
edu_m_b 0.0912 0.0855 1.07 0.0615 0.0651 0.94 0.1198 0.0624 1.92 0.0992 0.0632 1.57 0.1105 0.0649 1.7
edu_m_c 0.077 0.1906 0.4 0.1487 0.1206 1.23 0.2366 0.0989 2.39 0.2902 0.097 2.99 0.2365 0.1122 2.11
edu_h_b 0.094 0.0732 1.28 0.1016 0.0615 1.65 0.0386 0.0582 0.66 0.0578 0.062 0.93 0.0769 0.0936 0.82
edu_h_c 0.3774 0.2314 1.63 0.2574 0.1222 2.11 0.268 0.1382 1.94 0.2743 0.0776 3.53 0.3701 0.1045 3.54
centre~n 0.0863 0.1108 0.78 0.0532 0.0919 0.58 Ͳ0.044 0.0837 Ͳ0.53 Ͳ0.077 0.0743 Ͳ1.04 Ͳ0.2 0.0956 Ͳ2.1
time_hea 0.0866 0.2046 0.42 0.0354 0.1666 0.21 0.0521 0.1588 0.33 0.1315 0.1798 0.73 0.1092 0.2187 0.5
time_h~2 0.0593 0.0991 0.6 0.0138 0.0671 0.21 0.0116 0.0823 0.14 0.0438 0.1384 0.32 0.1692 0.1835 0.92
time_sch Ͳ0.349 0.4823 Ͳ0.72 Ͳ0.258 0.3246 Ͳ0.79 0.1822 0.3795 0.48 0.3983 0.3726 1.07 0.2779 0.475 0.58
time_s~2 0.6008 0.6699 0.9 0.4666 0.5714 0.82 0.2386 0.5479 0.44 0.0357 0.6616 0.05 Ͳ0.501 0.8065 Ͳ0.62
time_h~h 0.4546 0.6074 0.75 0.4446 0.4182 1.06 0.0402 0.4029 0.1 0.3382 0.4774 0.71 0.3337 0.558 0.6
time_alc Ͳ0.164 0.2324 Ͳ0.71 Ͳ0.105 0.1676 Ͳ0.63 Ͳ0.201 0.1502 Ͳ1.34 Ͳ0.211 0.1678 Ͳ1.26 Ͳ0.321 0.2117 Ͳ1.52
time_a~2 0.094 0.0986 0.95 0.0691 0.0524 1.32 0.0511 0.0578 0.88 0.0817 0.0656 1.25 0.1192 0.0754 1.58
timeal~a Ͳ0.197 0.1385 Ͳ1.42 Ͳ0.118 0.0811 Ͳ1.45 Ͳ0.077 0.0844 Ͳ0.91 Ͳ0.161 0.1303 Ͳ1.23 Ͳ0.301 0.1458 Ͳ2.06
timeal~h Ͳ0.148 0.5897 Ͳ0.25 Ͳ0.194 0.5119 Ͳ0.38 0.0586 0.5241 0.11 Ͳ0.171 0.5934 Ͳ0.29 0.134 0.5851 0.23
time_s~n Ͳ1.093 0.9575 Ͳ1.14 Ͳ1.737 0.8401 Ͳ2.07 Ͳ2.046 0.842 Ͳ2.43 Ͳ1.884 0.8625 Ͳ2.18 Ͳ1.552 1.0393 Ͳ1.49
time_h~n Ͳ0.148 0.2876 Ͳ0.51 Ͳ0.174 0.2357 Ͳ0.74 Ͳ0.271 0.241 Ͳ1.13 Ͳ0.088 0.2497 Ͳ0.35 Ͳ0.187 0.2783 Ͳ0.67
time_a~n 0.1388 0.2578 0.54 0.1874 0.1733 1.08 0.3419 0.1689 2.02 0.0736 0.1845 0.4 0.1077 0.1992 0.54
hosp 0.0991 0.0794 1.25 0.1926 0.071 2.71 0.1352 0.0697 1.94 0.1117 0.0697 1.6 0.0955 0.0836 1.14
pipe 0.8658 0.4462 1.94 0.2451 0.4409 0.56 0.2054 0.4054 0.51 0.3402 0.3909 0.87 0.0661 0.4084 0.16
sewage 0.1509 0.2688 0.56 0.0857 0.2508 0.34 0.1334 0.2266 0.59 0.1472 0.2014 0.73 0.3134 0.2197 1.43
insur_mun Ͳ1.18 1.847 Ͳ0.64 Ͳ0.973 1.3676 Ͳ0.71 Ͳ1.263 1.3578 Ͳ0.93 Ͳ0.817 1.4688 Ͳ0.56 Ͳ1.507 1.5177 Ͳ0.99
ss12_m~2 1.1029 1.4209 0.78 0.72 1.0533 0.68 0.7885 1.067 0.74 0.3189 1.1843 0.27 0.961 1.2225 0.79
numchi~n Ͳ0.014 0.3403 Ͳ0.04 0.0024 0.2435 0.01 0.0026 0.188 0.01 Ͳ0.028 0.2114 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.098 0.2312 Ͳ0.42
altitud 0.2666 0.2763 0.96 0.3854 0.2083 1.85 0.2417 0.223 1.08 0.0221 0.2431 0.09 0.1443 0.28 0.52
altitud2 Ͳ0.143 0.1019 Ͳ1.4 Ͳ0.172 0.0751 Ͳ2.29 Ͳ0.106 0.0774 Ͳ1.36 Ͳ0.037 0.0843 Ͳ0.44 Ͳ0.104 0.0983 Ͳ1.06
wage_fu Ͳ0.011 0.1718 Ͳ0.07 0.165 0.1559 1.06 0.2185 0.1611 1.36 0.2145 0.1759 1.22 0.322 0.1873 1.72
wage_fr 0.0645 0.1843 0.35 Ͳ0.085 0.1545 Ͳ0.55 Ͳ0.214 0.1687 Ͳ1.27 Ͳ0.289 0.1812 Ͳ1.59 Ͳ0.185 0.1955 Ͳ0.95
price_~x Ͳ0.405 0.534 Ͳ0.76 Ͳ0.286 0.617 Ͳ0.46 Ͳ0.049 0.6273 Ͳ0.08 0.4218 0.4992 0.85 0.4017 0.5436 0.74
region_2 0.4208 0.2652 1.59 0.4797 0.2473 1.94 0.3631 0.2274 1.6 0.398 0.22 1.81 0.2171 0.2233 0.97
region_3 0.1577 0.2931 0.54 0.2475 0.2472 1 0.166 0.2291 0.72 0.2003 0.2214 0.9 Ͳ0.04 0.2474 Ͳ0.16
region_4 0.223 0.2562 0.87 0.1535 0.2137 0.72 0.0248 0.2041 0.12 0.0337 0.1912 0.18 Ͳ0.147 0.2319 Ͳ0.63
time2 0.0843 0.0571 1.48 0.037 0.0519 0.71 0.0238 0.0491 0.49 Ͳ0.023 0.0502 Ͳ0.46 Ͳ0.03 0.0586 Ͳ0.52
time3 0.1274 0.1096 1.16 0.0957 0.0945 1.01 0.0402 0.0984 0.41 Ͳ0.018 0.0842 Ͳ0.21 0.0347 0.1034 0.34
_cons Ͳ11.17 1.2001 Ͳ9.31 Ͳ9.908 1.049 Ͳ9.45 Ͳ7.77 0.9466 Ͳ8.21 Ͳ7.764 0.9795 Ͳ7.93 Ͳ6.498 1.2146 Ͳ5.35
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Table A13: Eect Quantiles FeA Attendance
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightatdifferentquantilesͲFeAͲAttendance
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
 Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
asis_hc 0.6491 0.2899 2.24 0.6196 0.2604 2.38 0.4191 0.2307 1.82 0.1252 0.2216 0.57 0.0335 0.2772 0.12
res_asis Ͳ0.422 0.1861 Ͳ2.27 Ͳ0.452 0.1681 Ͳ2.69 Ͳ0.35 0.1479 Ͳ2.37 Ͳ0.114 0.1394 Ͳ0.82 Ͳ0.098 0.2006 Ͳ0.49
res_as~2 Ͳ0.069 0.0631 Ͳ1.09 0.0269 0.0398 0.68 0.0119 0.033 0.36 Ͳ0.064 0.0392 Ͳ1.62 Ͳ0.003 0.0562 Ͳ0.06
female 0.0692 0.0584 1.18 0.163 0.0434 3.76 0.163 0.0417 3.91 0.144 0.0374 3.85 0.1591 0.0425 3.74
age_m Ͳ0.033 0.0106 Ͳ3.06 Ͳ0.044 0.0092 Ͳ4.77 Ͳ0.042 0.0077 Ͳ5.46 Ͳ0.035 0.0074 Ͳ4.66 Ͳ0.032 0.0077 Ͳ4.12
age_m2 0.0335 0.0116 2.9 0.044 0.0099 4.45 0.0402 0.0084 4.79 0.0306 0.0082 3.72 0.0252 0.009 2.81
ln_age_h 0.2799 0.1256 2.23 0.328 0.1016 3.23 0.2667 0.1061 2.51 0.2598 0.1001 2.6 0.2098 0.134 1.57
ln_age_m 0.2359 0.206 1.15 0.2431 0.1524 1.6 0.349 0.132 2.64 0.2984 0.1389 2.15 0.5642 0.1592 3.54
height~t 6.1422 0.6483 9.47 6.0724 0.5303 11.45 5.0657 0.4922 10.29 5.3395 0.5422 9.85 5.2202 0.6629 7.87
ln_order Ͳ0.312 0.0549 Ͳ5.68 Ͳ0.327 0.0523 Ͳ6.25 Ͳ0.301 0.0451 Ͳ6.67 Ͳ0.263 0.0458 Ͳ5.73 Ͳ0.241 0.054 Ͳ4.47
edu_m_b 0.1004 0.0814 1.23 0.0842 0.0623 1.35 0.1403 0.061 2.3 0.0877 0.0627 1.4 0.1123 0.0643 1.75
edu_m_c 0.0917 0.2003 0.46 0.1909 0.1176 1.62 0.3037 0.0951 3.19 0.2951 0.1038 2.84 0.2926 0.1103 2.65
edu_h_b 0.0818 0.0756 1.08 0.0966 0.0659 1.46 0.0452 0.0579 0.78 0.0678 0.0637 1.06 0.069 0.0944 0.73
edu_h_c 0.3378 0.2243 1.51 0.2073 0.1206 1.72 0.2307 0.129 1.79 0.2549 0.0751 3.39 0.3257 0.1054 3.09
centre~n 0.0794 0.1038 0.77 0.0789 0.0834 0.95 Ͳ0.002 0.078 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.071 0.0728 Ͳ0.97 Ͳ0.206 0.0935 Ͳ2.2
time_hea 0.0893 0.1937 0.46 Ͳ0.057 0.1653 Ͳ0.35 Ͳ0.016 0.1649 Ͳ0.09 0.1092 0.1751 0.62 0.0694 0.2081 0.33
time_h~2 0.0522 0.0957 0.55 0.0014 0.0739 0.02 0.0088 0.073 0.12 0.062 0.1408 0.44 0.1753 0.182 0.96
time_sch Ͳ0.323 0.4416 Ͳ0.73 Ͳ0.07 0.3283 Ͳ0.21 0.2785 0.3639 0.77 0.4299 0.3576 1.2 0.2971 0.4743 0.63
time_s~2 0.5744 0.6285 0.91 0.0913 0.5539 0.16 0.1138 0.5018 0.23 Ͳ0.049 0.6406 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.485 0.7828 Ͳ0.62
time_h~h 0.4765 0.489 0.97 0.4985 0.356 1.4 0.2955 0.329 0.9 0.4229 0.4239 1 0.3665 0.4999 0.73
time_alc Ͳ0.22 0.2258 Ͳ0.97 Ͳ0.08 0.1686 Ͳ0.47 Ͳ0.106 0.1511 Ͳ0.7 Ͳ0.204 0.1632 Ͳ1.25 Ͳ0.292 0.2052 Ͳ1.42
time_a~2 0.1191 0.0997 1.19 0.0575 0.0588 0.98 0.0419 0.0574 0.73 0.0889 0.0634 1.4 0.1005 0.0734 1.37
timeal~a Ͳ0.21 0.135 Ͳ1.55 Ͳ0.091 0.0857 Ͳ1.07 Ͳ0.066 0.0819 Ͳ0.8 Ͳ0.177 0.1289 Ͳ1.37 Ͳ0.274 0.1432 Ͳ1.92
timeal~h Ͳ0.237 0.4344 Ͳ0.55 Ͳ0.129 0.3927 Ͳ0.33 Ͳ0.231 0.3819 Ͳ0.6 Ͳ0.313 0.4982 Ͳ0.63 0.0489 0.4987 0.1
time_s~n Ͳ1.042 0.9774 Ͳ1.07 Ͳ1.726 0.8461 Ͳ2.04 Ͳ2.144 0.8281 Ͳ2.59 Ͳ1.76 0.8611 Ͳ2.04 Ͳ1.397 1.0471 Ͳ1.33
time_h~n Ͳ0.133 0.2611 Ͳ0.51 Ͳ0.145 0.2291 Ͳ0.63 Ͳ0.26 0.2303 Ͳ1.13 Ͳ0.138 0.2435 Ͳ0.57 Ͳ0.165 0.2705 Ͳ0.61
time_a~n 0.2215 0.2347 0.94 0.1978 0.181 1.09 0.3269 0.1644 1.99 0.0733 0.1859 0.39 0.0837 0.1993 0.42
hosp 0.1002 0.0768 1.31 0.2113 0.0721 2.93 0.1376 0.0717 1.92 0.1093 0.0688 1.59 0.0702 0.0816 0.86
Pipe 0.7856 0.4353 1.8 0.3793 0.447 0.85 0.2023 0.4196 0.48 0.3464 0.3914 0.88 0.0081 0.4173 0.02
sewage 0.2508 0.2578 0.97 0.0995 0.2447 0.41 0.1608 0.2268 0.71 0.1854 0.2054 0.9 0.2662 0.2115 1.26
insur_mun Ͳ1.193 1.8022 Ͳ0.66 Ͳ0.799 1.3521 Ͳ0.59 Ͳ1.256 1.4305 Ͳ0.88 Ͳ0.825 1.4863 Ͳ0.55 Ͳ1.5 1.5228 Ͳ0.99
ss12_m~2 1.1399 1.394 0.82 0.5937 1.0541 0.56 0.7852 1.1244 0.7 0.3251 1.1947 0.27 0.9916 1.2277 0.81
numchi~n Ͳ0.058 0.349 Ͳ0.17 Ͳ0.01 0.2481 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.012 0.1924 Ͳ0.06 Ͳ0.041 0.2096 Ͳ0.2 Ͳ0.037 0.2348 Ͳ0.16
altitud 0.2172 0.2917 0.74 0.3195 0.2095 1.53 0.1936 0.2343 0.83 Ͳ0.054 0.2484 Ͳ0.22 0.1375 0.2791 0.49
altitud2 Ͳ0.138 0.1075 Ͳ1.28 Ͳ0.161 0.0774 Ͳ2.09 Ͳ0.091 0.082 Ͳ1.11 Ͳ0.012 0.0861 Ͳ0.14 Ͳ0.102 0.0996 Ͳ1.02
wage_fu Ͳ0.021 0.1626 Ͳ0.13 0.1031 0.1545 0.67 0.2202 0.1549 1.42 0.2165 0.1692 1.28 0.2889 0.1849 1.56
wage_fr 0.1046 0.188 0.56 Ͳ0.045 0.1514 Ͳ0.3 Ͳ0.233 0.1695 Ͳ1.38 Ͳ0.293 0.1758 Ͳ1.67 Ͳ0.189 0.1863 Ͳ1.02
price_~x Ͳ0.247 0.5878 Ͳ0.42 Ͳ0.219 0.6409 Ͳ0.34 0.0514 0.6613 0.08 0.5211 0.4951 1.05 0.4891 0.5264 0.93
region_2 0.2887 0.2445 1.18 0.4224 0.2435 1.73 0.2875 0.2247 1.28 0.3817 0.219 1.74 0.2141 0.2158 0.99
region_3 0.034 0.2722 0.12 0.1361 0.2402 0.57 0.0902 0.22 0.41 0.1642 0.2208 0.74 Ͳ0.028 0.2356 Ͳ0.12
region_4 0.0793 0.2441 0.32 0.114 0.2151 0.53 Ͳ0.003 0.2067 Ͳ0.01 Ͳ4EͲ04 0.1963 0 Ͳ0.11 0.2368 Ͳ0.47
time2 0.0522 0.0549 0.95 0.0235 0.052 0.45 0.0085 0.0487 0.18 Ͳ0.028 0.0464 Ͳ0.6 Ͳ0.03 0.0561 Ͳ0.54
time3 0.1043 0.1135 0.92 0.0893 0.0979 0.91 0.0299 0.1026 0.29 Ͳ0.047 0.0835 Ͳ0.56 0.0456 0.0994 0.46
_cons Ͳ11.12 1.1557 Ͳ9.62 Ͳ9.894 1.0158 Ͳ9.74 Ͳ7.35 0.9795 Ͳ7.5 Ͳ7.662 0.969 Ͳ7.91 Ͳ6.253 1.2357 Ͳ5.06


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Table A14: Eect Quantiles ENDS Exposure
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightatdifferentquantilesͲENDSͲExposure
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
 Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
exposure 3.4189 1.0746 3.18 3.0145 0.8444 3.57 2.2837 0.8978 2.54 1.6675 0.8051 2.07 1.6968 1.06811 1.59
res_exp Ͳ3.489 1.087 Ͳ3.21 Ͳ3.138 0.8502 Ͳ3.69 Ͳ2.416 0.8985 Ͳ2.69 Ͳ1.781 0.8003 Ͳ2.23 Ͳ2.1 1.076014 Ͳ1.95
res_exp2 0.985 0.4554 2.16 0.612 0.3822 1.6 1.0511 0.2932 3.59 0.7171 0.366 1.96 0.1709 0.360952 0.47
age_m Ͳ0.059 0.009 Ͳ6.57 Ͳ0.055 0.007 Ͳ7.87 Ͳ0.057 0.0068 Ͳ8.36 Ͳ0.053 0.0063 Ͳ8.5 Ͳ0.05 0.009483 Ͳ5.29
age_m2 0.0006 9EͲ05 6.53 0.0005 7EͲ05 7.51 0.0006 7EͲ05 8.35 0.0005 6EͲ05 8.35 0.0005 9.66EͲ05 5.01
female 0.0572 0.0422 1.36 0.0154 0.0352 0.44 0.057 0.0324 1.76 0.0611 0.0294 2.08 0.051 0.040575 1.26
ln_order Ͳ0.356 0.0584 Ͳ6.1 Ͳ0.375 0.039 Ͳ9.62 Ͳ0.348 0.0375 Ͳ9.29 Ͳ0.315 0.0407 Ͳ7.73 Ͳ0.343 0.0458 Ͳ7.49
height~t 5.1568 0.4395 11.73 5.3531 0.3626 14.76 5.5715 0.3473 16.04 5.7511 0.2739 21 5.9225 0.392225 15.1
ln_age_h 0.1163 0.076 1.53 0.0742 0.0579 1.28 0.0912 0.0532 1.71 0.0245 0.0645 0.38 0.0999 0.082315 1.21
ln_age_m 1.0056 0.1601 6.28 0.9292 0.113 8.22 0.814 0.0992 8.2 0.6957 0.116 6 0.8207 0.117212 7
edu_m_b 0.1954 0.1588 1.23 0.2235 0.11 2.03 0.156 0.1305 1.2 0.1358 0.1238 1.1 0.1639 0.144726 1.13
edu_m_c 0.2444 0.1729 1.41 0.2006 0.1147 1.75 0.1315 0.1271 1.03 0.1085 0.1179 0.92 0.0956 0.147132 0.65
edu_h_b Ͳ0.039 0.0806 Ͳ0.48 0.002 0.0605 0.03 0.0234 0.064 0.37 Ͳ0.005 0.0536 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.071 0.077537 Ͳ0.92
edu_h_c Ͳ0.196 0.0952 Ͳ2.05 Ͳ0.156 0.0718 Ͳ2.17 Ͳ0.106 0.0785 Ͳ1.36 Ͳ0.131 0.0745 Ͳ1.75 Ͳ0.129 0.094826 Ͳ1.36
sisben2 0.1548 0.0824 1.88 0.2068 0.0651 3.18 0.148 0.0587 2.52 0.185 0.0476 3.88 0.1885 0.071244 2.65
sisben3 0.3458 0.0841 4.11 0.3771 0.0651 5.79 0.309 0.0646 4.78 0.3457 0.053 6.53 0.3349 0.081326 4.12
pipe 0.038 0.1861 0.2 Ͳ0.001 0.1578 Ͳ0.01 Ͳ0.056 0.1483 Ͳ0.37 Ͳ0.076 0.147 Ͳ0.52 Ͳ0.012 0.132505 Ͳ0.09
sewage Ͳ0.025 0.2767 Ͳ0.09 0.1669 0.2557 0.65 0.1384 0.2152 0.64 0.1218 0.2063 0.59 0.0686 0.201959 0.34
altitud Ͳ0.01 0.2189 Ͳ0.04 0.0861 0.2102 0.41 Ͳ0.045 0.1745 Ͳ0.26 Ͳ0.014 0.1933 Ͳ0.07 Ͳ0.003 0.215038 Ͳ0.01
altitud2 Ͳ0.084 0.0837 Ͳ1 Ͳ0.134 0.0761 Ͳ1.76 Ͳ0.083 0.0677 Ͳ1.23 Ͳ0.076 0.0759 Ͳ1.01 Ͳ0.085 0.086234 Ͳ0.98
numchi~n 0.0016 0.0224 0.07 0.0121 0.0166 0.73 0.0153 0.0133 1.15 0.0125 0.017 0.74 0.0252 0.01606 1.57
dent1 Ͳ0.115 0.568 Ͳ0.2 Ͳ0.33 0.4742 Ͳ0.7 Ͳ0.102 0.4283 Ͳ0.24 Ͳ0.06 0.4441 Ͳ0.14 0.1419 0.508549 0.28
dent2 Ͳ0.459 0.5508 Ͳ0.83 Ͳ0.755 0.4699 Ͳ1.61 Ͳ0.562 0.425 Ͳ1.32 Ͳ0.35 0.4357 Ͳ0.8 Ͳ0.242 1.52E+11 0
dent3 Ͳ0.002 0.5166 0 Ͳ0.277 0.4676 Ͳ0.59 Ͳ0.278 0.3857 Ͳ0.72 Ͳ0.182 0.3865 Ͳ0.47 Ͳ0.265 1.21E+12 0
dent4 Ͳ0.677 0.5704 Ͳ1.19 Ͳ0.739 0.4997 Ͳ1.48 Ͳ0.6 0.4417 Ͳ1.36 Ͳ0.38 0.4383 Ͳ0.87 Ͳ0.261 1.84E+11 0
dent5 0.1607 0.6261 0.26 0.0455 0.5105 0.09 0.166 0.4601 0.36 0.3503 0.4642 0.75 0.6319 3.68E+11 0
dent6 Ͳ0.082 0.6031 Ͳ0.14 Ͳ0.321 0.4781 Ͳ0.67 0.1425 0.4291 0.33 0.1366 0.4674 0.29 0.4516 2.96E+11 0
dent7 Ͳ0.255 0.5755 Ͳ0.44 Ͳ0.26 0.4849 Ͳ0.54 Ͳ0.146 0.4306 Ͳ0.34 Ͳ0.079 0.447 Ͳ0.18 0.1843 2.40E+11 0
dent8 Ͳ0.354 0.5842 Ͳ0.61 Ͳ0.482 0.4923 Ͳ0.98 Ͳ0.221 0.4447 Ͳ0.5 0.0455 0.4472 0.1 0.1952 2.40E+11 0
dent9 Ͳ0.55 0.5719 Ͳ0.96 Ͳ0.599 0.4918 Ͳ1.22 Ͳ0.394 0.429 Ͳ0.92 Ͳ0.107 0.4463 Ͳ0.24 Ͳ0.004 6.42E+10 0
dent10 Ͳ0.621 0.5613 Ͳ1.11 Ͳ0.557 0.4732 Ͳ1.18 Ͳ0.41 0.4214 Ͳ0.97 Ͳ0.258 0.435 Ͳ0.59 Ͳ0.162 1.37E+11 0
dent11 0.3655 0.5595 0.65 0.1215 0.4636 0.26 0.3896 0.4274 0.91 0.2849 0.4398 0.65 0.2966 9.10E+10 0
dent12 Ͳ0.499 0.5613 Ͳ0.89 Ͳ0.488 0.5101 Ͳ0.96 Ͳ0.208 0.4679 Ͳ0.44 Ͳ0.14 0.4549 Ͳ0.31 0.0817 2.80E+11 0
dent13 Ͳ0.171 0.5817 Ͳ0.29 Ͳ0.364 0.4912 Ͳ0.74 Ͳ0.06 0.4399 Ͳ0.14 0.2401 0.4904 0.49 0.3226 1.12E+11 0
dent14 Ͳ0.423 0.5717 Ͳ0.74 Ͳ0.552 0.4721 Ͳ1.17 Ͳ0.46 0.4259 Ͳ1.08 Ͳ0.127 0.4458 Ͳ0.29 0.0756 1.95E+11 0
dent15 Ͳ0.681 0.5596 Ͳ1.22 Ͳ0.696 0.4917 Ͳ1.42 Ͳ0.465 0.4317 Ͳ1.08 Ͳ0.316 0.4492 Ͳ0.7 Ͳ0.102 1.02E+11 0
dent16 Ͳ0.277 0.588 Ͳ0.47 Ͳ0.182 0.4777 Ͳ0.38 0.0046 0.4337 0.01 0.1936 0.4431 0.44 0.2997 2.21E+11 0
dent17 0.032 0.5725 0.06 Ͳ0.027 0.4668 Ͳ0.06 0.04 0.4344 0.09 0.1586 0.4703 0.34 0.4533 2.11E+11 0
dent18 Ͳ0.053 0.5522 Ͳ0.1 Ͳ0.263 0.4574 Ͳ0.57 Ͳ0.071 0.4194 Ͳ0.17 0.1359 0.4539 0.3 0.3481 1.89E+11 0
dent20 Ͳ0.094 0.5597 Ͳ0.17 Ͳ0.166 0.462 Ͳ0.36 0.0832 0.4304 0.19 0.1376 0.4472 0.31 0.3601 2.16E+11 0
dent21 Ͳ0.033 0.5816 Ͳ0.06 Ͳ0.298 0.4799 Ͳ0.62 Ͳ0.087 0.4319 Ͳ0.2 Ͳ0.103 0.4679 Ͳ0.22 Ͳ0.035 1.21E+11 0
dent22 Ͳ0.069 0.5743 Ͳ0.12 Ͳ0.169 0.4747 Ͳ0.36 0.0194 0.4265 0.05 0.1141 0.4423 0.26 0.3237 1.12E+11 0
dent23 Ͳ0.426 0.5594 Ͳ0.76 Ͳ0.539 0.4604 Ͳ1.17 Ͳ0.464 0.4195 Ͳ1.11 Ͳ0.304 0.4387 Ͳ0.69 Ͳ0.212 1.37E+11 0
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Table A15: Eect Quantiles ENDS Exposure: continued
dent24 0.1558 0.5785 0.27 Ͳ0.211 0.4647 Ͳ0.45 Ͳ0.067 0.415 Ͳ0.16 0.1869 0.4392 0.43 0.4754 0.518293 0.92
dent25 0.0334 0.5222 0.06 Ͳ0.187 0.4223 Ͳ0.44 0.0822 0.3883 0.21 0.2552 0.4034 0.63 0.4062 5.08E+11 0
dent26 0.0891 0.5115 0.17 Ͳ0.167 0.4141 Ͳ0.4 Ͳ0.148 0.3661 Ͳ0.4 Ͳ0.071 0.4042 Ͳ0.18 0.0545 0.477197 0.11
dent27 0.1311 0.5492 0.24 0.0598 0.4574 0.13 0.1492 0.4087 0.37 0.1446 0.4314 0.34 0.1003 5.41E+11 0
dent30 0.1702 0.4292 0.4 Ͳ0.217 0.3669 Ͳ0.59 0.0016 0.3315 0 0.0592 0.3512 0.17 0.1562 8.80E+11 0
dent31 Ͳ0.123 0.5463 Ͳ0.23 Ͳ0.158 0.4265 Ͳ0.37 Ͳ0.098 0.38 Ͳ0.26 0.2748 0.3957 0.69 0.2859 6.37E+11 0
dent32 0.1699 0.4795 0.35 0.0856 0.3688 0.23 0.1227 0.3399 0.36 0.2278 0.3637 0.63 0.2554 8.79E+11 0
dent33 0.1558 0.5642 0.28 0.0497 0.4838 0.1 0.3042 0.3989 0.76 0.3943 0.4019 0.98 0.3761 4.69E+11 0
_cons 0.0727 1.106 0.07 Ͳ0.044 0.9046 Ͳ0.05 Ͳ0.046 0.7855 Ͳ0.06 0.019 0.7132 0.03 0.2345 0.881164 0.27
dent19 Ͳ0.029 0.5617 Ͳ0.05 Ͳ0.113 0.4835 Ͳ0.23 Ͳ0.002 0.4236 0 0.1647 0.4362 0.38 0.3526 2.41E+11 0
dent29 Ͳ13.27 0.4903 Ͳ27.06 Ͳ12.58 0.3436 Ͳ36.6 Ͳ11.91 0.3299 Ͳ36.11 Ͳ11.04 0.3714 Ͳ29.72 Ͳ11.64 8.83E+11 0
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Table A16: Eect Quantiles ENDS Attendance
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sHeightatdifferentquantilesͲENDSͲAttendance
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
 Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z Coeff SE z
asis_hc 1.3309 0.288185 4.62 1.0631 0.2108928 5.04 0.987 0.2261421 4.36 0.6598 0.1888501 3.49 0.4745 0.2801613 1.69
res_asis Ͳ0.8621 0.1802515 Ͳ4.78 Ͳ0.7233 0.1317933 Ͳ5.49 Ͳ0.6856 0.1384924 Ͳ4.95 Ͳ0.4726 0.1143777 Ͳ4.13 Ͳ0.3811 0.1780049 Ͳ2.14
res_as~2 0.1083 0.0401465 2.7 0.0931 0.0309992 3 0.1197 0.0267809 4.47 0.053 0.0300422 1.77 0.0374 0.0397432 0.94
age_m Ͳ0.0634 0.0079704 Ͳ7.95 Ͳ0.058 0.0059206 Ͳ9.8 Ͳ0.0617 0.0060938 Ͳ10.12 Ͳ0.0558 0.0050887 Ͳ10.97 Ͳ0.0487 0.0084422 Ͳ5.76
age_m2 0.0006 0.0000797 7.65 0.0005 0.0000617 8.79 0.0006 0.0000627 9.57 0.0006 0.0000542 10.39 0.0005 0.0000878 5.45
female 0.05 0.0437905 1.14 0.0151 0.0352942 0.43 0.0594 0.0330522 1.8 0.0747 0.0297002 2.52 0.0462 0.0411223 1.12
ln_order Ͳ0.3365 0.0604048 Ͳ5.57 Ͳ0.3595 0.0403699 Ͳ8.9 Ͳ0.3383 0.0376683 Ͳ8.98 Ͳ0.3139 0.0417206 Ͳ7.52 Ͳ0.3313 0.047308 Ͳ7
height~t 5.1529 0.4408052 11.69 5.3019 0.3841333 13.8 5.5389 0.3531213 15.69 5.6779 0.2811404 20.2 5.8202 0.4137008 14.07
ln_age_h 0.1251 0.0697195 1.79 0.085 0.0578855 1.47 0.1016 0.0569556 1.78 0.0602 0.0644383 0.93 0.115 0.0854476 1.35
ln_age_m 0.9944 0.1588412 6.26 0.921 0.1129339 8.16 0.8174 0.1003565 8.15 0.694 0.1169221 5.94 0.7868 0.1190684 6.61
edu_m_b 0.2289 0.1731122 1.32 0.1744 0.118839 1.47 0.1152 0.1453083 0.79 0.1541 0.1218145 1.26 0.1336 0.144111 0.93
edu_m_c 0.2754 0.1899409 1.45 0.1437 0.1240817 1.16 0.1032 0.1414382 0.73 0.1158 0.1141267 1.01 0.0671 0.1502656 0.45
edu_h_b Ͳ0.0305 0.0876479 Ͳ0.35 0.0247 0.0616707 0.4 0.0151 0.0638899 0.24 0.0086 0.0536464 0.16 Ͳ0.0632 0.085838 Ͳ0.74
edu_h_c Ͳ0.1929 0.102553 Ͳ1.88 Ͳ0.1436 0.0751472 Ͳ1.91 Ͳ0.1525 0.0778407 Ͳ1.96 Ͳ0.0954 0.0737346 Ͳ1.29 Ͳ0.1049 0.100649 Ͳ1.04
sisben2 0.1476 0.0771209 1.91 0.1763 0.0686948 2.57 0.162 0.0585125 2.77 0.1719 0.0488996 3.52 0.1875 0.0722483 2.6
sisben3 0.3571 0.0806927 4.43 0.3585 0.0678202 5.29 0.3379 0.0618847 5.46 0.328 0.0520024 6.31 0.3251 0.0823306 3.95
pipe 0.0233 0.1793097 0.13 Ͳ0.0382 0.154678 Ͳ0.25 Ͳ0.0338 0.1539125 Ͳ0.22 Ͳ0.0547 0.1455292 Ͳ0.38 0.0093 0.1399204 0.07
sewage 0.0215 0.275104 0.08 0.1218 0.2360827 0.52 0.1306 0.225885 0.58 0.1532 0.2047109 0.75 Ͳ0.0152 0.2023494 Ͳ0.08
altitud 0.0475 0.227422 0.21 0.0614 0.201636 0.3 Ͳ0.0338 0.175981 Ͳ0.19 0.0795 0.1923556 0.41 0.1014 0.2240435 0.45
altitud2 Ͳ0.1028 0.087807 Ͳ1.17 Ͳ0.1188 0.0737049 Ͳ1.61 Ͳ0.0801 0.069636 Ͳ1.15 Ͳ0.1114 0.0750143 Ͳ1.49 Ͳ0.1208 0.088685 Ͳ1.36
numchi~n 0.0043 0.0208644 0.2 0.0162 0.0163124 0.99 0.0185 0.0139612 1.32 0.0068 0.0169748 0.4 0.0285 0.0175089 1.63
dent1 Ͳ0.2233 0.5696543 Ͳ0.39 Ͳ0.3842 0.5015229 Ͳ0.77 Ͳ0.1729 0.443178 Ͳ0.39 Ͳ0.1069 0.4312428 Ͳ0.25 0.0014 0.499844 0
dent2 Ͳ0.531 2.60E+10 0 Ͳ0.7526 1.89E+11 0 Ͳ0.5716 2.30E+09 0 Ͳ0.3805 0.4260083 Ͳ0.89 Ͳ0.2541 0.4936105 Ͳ0.51
dent3 Ͳ0.0858 0.5110135 Ͳ0.17 Ͳ0.4039 1.34E+13 0 Ͳ0.362 2.09E+10 0 Ͳ0.0376 0.4177048 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.3913 0.4844463 Ͳ0.81
dent4 Ͳ0.8487 3.91E+10 0 Ͳ0.8852 3.06E+11 0 Ͳ0.7401 5.22E+10 0 Ͳ0.4648 0.4206065 Ͳ1.11 Ͳ0.3374 0.4989149 Ͳ0.68
dent5 0.1229 0.5942594 0.21 Ͳ0.0342 4.51E+12 0 0.151 7.09E+09 0 0.3137 0.4587913 0.68 0.5909 0.5051645 1.17
dent6 Ͳ0.1615 6.06E+10 0 Ͳ0.3064 3.67E+12 0 0.0986 8.17E+10 0 0.0397 0.450606 0.09 0.412 0.5104511 0.81
dent7 Ͳ0.3597 4.74E+10 0 Ͳ0.3109 3.55E+11 0 Ͳ0.1777 6.33E+10 0 Ͳ0.1922 0.4301466 Ͳ0.45 0.1279 0.5071397 0.25
dent8 Ͳ0.5145 4.40E+10 0 Ͳ0.4945 2.68E+12 0 Ͳ0.302 5.76E+10 0 Ͳ0.0677 0.4421813 Ͳ0.15 0.1061 0.5264225 0.2
dent9 Ͳ0.6181 1.50E+10 0 Ͳ0.6326 1.12E+11 0 Ͳ0.4484 2.00E+10 0 Ͳ0.1999 0.4325563 Ͳ0.46 Ͳ0.0552 0.5123427 Ͳ0.11
dent10 Ͳ0.6991 2.60E+10 0 Ͳ0.6252 2.03E+11 0 Ͳ0.4427 3.48E+10 0 Ͳ0.3426 0.4190373 Ͳ0.82 Ͳ0.147 0.5033517 Ͳ0.29
dent11 0.3523 2.29E+10 0 0.1602 1.37E+12 0 0.4024 3.06E+10 0 0.2249 0.4368306 0.51 0.2922 0.5124098 0.57
dent12 Ͳ0.585 5.48E+10 0 Ͳ0.4993 4.26E+11 0 Ͳ0.2936 7.50E+10 0 Ͳ0.1839 0.4320011 Ͳ0.43 0.0467 0.4948322 0.09
dent13 Ͳ0.3386 2.75E+10 0 Ͳ0.3949 3.13E+11 0 Ͳ0.0983 3.67E+10 0 0.1235 0.4777679 0.26 0.269 0.5212526 0.52
dent14 Ͳ0.5513 3.91E+10 0 Ͳ0.5593 2.93E+11 0 Ͳ0.4998 5.22E+10 0 Ͳ0.2105 0.4446649 Ͳ0.47 0.0062 0.5043136 0.01
dent15 Ͳ0.8746 1.73E+10 0 Ͳ0.7698 1.46E+11 0 Ͳ0.5846 2.58E+10 0 Ͳ0.4308 0.4314245 Ͳ1 Ͳ0.1052 0.4958785 Ͳ0.21
dent16 Ͳ0.339 4.39E+10 0 Ͳ0.2124 3.39E+11 0 Ͳ0.0565 5.86E+10 0 0.103 0.4359463 0.24 0.2515 0.4978199 0.51
dent17 0.0276 3.49E+10 0 Ͳ0.015 9.95E+11 0 0.0374 4.80E+10 0 0.1837 0.4393228 0.42 0.4154 0.5234113 0.79
dent18 Ͳ0.119 2.75E+10 0 Ͳ0.3117 2.16E+11 0 Ͳ0.0832 3.67E+10 0 0.122 0.4445364 0.27 0.2918 0.5097089 0.57
dent20 Ͳ0.2204 4.01E+10 0 Ͳ0.1565 8.83E+11 0 0.0495 5.36E+10 0 0.0394 0.4318868 0.09 0.293 0.5054437 0.58
dent21 Ͳ0.2117 2.45E+10 0 Ͳ0.3574 1.47E+12 0 Ͳ0.1787 3.27E+10 0 Ͳ0.2231 0.4579376 Ͳ0.49 Ͳ0.1365 0.5313393 Ͳ0.26
dent22 Ͳ0.1738 2.12E+10 0 Ͳ0.2106 1.56E+11 0 Ͳ0.053 2.83E+10 0 Ͳ0.0755 0.4246742 Ͳ0.18 0.1692 0.4954751 0.34
dent23 Ͳ0.5272 2.46E+10 0 Ͳ0.5763 4.89E+11 0 Ͳ0.5252 3.48E+10 0 Ͳ0.4056 0.4350767 Ͳ0.93 Ͳ0.238 0.5050306 Ͳ0.47
193
Table A17: Eect Quantiles ENDS Attendance: continued
dent24 0.0843 0.560805 0.15 Ͳ0.2192 0.4851738 Ͳ0.45 Ͳ0.0587 0.4274893 Ͳ0.14 0.1206 0.4246788 0.28 0.3784 0.5038934 0.75
dent25 Ͳ0.0664 9.71E+10 0 Ͳ0.1688 7.20E+11 0 0.0831 1.21E+11 0 0.22 0.3875877 0.57 0.331 0.4464315 0.74
dent26 Ͳ0.0061 1.40E+11 0 Ͳ0.1505 0.4247659 Ͳ0.35 Ͳ0.163 1.73E+11 0 Ͳ0.1316 0.3865346 Ͳ0.34 0.022 0.4497306 0.05
dent27 0.0142 1.01E+11 0 Ͳ0.0133 0.4810213 Ͳ0.03 0.1311 1.35E+11 0 0.0329 0.4090277 0.08 0.0522 0.4669473 0.11
dent30 0.1132 0.4444667 0.25 Ͳ0.1867 1.31E+12 0 Ͳ0.0004 2.23E+11 0 0.0431 0.3360463 0.13 0.1032 0.3929244 0.26
dent31 Ͳ0.1587 1.20E+11 0 Ͳ0.2062 7.13E+12 0 Ͳ0.0742 1.49E+11 0 0.1969 0.3914075 0.5 0.2416 0.4625335 0.52
dent32 0.1749 1.66E+11 0 0.0298 6.26E+10 0 0.1552 0.3511204 0.44 0.2164 0.3372387 0.64 0.215 0.4000204 0.54
dent33 0.0453 8.99E+10 0 Ͳ0.0207 5.33E+12 0 0.2426 1.19E+11 0 0.3217 0.3870521 0.83 0.3097 0.4745297 0.65
_cons Ͳ0.0002 1.043592 0 Ͳ0.1228 0.9251655 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.0305 0.79288 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.0592 0.7021394 Ͳ0.08 0.2028 0.8659093 0.23
dent19 Ͳ0.0981 4.39E+10 0 Ͳ0.1655 2.63E+12 0 0.0229 5.86E+10 0 0.1342 0.422547 0.32 0.3541 0.5052972 0.7
dent29 Ͳ12.793 1.68E+11 0 Ͳ11.949 1.24E+12 0 Ͳ11.556 2.08E+11 0 Ͳ10.813 0.36 Ͳ30.01 Ͳ11.092 0.4139089 Ͳ26.8
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Table A18: Eect on Birthweight linear IV FeA
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sBirthweightUsinglinearIV–FeA
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VARIABLES OLS IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance OLS
IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance
exposure 0.0202 0.399 Ͳ0.0947 Ͳ0.331 1.01
[0.0932] [0.566] [0.851] [1.211] [0.689]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0136 0.384 0.0415 Ͳ0.59 0.539
[0.0627] [0.359] [0.808] [1.643] [0.384]
female Ͳ0.0936** Ͳ0.0956*** Ͳ0.0929** Ͳ0.0917** Ͳ0.0989** Ͳ0.0933** Ͳ0.0989*** Ͳ0.0940** Ͳ0.0851** Ͳ0.101**
[0.0361] [0.0366] [0.0364] [0.0357] [0.0394] [0.0362] [0.0368] [0.0379] [0.0399] [0.0380]
age_m 0.000987 Ͳ0.00187 0.00185 0.00363 Ͳ0.00647 0.00144 Ͳ0.00724 0.000234 0.014 Ͳ0.0106
[0.00398] [0.00552] [0.00649] [0.00892] [0.00711] [0.00381] [0.00877] [0.0170] [0.0348] [0.00989]
age_m2 Ͳ0.00292 Ͳ0.000857 Ͳ0.00355 Ͳ0.00483 0.00247 Ͳ0.00337 0.00658 Ͳ0.00199 Ͳ0.0178 0.0105
[0.00452] [0.00521] [0.00555] [0.00718] [0.00644] [0.00449] [0.00999] [0.0195] [0.0402] [0.0112]
ln_age_h 0.00614 0.0148 0.00353 Ͳ0.00185 0.0287 0.0057 0.00509 0.00562 0.0066 0.00485
[0.0790] [0.0768] [0.0759] [0.0771] [0.0842] [0.0787] [0.0785] [0.0791] [0.0827] [0.0819]
ln_age_m 0.183* 0.194** 0.180* 0.174* 0.211** 0.182* 0.205** 0.185* 0.149 0.214**
[0.0990] [0.0978] [0.0985] [0.100] [0.103] [0.0993] [0.0987] [0.103] [0.130] [0.103]
height_mot 0.449 0.478* 0.441 0.423 0.524* 0.446 0.510* 0.454 0.353 0.535*
[0.269] [0.272] [0.291] [0.280] [0.293] [0.270] [0.274] [0.323] [0.371] [0.280]
ln_order Ͳ0.0223 Ͳ0.0362 Ͳ0.0181 Ͳ0.00938 Ͳ0.0586 Ͳ0.0211 Ͳ0.0334 Ͳ0.0228 Ͳ0.00328 Ͳ0.0382
[0.0451] [0.0485] [0.0518] [0.0502] [0.0555] [0.0449] [0.0461] [0.0490] [0.0574] [0.0488]
edu_m_b Ͳ0.0473 Ͳ0.0497 Ͳ0.0466 Ͳ0.0451 Ͳ0.0537 Ͳ0.0474 Ͳ0.0408 Ͳ0.0465 Ͳ0.057 Ͳ0.0382
[0.0638] [0.0637] [0.0645] [0.0626] [0.0677] [0.0641] [0.0655] [0.0641] [0.0702] [0.0690]
edu_m_c Ͳ0.108 Ͳ0.0975 Ͳ0.111 Ͳ0.117 Ͳ0.0812 Ͳ0.109 Ͳ0.0795 Ͳ0.105 Ͳ0.152 Ͳ0.0679
[0.0796] [0.0764] [0.0798] [0.0955] [0.0791] [0.0809] [0.0778] [0.0915] [0.166] [0.0817]
edu_h_b 0.0264 0.0228 0.0275 0.0297 0.017 0.0269 0.0175 0.0256 0.0406 0.0138
[0.0494] [0.0478] [0.0500] [0.0527] [0.0507] [0.0494] [0.0503] [0.0523] [0.0673] [0.0537]
edu_h_c 0.0351 0.0353 0.035 0.0349 0.0357 0.0356 0.0219 0.0337 0.0554 0.0165
[0.0961] [0.0925] [0.0966] [0.0981] [0.0957] [0.0963] [0.0962] [0.103] [0.129] [0.0995]
centretown 0.0191 0.00717 0.0227 0.0301 Ͳ0.012 0.0203 0.00244 0.0178 0.0462 Ͳ0.00455
[0.0569] [0.0657] [0.0665] [0.0647] [0.0742] [0.0569] [0.0628] [0.0730] [0.0968] [0.0645]
time_hea Ͳ0.0815 Ͳ0.016 Ͳ0.101 Ͳ0.142 0.0895 Ͳ0.0868 Ͳ0.0347 Ͳ0.0796 Ͳ0.162 Ͳ0.0143
[0.172] [0.196] [0.233] [0.264] [0.225] [0.173] [0.178] [0.209] [0.275] [0.185]
time_hea2 0.187 0.135 0.203 0.235 0.0519 0.192 0.13 0.183 0.282 0.106
[0.165] [0.181] [0.219] [0.238] [0.190] [0.167] [0.173] [0.224] [0.315] [0.174]
time_sch 0.35 0.497 0.305 0.214 0.735* 0.335 0.552 0.365 0.0199 0.637*
[0.293] [0.363] [0.438] [0.590] [0.396] [0.297] [0.340] [0.527] [0.974] [0.349]
time_sch2 0.0628 Ͳ0.06 0.1 0.177 Ͳ0.258 0.078 Ͳ0.174 0.0431 0.443 Ͳ0.273
[0.384] [0.393] [0.456] [0.590] [0.392] [0.388] [0.403] [0.612] [1.153] [0.419]
time_hea_sch Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.406 Ͳ0.458* Ͳ0.413 Ͳ0.331 Ͳ0.478*
[0.273] [0.253] [0.279] [0.292] [0.255] [0.275] [0.265] [0.283] [0.404] [0.276]
time_alc Ͳ0.0103 Ͳ0.047 0.000821 0.0237 Ͳ0.106 Ͳ0.00724 Ͳ0.0397 Ͳ0.0117 0.0398 Ͳ0.0524
[0.111] [0.126] [0.145] [0.134] [0.155] [0.110] [0.126] [0.139] [0.154] [0.136]
time_alc2 0.0279 0.0297 0.0273 0.0261 0.0328 0.0281 0.0193 0.0268 0.0408 0.0158
[0.0375] [0.0359] [0.0376] [0.0369] [0.0377] [0.0377] [0.0359] [0.0418] [0.0632] [0.0365]
timealchea Ͳ0.122 Ͳ0.0918 Ͳ0.132 Ͳ0.151 Ͳ0.0424 Ͳ0.126 Ͳ0.067 Ͳ0.118 Ͳ0.212 Ͳ0.0438
[0.141] [0.145] [0.172] [0.180] [0.143] [0.143] [0.147] [0.202] [0.300] [0.145]
timealcsch 0.25 0.267 0.245 0.234 0.294 0.245 0.346 0.259 0.0998 0.385
[0.327] [0.307] [0.333] [0.361] [0.314] [0.330] [0.330] [0.370] [0.593] [0.350]
time_sch_mun 0.149 0.128 0.156 0.169 0.0943 0.147 0.236 0.16 0.0189 0.27
[0.576] [0.549] [0.586] [0.588] [0.558] [0.582] [0.535] [0.599] [0.818] [0.545]
time_hea_mun Ͳ0.457** Ͳ0.437** Ͳ0.463** Ͳ0.476** Ͳ0.404** Ͳ0.458** Ͳ0.450*** Ͳ0.457** Ͳ0.470** Ͳ0.447**
[0.181] [0.176] [0.196] [0.208] [0.173] [0.182] [0.168] [0.184] [0.213] [0.169]
time_alc_mun 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.468*** 0.464***
[0.120] [0.113] [0.123] [0.128] [0.112] [0.121] [0.109] [0.120] [0.143] [0.110]
hosp 0.0146 0.0219 0.0124 0.00785 0.0337 0.0147 0.00157 0.0129 0.0337 Ͳ0.00355
[0.0636] [0.0629] [0.0709] [0.0774] [0.0623] [0.0625] [0.0603] [0.0607] [0.0669] [0.0635]
pipe Ͳ0.0323 Ͳ0.0407 Ͳ0.0298 Ͳ0.0245 Ͳ0.0543 Ͳ0.0306 Ͳ0.0671 Ͳ0.0357 0.0223 Ͳ0.0814
195
Table A19: Eect on Birthweight linear IV FeA:continued
[0.160] [0.155] [0.162] [0.167] [0.161] [0.160] [0.149] [0.178] [0.251] [0.148]
sewage 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.289*** 0.256*** 0.284*** 0.335** 0.244***
[0.0832] [0.0773] [0.0846] [0.0880] [0.0766] [0.0839] [0.0806] [0.103] [0.155] [0.0843]
insur_mun Ͳ0.917** Ͳ0.874** Ͳ0.931** Ͳ0.958** Ͳ0.804* Ͳ0.920** Ͳ0.918** Ͳ0.919** Ͳ0.923* Ͳ0.917**
[0.404] [0.394] [0.434] [0.460] [0.421] [0.402] [0.376] [0.399] [0.473] [0.387]
insur_mun2 0.879** 0.805** 0.901* 0.947* 0.686* 0.884** 0.851** 0.879** 0.931* 0.839**
[0.388] [0.388] [0.452] [0.506] [0.400] [0.384] [0.358] [0.397] [0.480] [0.364]
numchildren Ͳ0.015 Ͳ0.0202 Ͳ0.0135 Ͳ0.0103 Ͳ0.0285 Ͳ0.0154 0.00313 Ͳ0.0128 Ͳ0.0423 0.0104
[0.0845] [0.0846] [0.0912] [0.0993] [0.0893] [0.0830] [0.0771] [0.0744] [0.0798] [0.0833]
altitud Ͳ0.0426 Ͳ0.00896 Ͳ0.0528 Ͳ0.0737 0.0452 Ͳ0.0458 Ͳ0.00296 Ͳ0.0399 Ͳ0.108 0.0138
[0.115] [0.116] [0.133] [0.138] [0.130] [0.112] [0.116] [0.141] [0.191] [0.122]
altitud2 Ͳ0.00347 Ͳ0.0122 Ͳ0.000837 0.00458 Ͳ0.0262 Ͳ0.00266 Ͳ0.0128 Ͳ0.00406 0.012 Ͳ0.0167
[0.0381] [0.0370] [0.0408] [0.0387] [0.0410] [0.0373] [0.0371] [0.0414] [0.0455] [0.0388]
wage_fu 0.175* 0.189** 0.171* 0.163* 0.210** 0.175* 0.170* 0.174* 0.182* 0.168
[0.0951] [0.0933] [0.100] [0.0906] [0.101] [0.0963] [0.0984] [0.0971] [0.108] [0.104]
wage_fr Ͳ0.0764 Ͳ0.0751 Ͳ0.0768 Ͳ0.0776 Ͳ0.073 Ͳ0.0773 Ͳ0.0528 Ͳ0.0739 Ͳ0.113 Ͳ0.0433
[0.104] [0.102] [0.105] [0.107] [0.107] [0.106] [0.106] [0.120] [0.165] [0.109]
price_index 0.0877 Ͳ0.0517 0.13 0.217 Ͳ0.276 0.102 Ͳ0.0923 0.0749 0.383 Ͳ0.168
[0.191] [0.278] [0.386] [0.476] [0.312] [0.187] [0.244] [0.455] [0.815] [0.247]
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
RͲsquared 0.092 0.079 0.09 0.081 0.009 0.092 0.058 0.091 0.022 0.027
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Table A20: Eect on Birthweight Nonlinear IV FeA
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sBirthweightUsingnonlinearIVͲFeA
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VARIABLES OLS IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance OLS
IV:All
Instruments
IV:
Capacity IV:Fee
IV:
Distance
exposure 0.0202 0.178 Ͳ0.196 Ͳ0.0156 0.439
[0.0932] [0.495] [0.644] [0.747] [0.590]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0136 0.175 0.235 0.345 0.223
[0.0627] [0.230] [0.301] [0.299] [0.239]
female Ͳ0.0936** Ͳ0.0944** Ͳ0.0924** Ͳ0.0934** Ͳ0.0958** Ͳ0.0933** Ͳ0.0959** Ͳ0.0968** Ͳ0.0983*** Ͳ0.0966**
[0.0361] [0.0368] [0.0360] [0.0359] [0.0373] [0.0362] [0.0370] [0.0367] [0.0364] [0.0371]
age_m 0.000987 Ͳ0.000202 0.00261 0.00126 Ͳ0.00217 0.00144 Ͳ0.00269 Ͳ0.00399 Ͳ0.0064 Ͳ0.00373
[0.00398] [0.00494] [0.00495] [0.00561] [0.00567] [0.00381] [0.00611] [0.00651] [0.00660] [0.00668]
age_m2 Ͳ0.00292 Ͳ0.00206 Ͳ0.0041 Ͳ0.00312 Ͳ0.00064 Ͳ0.00337 0.00136 0.00285 0.0056 0.00255
[0.00452] [0.00487] [0.00463] [0.00501] [0.00527] [0.00449] [0.00703] [0.00770] [0.00781] [0.00766]
ln_age_h 0.00614 0.00974 0.00123 0.00533 0.0157 0.0057 0.00541 0.00532 0.00515 0.00534
[0.0790] [0.0766] [0.0753] [0.0761] [0.0787] [0.0787] [0.0792] [0.0795] [0.0802] [0.0794]
ln_age_m 0.183* 0.188* 0.177* 0.182* 0.195* 0.182* 0.193* 0.196* 0.202* 0.196*
[0.0990] [0.100] [0.0999] [0.102] [0.103] [0.0993] [0.100] [0.101] [0.103] [0.102]
height_mot 0.449 0.461 0.433 0.447 0.481* 0.446 0.476* 0.486* 0.503* 0.484*
[0.269] [0.276] [0.285] [0.277] [0.279] [0.270] [0.276] [0.285] [0.282] [0.274]
ln_order Ͳ0.0223 Ͳ0.0281 Ͳ0.0143 Ͳ0.021 Ͳ0.0377 Ͳ0.0211 Ͳ0.027 Ͳ0.0288 Ͳ0.0322 Ͳ0.0284
[0.0451] [0.0463] [0.0467] [0.0457] [0.0499] [0.0449] [0.0454] [0.0440] [0.0442] [0.0461]
edu_m_b Ͳ0.0473 Ͳ0.0483 Ͳ0.0459 Ͳ0.0471 Ͳ0.05 Ͳ0.0474 Ͳ0.0442 Ͳ0.0433 Ͳ0.0414 Ͳ0.0435
[0.0638] [0.0646] [0.0642] [0.0641] [0.0654] [0.0641] [0.0652] [0.0654] [0.0667] [0.0658]
edu_m_c Ͳ0.108 Ͳ0.103 Ͳ0.113 Ͳ0.109 Ͳ0.0964 Ͳ0.109 Ͳ0.0951 Ͳ0.0906 Ͳ0.0824 Ͳ0.0915
[0.0796] [0.0800] [0.0808] [0.0841] [0.0803] [0.0809] [0.0802] [0.0790] [0.0840] [0.0818]
edu_h_b 0.0264 0.0249 0.0285 0.0268 0.0225 0.0269 0.0225 0.021 0.0184 0.0213
[0.0494] [0.0492] [0.0496] [0.0494] [0.0494] [0.0494] [0.0502] [0.0498] [0.0506] [0.0505]
edu_h_c 0.0351 0.0352 0.035 0.0351 0.0354 0.0356 0.0291 0.027 0.0232 0.0274
[0.0961] [0.0954] [0.0973] [0.0962] [0.0949] [0.0963] [0.0969] [0.0969] [0.0991] [0.0965]
centretown 0.0191 0.0141 0.0258 0.0202 0.00591 0.0203 0.0118 0.00914 0.00419 0.00968
[0.0569] [0.0635] [0.0621] [0.0611] [0.0657] [0.0569] [0.0615] [0.0621] [0.0601] [0.0609]
time_hea Ͳ0.0815 Ͳ0.0542 Ͳ0.119 Ͳ0.0877 Ͳ0.00911 Ͳ0.0868 Ͳ0.062 Ͳ0.0542 Ͳ0.0398 Ͳ0.0558
[0.172] [0.181] [0.201] [0.193] [0.178] [0.173] [0.176] [0.180] [0.176] [0.174]
time_hea2 0.187 0.165 0.216 0.192 0.13 0.192 0.162 0.153 0.136 0.155
[0.165] [0.163] [0.180] [0.161] [0.153] [0.167] [0.168] [0.166] [0.159] [0.163]
time_sch 0.35 0.412 0.266 0.336 0.513 0.335 0.438 0.471 0.531 0.464
[0.293] [0.362] [0.394] [0.446] [0.389] [0.297] [0.320] [0.344] [0.353] [0.324]
time_sch2 0.0628 0.0117 0.133 0.0744 Ͳ0.073 0.078 Ͳ0.0418 Ͳ0.0795 Ͳ0.149 Ͳ0.0719
[0.384] [0.432] [0.469] [0.520] [0.446] [0.388] [0.416] [0.438] [0.464] [0.430]
time_hea_sch Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.408 Ͳ0.406 Ͳ0.431 Ͳ0.438 Ͳ0.453 Ͳ0.437
[0.273] [0.267] [0.284] [0.275] [0.259] [0.275] [0.276] [0.278] [0.283] [0.278]
time_alc Ͳ0.0103 Ͳ0.0256 0.0106 Ͳ0.00684 Ͳ0.0509 Ͳ0.00724 Ͳ0.0227 Ͳ0.0275 Ͳ0.0365 Ͳ0.0265
[0.111] [0.113] [0.127] [0.112] [0.115] [0.110] [0.118] [0.123] [0.121] [0.117]
time_alc2 0.0279 0.0286 0.0268 0.0277 0.0299 0.0281 0.0239 0.0226 0.0201 0.0228
[0.0375] [0.0370] [0.0379] [0.0368] [0.0369] [0.0377] [0.0371] [0.0373] [0.0385] [0.0373]
timealchea Ͳ0.122 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.14 Ͳ0.125 Ͳ0.0886 Ͳ0.126 Ͳ0.098 Ͳ0.0892 Ͳ0.0727 Ͳ0.0909
[0.141] [0.136] [0.149] [0.134] [0.125] [0.143] [0.141] [0.139] [0.132] [0.137]
timealcsch 0.25 0.257 0.24 0.248 0.268 0.245 0.293 0.308 0.336 0.305
[0.327] [0.326] [0.346] [0.343] [0.320] [0.330] [0.342] [0.350] [0.366] [0.350]
time_sch_mun 0.149 0.14 0.161 0.151 0.126 0.147 0.189 0.203 0.227 0.2
[0.576] [0.570] [0.592] [0.579] [0.563] [0.582] [0.558] [0.545] [0.539] [0.549]
time_hea_mun Ͳ0.457** Ͳ0.448** Ͳ0.468** Ͳ0.459** Ͳ0.435** Ͳ0.458** Ͳ0.454** Ͳ0.453** Ͳ0.451** Ͳ0.453**
[0.181] [0.183] [0.193] [0.192] [0.179] [0.182] [0.177] [0.176] [0.174] [0.175]
time_alc_mun 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.465***
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[0.120] [0.118] [0.125] [0.122] [0.115] [0.121] [0.116] [0.115] [0.113] [0.115]
hosp 0.0146 0.0176 0.0104 0.0139 0.0227 0.0147 0.00844 0.00648 0.00285 0.00687
[0.0636] [0.0644] [0.0682] [0.0677] [0.0620] [0.0625] [0.0615] [0.0605] [0.0598] [0.0628]
pipe Ͳ0.0323 Ͳ0.0358 Ͳ0.0275 Ͳ0.0315 Ͳ0.0416 Ͳ0.0306 Ͳ0.048 Ͳ0.0534 Ͳ0.0635 Ͳ0.0523
[0.160] [0.160] [0.162] [0.161] [0.159] [0.160] [0.153] [0.151] [0.147] [0.150]
sewage 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.289*** 0.273*** 0.269*** 0.260*** 0.270***
[0.0832] [0.0814] [0.0861] [0.0837] [0.0790] [0.0839] [0.0824] [0.0865] [0.0877] [0.0835]
insur_mun Ͳ0.917** Ͳ0.899** Ͳ0.942** Ͳ0.921** Ͳ0.869** Ͳ0.920** Ͳ0.919** Ͳ0.918** Ͳ0.918** Ͳ0.918**
[0.404] [0.406] [0.433] [0.430] [0.401] [0.402] [0.390] [0.388] [0.386] [0.388]
insur_mun2 0.879** 0.848** 0.921** 0.886* 0.797** 0.884** 0.868** 0.864** 0.855** 0.865**
[0.388] [0.400] [0.441] [0.444] [0.391] [0.384] [0.372] [0.372] [0.370] [0.367]
numchildren Ͳ0.015 Ͳ0.0172 Ͳ0.0121 Ͳ0.0145 Ͳ0.0208 Ͳ0.0154 Ͳ0.00658 Ͳ0.00381 0.00132 Ͳ0.00437
[0.0845] [0.0864] [0.0899] [0.0886] [0.0845] [0.0830] [0.0789] [0.0788] [0.0803] [0.0818]
altitud Ͳ0.0426 Ͳ0.0286 Ͳ0.0617 Ͳ0.0458 Ͳ0.00542 Ͳ0.0458 Ͳ0.0255 Ͳ0.019 Ͳ0.00715 Ͳ0.0203
[0.115] [0.115] [0.121] [0.122] [0.121] [0.112] [0.111] [0.115] [0.114] [0.113]
altitud2 Ͳ0.00347 Ͳ0.0071 0.00148 Ͳ0.00265 Ͳ0.0131 Ͳ0.00266 Ͳ0.00746 Ͳ0.00897 Ͳ0.0118 Ͳ0.00867
[0.0381] [0.0371] [0.0384] [0.0379] [0.0388] [0.0373] [0.0364] [0.0373] [0.0369] [0.0370]
wage_fu 0.175* 0.181* 0.168* 0.174* 0.190* 0.175* 0.173* 0.172* 0.171* 0.172*
[0.0951] [0.0936] [0.0977] [0.0925] [0.0950] [0.0963] [0.0981] [0.0987] [0.101] [0.0985]
wage_fr Ͳ0.0764 Ͳ0.0758 Ͳ0.0771 Ͳ0.0765 Ͳ0.0749 Ͳ0.0773 Ͳ0.0657 Ͳ0.062 Ͳ0.0552 Ͳ0.0627
[0.104] [0.104] [0.106] [0.105] [0.104] [0.106] [0.107] [0.109] [0.109] [0.106]
price_index 0.0877 0.0296 0.167 0.101 Ͳ0.0664 0.102 0.00947 Ͳ0.0195 Ͳ0.0734 Ͳ0.0137
[0.191] [0.258] [0.323] [0.344] [0.272] [0.187] [0.218] [0.255] [0.242] [0.216]
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
RͲsquared 0.092 0.079 0.09 0.081 0.009 0.092 0.058 0.091 0.022 0.027
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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Table A22: Eect on Birthweight ENDS
EffectofHCParticipationonChild'sbirthweightUsinglinearandnonlinearIVͲENDS
 1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES OLS.DHS OLS.DHS NonͲLinearIV:Capacity.DHS NonͲLinearIV:Capacity.DHS LinearIV:Capacity.DHS LinearIV:Capacity.DHS
exposure 0.00695 Ͳ0.249 Ͳ1.558*
[0.0812] [0.402] [0.872]
asis_hc Ͳ0.0101 Ͳ0.0553 Ͳ0.875*
[0.0287] [0.169] [0.515]
female Ͳ0.127*** Ͳ0.128*** Ͳ0.128*** Ͳ0.128*** Ͳ0.132*** Ͳ0.136***
[0.0225] [0.0224] [0.0226] [0.0223] [0.0252] [0.0267]
age_m 0.00116 0.0014 0.00217 0.00225 0.00731 0.0176*
[0.00287] [0.00289] [0.00338] [0.00456] [0.00452] [0.0103]
age_m2 Ͳ1.10EͲ05 Ͳ1.28EͲ05 Ͳ1.47EͲ05 Ͳ1.95EͲ05 Ͳ3.39EͲ05 Ͳ0.000143
[4.50eͲ05] [4.49eͲ05] [4.57eͲ05] [5.51eͲ05] [4.78eͲ05] [9.52eͲ05]
ln_age_h Ͳ0.0451 Ͳ0.0461 Ͳ0.0495 Ͳ0.0494 Ͳ0.0718 Ͳ0.110*
[0.0431] [0.0433] [0.0430] [0.0434] [0.0484] [0.0605]
ln_age_m 0.0303 0.0298 0.0216 0.0278 Ͳ0.0228 Ͳ0.00947
[0.0853] [0.0848] [0.0876] [0.0865] [0.0903] [0.0955]
height_mot 1.226*** 1.227*** 1.237*** 1.234*** 1.290*** 1.366***
[0.216] [0.215] [0.216] [0.216] [0.241] [0.266]
ln_order 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.101***
[0.0330] [0.0328] [0.0333] [0.0328] [0.0344] [0.0374]
edu_m_b 0.252** 0.252** 0.259** 0.254** 0.299** 0.288**
[0.0978] [0.0982] [0.101] [0.0995] [0.128] [0.131]
edu_m_c 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.297*** 0.294*** 0.332** 0.346**
[0.0998] [0.100] [0.102] [0.101] [0.130] [0.142]
edu_h_b Ͳ0.078 Ͳ0.0784 Ͳ0.0791 Ͳ0.0792 Ͳ0.0845 Ͳ0.0931
[0.0519] [0.0519] [0.0516] [0.0526] [0.0516] [0.0595]
edu_h_c Ͳ0.0806 Ͳ0.0816 Ͳ0.0819 Ͳ0.0824 Ͳ0.0884 Ͳ0.0967
[0.0666] [0.0666] [0.0671] [0.0675] [0.0708] [0.0778]
pipe 0.0799 0.0796 0.0727 0.0786 0.0361 0.0598
[0.111] [0.111] [0.113] [0.111] [0.125] [0.124]
sewage Ͳ0.0748 Ͳ0.0737 Ͳ0.0693 Ͳ0.0747 Ͳ0.0414 Ͳ0.0934
[0.132] [0.132] [0.135] [0.132] [0.156] [0.164]
numchildren Ͳ0.00213 Ͳ0.0024 Ͳ0.00158 Ͳ0.00253 0.00124 Ͳ0.0049
[0.0108] [0.0108] [0.0112] [0.0108] [0.0133] [0.0117]
altitud 0.205* 0.204* 0.203* 0.203* 0.19 0.196
[0.120] [0.120] [0.121] [0.120] [0.136] [0.140]
altitud2 Ͳ0.0763 Ͳ0.0759 Ͳ0.0758 Ͳ0.0761 Ͳ0.0731 Ͳ0.0794
[0.0513] [0.0512] [0.0513] [0.0510] [0.0576] [0.0596]
sisben2 0.0261 0.026 0.0236 0.0248 0.0108 0.0024
[0.0526] [0.0524] [0.0518] [0.0518] [0.0514] [0.0529]
sisben3 0.0232 0.0234 0.0208 0.0212 0.00864 Ͳ0.0182
[0.0573] [0.0573] [0.0564] [0.0562] [0.0583] [0.0616]
Observations 2093 2097 2093 2097 2093 2097
RͲsquared 0.076 0.076 0.071 0.075  
Robuststandarderrorsinbrackets,***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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